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In this paper

I

examine the nature of the relationship between

arguing for the centrality of the role of art
reality

which

is

the

human

world.

1

in the creation

and

art

reality,

and cognition of the shared

support this argument through reference to the

developing discipline of psychoanalysis, specifically considering three “stages” of
psychoanalysis: classic Freudian psychoanalysis, ego psychology, and object relations

theory.

I

take the position that if we are to reap the

of psychoanalysis as
psychoanalysis as

it

may

we do any

other growing

body of theory, recognizing

may be

applicability

by advances based on new evidence.

this end,

I

benefit of the explanatory

be applied to an understanding of aesthetics,

formulations

To

full

we must

power
treat

that initial

transformed, superceded, or restricted to a circumscribed area of

examine

classic Freudian psychoanalysis in terms

of concepts such

as conscious/unconscious, repression, instinctual derivatives, primary and secondary

process functioning, condensation and displacement, phantasy, symptom, and dream.
also consider the development of the psychoanalytic techniques of free association,

transference analysis, and interpretation.

I

look

VI

at

ego psychology

in

terms of the

I

mechanisms of defense,

the fomiation of the superego, adaptation, the “conflict free

sphere of ego functioning,” and “regression in service of the ego.”
relations theory in terms of Melanie Klein’s inner and outer reality,
transitional space,

tie

object

D.W. Winnicott’s

and the elaboration of world and self through mechanisms of

identification, introjection, projection,

I

And I examine

and regression

each of the psychoanalytic theories

the psychoanalytic premises, and

I

to

dependence.

to a theory

of aesthetics developed from

provide concrete examples through interpretations of

Hamlet based on each of the

three aesthetic theories.

relations theory grounds the

most robust theory of aesthetics, one which supports the

I

conclude that Winnicott’s object

centrality of the role of art in our constitution of our selves

vii

and our world.
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INTRODUCTION

In the Republic, Plato raises

of the relationship between
argues that

art

art

some

complex

interesting and

and the individual personality and

issues about the nature

its

grasp of

reality.

appeals to the appetitive and emotional aspects of the personality

expense of the

rational,

natural world,

is at

and

that art, as imitative

of the objects of appearance

three’

removes from the

intelligible world.

Art

thus doubly dangerous, in the

incorrect balance

among

and prevents the

intellect

is

reality represented

first

at

He

the

in the

by the fomis of the

place because

the parts of the soul, and in the second because

it

it

promotes an

acts as a

decoy

from focusing on the true objects of cognition which are

attainable only through reason.

Though we have

since Plato’s time developed a

more

sophisticated understanding of both the nature of reality and the nature of human

psychology,

art.

we

are

still

influenced by a

The perpetually recumng

number of his assumptions about

issue of censorship attests to a lingering fear that

through a tendency to circumvent

critical

thought,

social stability; simultaneously, the tendency to

not only in the popular educational slogan,

secondary role of aesthetics

in

the nature of

may be

view

“Back

art,

subversive of individual or

art as less

than essential

is

reflected

to the Basics,” but also in the

departments of philosophy where metaphysics and

epistemology have traditionally held pride of place.

What

is

the nature of the relationship

be objects of cognition appealing

to

between

art

our rational selves

'Three removes because the Greeks counted the
series.

at

and reality? Can objects of art
the

first

same time

that they appeal

as well as the last term ol a

to

our aesthetic and desiring selves? In

discipline of psychoanalysis as

of the relationship between

art

it

which

is

dissertation

will look at the developing

and the human personality and
of art

in the creation

its

grasp of reality, and

1

and cognition of the shared

the intersubjective world.

Freud analyzed the symptoms presented by
interpretive theory

The obsession

I

has reflected a number of positions regarding the nature

will argue for the centrality of the role

reality

my

which made sense of their

his neurotic patients

illness as the expression

and developed an

of repressed desire.

or hysteria which manifested itself in a bewildering array of

incomprehensible behavior yielded

to a

complex process of translation which read

backwards from the surface presentation

to the

hidden wish. Freud argued

that the

same

process which provided the key to understanding the hysteric’s symptoms and the
obsessive’s compulsions could be applied to dreams, to slips of the tongue and pen, to
jokes, even to works of

art.

He saw

the language of rational discourse as constantly

disrupted by an archaic “primary” thought process which

was driven by

desire,

found

identity in similarity, substituted part for whole, operated in an eternal present, and spoke

in

symbols.

For Freud, the great foundational event
successful resolution of the Oedipus complex.

in the constitution

He saw

of the self was the

the renunciation of the desire to

sexually possess the mother through the internalization of the father’s prohibition as the

source of civilized

human

behavior, while the lingering conflicts of an unresolved

Oedipus complex provided the basis

for neurotic illness.

Freud’s insights have proved to be extraordinarily

humankind moves

in a

world ot meaning which

2

is

rich.

The argument

that

mediated by repressed desire has both

complemented and undercut

knowing

subject.

temis of a

the rationalist agenda with

After Freud,

we

its

emphasis on man as the

think not only in tenns of external “reality,” but also

in

psychic reality” comprised of a complex interaction between past and
present,

between what
In the

is

given and what

is

remembered and

work of psychoanalysts

after Freud,

desired.

however, a new

set

lead to a corresponding sophistication of psychoanalytic theory.

A

of the mechanisms of defense and the role of adaptation has lead

to a

of clinical data has

clearer understanding

new

appreciation of

the complexity of ego functioning. In addition, the analysis of children and the analysis

of psychotics

(whom Freud had

considered beyond the reach of his therapy) have

revealed the importance of pre-oedipal issues which

complex merely one of a number of events

in

my

dissertation

I

will argue that if

explanatory power of psychoanalysis as

of aesthetics,

we must

it

the resolution of the Oedipal

an ongoing process through which the self

continually defines and redefines itself in relation to

In

make

we

its

objects.

are to reap the full benefit of the

may be

applied to understanding of the nature

not stop with Freud. Rather,

do any other growing body of theory, recognizing

we must

treat

psychoanalysis as

that initial fonmilations

may

we

be

transfonned, superseded, or restricted to a circumscribed area of applicability by

advances based on new evidence.
Specifically,

1

will structure

paradigm of psychoanalysis

my

argument according

to

Norman N.

as falling historically into three phases

through the polarities which psychoanalysts use to explain events.

Holland’s

which can be defined

The

first

phase (1897-

1923) finds the most important distinction to be that between conscious and unconscious,
the second (beginning in 1923) that between ego and non-ego, and the third (beginning

3

around 1950)
in clinical

that

between

self

evidence which give

and

not-self.^

rise to

new

Each of these phases grows out of advances

theoretical fomuilations.

Each, rather than

simply replacing an earlier phase, builds on what went before and extends
the range of

phenomena

to

which psychoanalytic theory may address

itself.

1

will attempt to explore

the relevancy of these advances within psychoanalysis proper to the creation
of a

psychoanalytic theory of aesthetics which supports the centrality of the role of art

in

our

constitution of our selves and our world.

Chapter One

Although Freud was fascinated by the mutual

light

which psychoanalysis and

works of art could shed upon one another, he never developed
based on his

new

on

science. Instead, his writings

art

a full aesthetic theory

and the creative processes may be

read as a series of explorations, tentative but promising. Perhaps even

Freud never applied his

later theoretic elaborations

mature psychology of the ego
psychic

to

more

significantly,

which eventually contributed

to a

an understanding of the place of works of art within

life.

In

Chapter

1,

1

work through Freud’s

will

early contributions to a theory of

aesthetics and try to define both the positive aspects and the limitations of this classical

psychoanalytic approach.

I

will structure

much of this

introductory material through

reference to the inteipretation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet advanced by Freud and further

elucidated by Ernest Jones.

richly fruitful,

is

I

will argue that the classical approach, while in

ultimately incomplete. Because

^Norman N.

Flolland, Ilollaml’s

Literature-aml-Psycholog\>,

Guide

is

based on a naive understanding of

to Psyclioanalytie Psychology’

(New York; Oxford
4

it

some ways

University Press, 1990),

ami

p. 5.

the nature of reality,

may be

it

leaves important dimensions of even those art works to which

applied either unexplained or only trivially explained, and

criticism that

it

has no applicability

music. In conclusion,

I

approach

may

to aesthetics

psychoanalysis

at all to

in

Freud’s

later

to the

or to pure

will suggest that these limitations ot a classical psychoanalytic

be overcome by appeal

Chapter

2,

art

open

to

advances within the

field

of

advances which make possible a new kind of psychoanalytic

itself,

Chapter

further,

nonrepresentational fonns of

theorizing about creative processes and works of

In

is,

it

I

will

art.

Two

examine those implications

work, especially as that work

is

for a theory

of aesthetics implicit

developed by the ego psychologists. The

exploration of the unconscious ego and the mechanisms of defense, the theorization of an

“autonomous” sphere of ego functioning, and
redirection of sexual energy from

its

the understanding of sublimation as a

instinctual

transfomiation of the ego taken as a whole,

all

aims and objects

significantly

to the elaboration

advance the potential of

psychoanalysis to provide the basis for a sophisticated aesthetic theory.

I

will illustrate

these advances with a discussion of Nomian N. Holland’s treatment of Hamlet, and

argue

that,

while these developments, fimily based

theorization, take us far

first

beyond

and

in clinical practice

I

will

and careful

the aesthetic fomuilations possible under psychoanalysis’

phase, they are yet inadequate, both in tenns of their ability to completely theorize

the significance of works of art and in terms of their failure to capitalize on the

of explanatory power available through reference
theory.

5

to the “third

full

range

phase” of psychoanalytic

Chapter Three
In

Chapter

3,

I

will turn to “third-phase” psyehoanalysis as
exemplified in the

work of D.W. Winnicott, an

object relations theorist, pediatrician, and psychoanalyst

practiced during the period between 1923 and 1971. Winnicott

known

alliance

part of the loose

as the independent group of the British Psycho-Analytical Society.

independent group consisted of those analysts
either of the

was

who

who

The

refused to align themselves with

two factions (one lead by Anna Freud, the other by Melanie Klein)

that

struggled to dominate the British Psycho-Analytical Society during the 1940s.

Both Anna Freud and Melanie Klein used
different positions

tradition

their

work with children

to stake out

on basic psychoanalytic concepts. Anna Freud worked within the

of the classical psychoanalysis and the ego psychologists and sought

to elaborate

her father’s schema of genetic psychosexual stages of development, paying particular
attention to the defense

more

mechanisms of the developing ego. Melanie Klein professed

radical allegiance to

death instinct as

it

was

Sigmund Freud

in her reinterpretation

a

of his concept of the

reflected in the child’s fantasy life and played itself out within the

psychoanalytic transference. These theoretical differences lead to differences

in

technique, and each faction sought to control the training through which theory and

technique were transmitted. This

split

within the Society

1944 through a compromise engineered by Sylvia Payne
within two training courses.

An “A”

came

to

an uneasy resolution

that established three

in

groups

group, associated with Melanie Klein, and a “B”

group associated with Anna Freud, each controlled major aspects of training within the
Society, while a third group of nonaligned analysts

control a training program of their own.

worked with both groups but did not

The members of this nonaligned or “middle”

6

group

(later

known

as the Independent Tradition), while fully cognizant
of the theoretical

femient which swirled around them, emphasized an eclectic and
empirical approach, and

found their main focus of interest

in the relationship

of the subject

to its objects.

within this context that third-phase psychoanalysis developed, and

among

It

was

the

Independents of the middle group, Winnicott has gradually assumed a preeminent
position.

Because third-phase psychoanalysis remains

less well explicated as a coherent

theory than does either classical psychoanalysis or ego psychology,

1

will devote this

chapter to an exploration of Winnicott’s work, to the end of analyzing

its

applicability to

a theory of aesthetics in Chapter 4.

I

have chosen Winnicott as an exemplar of third-phase psychoanalysis

number of reasons. The

first is that

for a

historically he provides a synthesis of Freudian and

Kleinian insights, while theoretically advancing both. Influenced by the ego

psychologists and their postulation of a conflict-free sphere of ego functioning and by the
object relations theory of Melanie Klein, Winnicott’s main focus of attention

understanding of the

way

in

became

which an individual creatively connects inner psychic

with an external intersubjectively experienced world.

I

the

reality

have also chosen Winnicott

because of the particularly close connection between observation and theory which
characterizes his thought.

As

a practicing pediatrician, Winnicott

met

in consultation

with over 60,000 mother/infant pairs throughout his career; as a psychoanalyst, he

worked not only with neurotics but
an Linanalyzable.

When

also with the psychotics

reading Winnicott, one

is

whom

never very

far

Freud had dismissed

from the

clinical

practice and a real patient or analysand. All too often, attempts to derive literary or

7

aesthetic theories from psychoanalysis piggy-back theory

upon speculation and end up

with a body of work grounded in nothing but abstract thought.
With Winnicott, one

remains empirically grounded.

A

further consideration

is

that Winnicott’s

well in the light of current empirical infant studies (see, for example,
the

work holds up

work of Daniel

Stem).

Finally, Winnicott

s

work has proven

to

be especially rich

in

implications for a

transfomiational psychoanalytic aesthetics. Winnicott theorizes a period of “primary

maternal preoccupation

during which the mother provides a “holding environment” and

adapts the world to the infant’s needs and resulting fantasies in such a
fantasies are

met with

a

matching

the externally existing world.

is

It

way

the infant’s

reality

producing the illusion that the infant has created

is in this

period of “absolute dependence” that the infant

introduced to the world, not in desperation following the failure of hallucination to

provide the necessary satisfaction of need, but through the ministrations of the “good

enough” mother who

sets the stage for a creative relationship to a reality that is

intersubjectively negotiated.

The

stage of primary maternal preoccupation gives

disillusionment for which weaning provides the paradigm.

ego becomes strong enough
in a

panicked reaction

to

to

to a gradual deliberate

As

the infant’s developing

withstand the impingements of reality without losing

them, the mother gradually allows the infant

with a world that does not support
the infant and through adult

reality

way

life,

its

omnipotent

illusions.

a “potential space”

to interact directly

There remains, however,

for

which supports a blending of psychic

with the external world and which becomes the basis for

creative scientific thought, and creative living in general.

8

itself

art,

religion, culture,

Chapter 3 will be devoted
Winnicott’s work including,

to a detailed explication

among

others,

of the central concepts within

“psyche-soma,” “impingement,” “primary

maternal preoccupation,” the “good enough mother,” the “facilitating”
or “holding”

environment, “potential space,” “transitional object,” “false self’ and “true
regression to dependence.

from

clinical experience

I

will

pay special attention

and techmcjue and

how

to

how

and

self,”

these concepts derive

they contribute to a coherent theory of

psychic functioning.

Chapter Four
In

Chapter

4,

1

will use the Chapter 3 explication of

Winnicotf s thought

as the

basis for the construction of a “third-phase” psychoanalytic theory of aesthetics. While

was most concerned with

“first-phase” psychoanalysis

and unconscious, and “second-phase” psychoanalysis
“third-phase” psychoanalysis

is

the polarity

that

between conscious

between ego and non-ego,

most concerned with the polarity between

self

and not-

self

In broad outline,

split

one

may

between “inner” and “outer”

say that within Winnicott’s thought there

reality,

is

no

radical

but rather a continuum between the objective

and subjective which allows the creation of the symbolic and intersubjective world. And
there

is

no radical

split

between

rational, discursive thought

and fantasy, but rather a

continuum which includes the kind of playful imaginative creation which
of art and

scientific theories.

Reality

is

not imposed on the psyche, nor

product of human thought. Instead the psyche
finds and in part creates

is

connected

and which becomes the ground

9

for

to a

is

results in

it

works

merely a

world which

it

in part

meaningful existence.

In this

chapter,

I

will attempt to

make

concrete and detailed the vision of aesthetics

made

possible by Winnicottian psychoanalysis.

Chapter Five
In

in

Chapter

5,

1

will offer a concrete application

of the aesthetic theory developed

Chapter 4 through a reading of Hamlet which interprets the play as being about the

boundaries between self and world and the
SLibjectively negotiated through culture

language

in a

ability

of language

to

that those

boundaries are

and language. Hamlet

world where potential space

example of the

way

is

inter-

about the failure of

is

denied, and the play

is itself

a paradigmatic

transcend interpsychic boundaries in the creation of

a meaningful intersubjective world.

This reading of Hamlet does not replace earlier psychoanalytic readings.

add significantly

to

does

our understanding of why the play has held such a preeminent

position within the canon of Western literature, and

it

arises

which not only enriches our understanding of Hamlet, but
nonrepresentational

It

art

and pure music. Most important,

from an aesthetic theory

also allows us to understand

it

demonstrates a sophisticated

conception of the nature of reality and of the place of aesthetics

10

in its creation.

CHAPTER

1

ART AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
When Sigmund
considered

phenomena

What

the

it

to

Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams

be the key statement of a unified theory of mind which could explain

as diverse as the neurotic’s

young neurologist had

the mentally

ill

he

in 1899,

had shown

first

itself in

he would apply the same analysis

symptoms and

encountered

the dreamer’s night-time fantasies.

in the bizarre beliefs

another guise within his

to

own

dreams. In a bold

works of art. Symptom, dream,

yielded to a single explanatory scheme. Thirty years

later, in

and behavior of

move

artistic creation-all

the preface to the Third

(Revised) English Edition of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud would affimi the work

without reservation:

“It contains,

valuable of all the discoveries

falls to

one’s

lot

but once in a

Freud’s work
the core of

is

it

even according

has been

to

my good

my present-day judgement,

the

most

fortune to make. Insight such as this

lifetime.’’'

not easily simplified, but

at its

heart

is

the insight

The Interpretation of Dreams. “[A] dream’’ wrote Freud,

which

“is a (disguised)

fulfillment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish.’’^ Implicit in this definition

'Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams,

lies at

(First Part), in

is

the notion

The Standard

Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. IV, ed. James
Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson

(London: Hogarth Press, 1953), xxxii. (All references
Standard Edition, hereafter SE).
^Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams,

SE

to

IV, 160.

Freud’s work will be from the

of dynamic unconscious thought— thought which
nevertheless infomis one

dreamer

s

s

banished from consciousness yet

behavior, beliefs, fears, and motivations. Just as the

unconscious thoughts make their

dreams, Freud

is

way

(albeit in disguised fashion) into his

patients not only had thoughts of which they

s

were unaware, those

thoughts were manifested in the bewildering array of symptoms which so
often

dominated

their lives.

Through

trial

and

error,

Freud found he was able

the unconscious thoughts motivating

association. This technique,

to

them by employing

connect these symptoms

to

the technique of free

which became the “fundamental rule” of psychoanalysis,

required the patient to act as an “attentive and dispassionate self-observ^er” reporting with
absolute honesty whatever

irrelevant.

after the

came

to

mind, no matter

how

unpleasant,

trivial,

or seemingly

Such associations produced a mass of material which was often revealed only

overcoming of great resistance or with obvious gaps

in the associative process.

Listening to these revelations with an “evenly suspended attention”

(i.e.,

without

reflection or consciously constructed expectations), Freud found that the patient’s

associations

short step

emerged

from there

“like allusions ... to

one particular theme” and
guess

to the physician’s ability to

at

that

it

was only

a

the unconscious wishes hidden

from the patient himself.^

Applying the technique he had developed
the neurotic’s

symptoms, Freud was able

to

make

for uncovering the

sense of his

own

hidden meaning of

dreams, discovering

repressed wishes which sought a disguised, hallucinatory fulfillment while he

^Freud,

“Two Encyclopedia

Articles” in

12

SE

XVllI, 238-39.

slept.

Similarly, Freud argued, the compelling nature of many
in

works of art could be explained

terms of their appeal to powerful unconscious wishes/
It is

this idea

analysis, with

act

of the dynamic unconscious which

“dynamic”

is

the bedrock of all psycho-

referring to the acting out of what

of repression. That the human mind

is

is

repressed as well as to the

best understood as an interplay of interactive

forces— some available to consciousness and some actively barred from consciousness— is

Freud

s

central insight.

And

the development of free association as the technique for

uncovering what has been banished from consciousness

is

one of his most important

achievements.
Freud’s exploration of the great dichotomy between conscious and unconscious

thought and the formulation of his findings occupied him for more than twenty-five
years.

Nomian N. Holland

“classical” psychoanalysis.^

has referred to this period (1897-1923) as “first-phase” or

It

was during these years

^Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams,

SE

^Norman N. Holland, Holland’s Guide

to

that

Freud consolidated his ideas

IV, 261-266.

Psychoanalytie Psychology^ and

Literature-and-Psycholog}’, 5-8. Holland describes “psyehoanalysis as having evolved in
three chronological phases: a psychology of the unconscious (1897-1923), ego

psychology (1923-

),

and a psychology of the self (c. 1950-

).”

Arguing

that

one can

“define these phases by the polarity psychoanalytic thinkers use to explain events,”
Holland sees first-phase psychoanalysis as contrasting conscious and unconscious,

second-phase psychoanalysis as contrasting ego and non-ego, and third-phase
psychoanalysis as opposing self and non-self “More whimsically,” he adds, “you could
contrast these three phases by the parts of speech they would make the word unconscious
into.

In the first phase,

it

was an

adjective but also a noun, referring to a thing, a system,

or even a place-a sort of bin-in the brain. In the second phase, when Freud announced
that ‘unconscious’ was only descriptive, the word became an adjective and only an

Now, one major theorist (Schaefer) has ingeniously
word has become an adverb-we should think of the whole person

adjective, as in ‘unconscious ego.’

suggested that the

doing

this or that

unconsciously.”
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about the nature of unconscious thought, advanced
his theory regarding the psychosexual
stages of development, and refined the technique of
free association as the

which the unconscious

is

revealed. In this chapter,

psychoanalysis and the contribution

this

I

will

examine

means by

first-phase

psychoanalytic position can

make

to a theory

of

aesthetics.

Freud’s psychoanalytic theory was informed by a wide variety of disparate
sources. First

left

was an education both

gymnasium having learned

French, and English.

He was

scientifically rigorous

six languages: his native

Italian

Greek and Latin

translation, mathematics,

cum laude

age of 17 and was admitted

at the

Gemian, Hebrew,

Fie

Latin, Greek,

thoroughly familiar with Shakespeare and the German

and had taught himself to read

classics

and broadly humanistic.

and Spanish. Passing examinations

in

and German composition, he graduated
to the University

of Vienna

to

summa

study

medicine.*’

At the University of Vienna, Freud was able
chemistry, and physics

at

at

anatomy, physiology,

one of the preeminent medical schools

supplementing the medical curriculum with
years

to study

interests

in

Europe while

of his own. During his

first

three

the university, in addition to his medical studies Freud read philosophy with

Franz Brentano and took courses

in botany, physics,

and mineralogy. He studied

“Biology and Darwinism” with the zoologist Carl Claus, a committed Darwinist who had

been brought

to the university to

modernize

^Ernest Jones, The Formative Years

lof The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud

its

zoology department, and he went on

ami

the Great Discoveries 1856-1900, vol.

(New York: Basic Books,
14

to

Inc., 1981), 20-21.

take a

number of zoology courses with

the Zoological Experimental Station

In the

which Claus had established

autumn of 1876, Freud narrowed

accepted as a research scholar

Brucke, along with Emil

founding

Claus, eventually winning two grants for study

at

at Trieste.’

his studies to medical subjects

and was

Ernest Briicke’s prestigious Institute of Physiology.

Du Bois-Reymond, Hemian

member of the group of physicists and

discredit the theory of vitalism

at

and

Helmholtz, and Carl Ludwig, was a

physiologists

institute in its place a

who

set out in the

1840s

view of the living organism

to

as a

physical-chemical entity properly investigated through a reliance on the same physical-

mathematical methods one would use

to study nonliving entities.

The four founders of

the Helmholtz School

German physiology, which

at that

time was the

874),

which Freud

were leaders

world.*
most advanced

in the

*

in

Brucke’s Lectures on Physiology’

( 1

greatly admired, applies the notion of the conservation of energy to living organisms and
offers an “elaborate presentation of what

and interplay of physical forces
scientific orientation,

in the exacting

was

in the living

Brucke was also an

at

the time

known about

the transfonnation

organism.”^ In line with this materialist

evolutionist.

Freud, a gifted researcher, thrived

atmosphere of Briicke’s laboratory, publishing a number of studies on the

histology of nerve cells. After six years

at

the Institute, Freud

had thoroughly absorbed

Brucke’s teaching on the function and anatomy of the nervous system and was poised

’Jones, Life

and Work,

vol.

1,

36-38.

Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education and Its Influence on
Psychoanalytic Theory” in Psychological Issues, vol. 14, No. 4, Monograph 16 (New
*Peter

York: International Universities Press,
‘’Jones,

Life

and Works,

Inc., 1965), 9.

vol. 1,41.
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for

a career in the vanguard of neurological research.

impractical, however, and in the

rotations at the

summer of

Vienna General Hospital

Such a career proved

to

be financially

1881, Freud reluctantly began clinical

in preparation for private practice in the

treatment of nervous system disorders.

After a two-month surgical rotation and six and one-half months as
Aspirant
(clinical assistant)

under Hermann Nothnagel"

in Internal

Medicine, Freud was named

Sekundardrzte (a sort of combination Resident and Registrar)

Theodore Meynert. Meynert was generally considered
of his day and 1,400
cures; patients

to 1,600 patients a year

were diagnosed and

and then sent

to alleviate

under

be the greatest brain anatomist

passed through his

classified

whieh generally consisted of an attempt

to

in Psychiatry

clinic.

There were no

to other clinics for treatment

symptoms through

electric

massage,

hot or cold baths, or bromide drugs. Freud spent ten hours a day with patients and

another two in the laboratory where he continued his anatomical study of the nervous

system through dissection of the medulla oblongata of infant brains. His psychiatric

was completed

rotation

lab for a

in

number of years.

where he was able

only five months, but he was to continue his work

His next rotation was as Sekundardrzte

to study the

in

in

Meynarf s

Dermatology

important connection between syphilis and disorders of

“’Freud remained in Briicke’s laboratory for a year after obtaining his medical
degree. See Jones, Life

and Work,

vol. 1, 58-59.

"Nothnagel had just arrived from Germany to occupy the Chair of Medicine at
the University. In that capacity and as head of the Division of Internal Medicine at the
General Hospital, Nothnagel had great prestige and influence. Freud secured his position
through the help of Theodore Meynert. See Jones, Life and Work vol. 1, 63-64.
,

"Jones, Life and Work, vol.

work and influence on Freud,

1,

65.

For a more detailed exposition of Meynert’s

see also Amacher, Freud’s Neurological Education, 21-41.

16

the nervous system.

Sekundardrzte

After three months

in

Dermatology, Freud became a junior

“Fourth Department,” a catch-all for baffling diseases,

in the

them pathologies of the nervous system. He worked
months encountering

patients with

in this

many of

department for fourteen

kinds of injuries, muscular atrophies, brain tumors,

all

meningitis, convulsions, sensory disturbances, and hysteria. While immersed in this
rich
clinical

environment, Freud published three case studies on organic nervous diseases, and

also found time to continue his anatomical

rotations,

one

in

Ophthalmology and

work

in

Meynert’s

lab.‘'^

Two more

short

a second stint in Dermatology'^ completed the

formal medical education that had taken Freud thirteen years to

In

finish.

September

of 1885, on the basis of his publications and the recommendations of Briicke, Meynert,

and Nothnagel, he was awarded the coveted

title

of Privatdocent

While Freud’s psychoanalytic theorizing would go
training he

had received

at the

University of Vienna,

'^Jones, Life

and Work,

vol. 1, 65-66.

'“^Jones, Life

and Work,

vol.

‘^Jones, Life

and Work,

vol. 1, 73.

'^Jones, Life

and Work,

vol.

1,

1,

it

far

beyond

the medical

was nevertheless

the early

67-69.

70-72. According to Jones, the rank of

Privatdocent allowed Freud to hold classes
public recognition of special competence.

at the

Few

University of Vienna and guaranteed

such positions were granted, and the

stringent requirements for appointment included evidence of “independent, original, and

valuable achievements as documented by a considerable number of publications.” The

committee recommendation (written by Briicke, but signed by all three)
following papers in support of their endorsement: “The Posterior Roots

cited the

Petromyzon”
Anatomical

in

“A New Method for
Preparations of the Central Nervous System” (1879), “A Histological Method for the
Study of Brain Tracts” (1884), “A Case of Cerebral Hemorrhage” (1884), “On Coca”

(1877-1878), “The Nerve Cells

in

Crayfish” (1882),

(1884), and “Structure of the Elements of the Nervous System” (1884).
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physicalist and Darwinian perspectives that provided
the

psychoanalytic explorations.
writes tellingly of the

The

framework

In his 1915 paper, “Instincts

method employed

and

for his

their Vicissitudes,”

Freud

of a new science;

in the creation

true beginning of scientific activity consists ... in

phenomena and then in proceeding to group,
and correlate them. Even at the stage of description

describing
classify

not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to
the material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other
it

is

new observations alone. Such
become the basic concepts of the

but certainly not from the

ideas-which will
science-are

worked

later

more indispensable as the material is further
They must at first necessarily possess some

still

over.

degree of indefiniteness; there can be no question of any
clear delimitation of their content. So long as they remain
in this condition,

we come

to

an understanding about their

meaning by making repeated references to the material of
observation from which they appear to have been derived,
but upon which, in fact, they have been imposed. Thus,
strictly speaking,

they are in the nature of conventions-

although everything depends on their not being arbitrarily

chosen but determined by

having significant relations

their

to the empirical material, relations that

before

It is

in this sense that

we

we seem

to sense

can clearly recognize and demonstrate them.'^

Freud’s early training came to provide a scaffolding for his

psychoanalytic theory.

Flis

observations would take place within the realm of psychology

rather than that of neurons and synapses, but the shape of Freud’s theory

comes from

his

deep understanding of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system.
Freud’s medical education had been deficient

few

specialists in the clinical study

department

in

in

of nervous diseases

which he could receive such

training.

one regard, however. There were
in

Vienna

at that

The student of nervous

therefore forced to put together a course of study distributed across a

‘^Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” in

18

time, and no one

SE XIV,

117.

diseases

was

number of different

departments, none of them with a primary interest

Freud’s dream to study

at

in his subject.'*

It

had long been

the Salpetriere with Jean-Martin Charcot, the famous
French

professor of neuropathology,'^ and, just prior to completion of his medical
studies

in

Vienna, Freud applied for and was awarded a travel grant that would allow him

do

The

grant permitted

for seventeen

him

to

spend October

weeks he attended

13,

lectures and

1885

to

February 28, 1886

accompanied Charcot on

to

in Paris

so.^°

where

his rounds at the

Salpetriere.^'

The

Salpetriere,

which served

as a residential hospital for elderly

women

afflicted

with incurable diseases (many of them of nervous origin), provided Charcot with the
opportunity to study patients for periods of time that extended over

many

relate his clinical studies to anatomical studies after their deaths.

Freud was

'*Freud,

'^Frank

“An
J.

Autobiographical Study”

11.

the height of the varied medical career that had led

of neurology, and his stature
(p. 28).

in

famous Salpetriere”

him

to the study

French medicine was equaled only by that of the great

Sulloway also points out

neurologist in the late nineteenth century studied
the

SE XX,

later to

Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind, Beyond the Psychoanalytic
Inc., Publishers: New York, 1983), 28-35. “Jean-Martin Charcot

Legend (Basic Books,
(1825-93) was then at
Louis Pasteur”

in

years and to

that “almost every
at

prominent French

one time or another under Charcot

at

(29).

My Studies in Paris and Berlin” in SE I, 3. The
was awarded by the College of Professors in the Faculty of Medicine
University of Vienna and was accompanied by a six-month leave of absence.
^°See Editor’s Note to “Report on

grant of 600 florins
at

the

was merely one of a large group until
his offer to translate Charcot’s new volume of lectures into Gennan was accepted and
brought him into Charcot’s “circle of personal acquaintances” (“An Autobiographical
^'Freud reports that, as a foreign student, he

Study”

inSEXX,

12).

^^Freud, “Paris Report” in

SE

I,

7.

Freud

Charcot’s patience in this regard. “While he was

cites a
still

somewhat macabre example of

a student he [Charcot]

engage a maid-servant who suffered from a peculiar tremor and could not
19

happened

to

find a situation

describe Charcot as “not a reflective man, not
a thinker; he had the nature of an artist-he

was

as he himself said, a ‘visuel \ a

to constantly

man who

observe the same phenomena

been overlooked or misunderstood came
In his

sees.”''

until

Charcot’s method of working was

an understanding of what had previously

to him.

mind’s eye the apparent chaos presented by the

continual repetition of the same
to order; the

new

symptoms then gave way

nosological pictures emerged, characterized

by the constant combination of certain groups of symptoms.
The complete and extreme cases, the ‘types,’ could be brought
into prominence with the help of a certain sort of schematic
planning, and, with these types as a point of departure, the eye
could travel over the long series of ill-defined cases-the ‘formes
fnistes -which, branching off from one or other characteristic
feature of the type, melt away into indistinctness.'"^
In

1

870, Charcot had begun the project of distinguishing the convulsions of

hysteria from those of epilepsy.

Believing that the state of hypnosis was very similar

an attack of hysteria, Charcot hypnotized his hysterical patients

symptoms. Eventually, he succeeded
believed characterized the hysterical

rather than

in describing a

crisis,

to

in order to study their

“lawful” set of symptoms that he

and so established hysteria as a disease

mere malingering." While Charcot had been unable

on account of her clumsiness. Charcot recognized her condition

to

entity

connect the symptoms

as a paralysie

choreifonne, a disease which had already been described by Duchenne, but whose basis

was unknown. Charcot kept this interesting servant, although in the course of the years
she cost him a small fortune in dishes and plates. When at last she died he was able to
demonstrate from her case that paralysie choreifonne was the clinical expression of
multiple cerebro-spinal sclerosis” (“Charcot” in

"Freud, “Charcot”

in

SE

III,

12.

“Charcot”

in

SE

III,

12.

'‘'Freud,

"Freud, “Paris Report”

in

SE

I,

10-12.
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SE

III,

14).

of hysteria with actual lesions
functional or

Charcot

dynamic lesions”

influence, hysteria

s

in the

nervous system, he maintained that there must be

that could not

became

be discovered post-mortem}^ Under

a legitimate area of medical interest.

Charcot had also legitimized the study of hypnosis. In 1882
he delivered a paper

French

to the

Academy of Sciences

testifying to the authenticity of the

endorsing the use of hypnosis as a research tool and

phenomenon. Here,

too, his influence brought about a

resurgence of interest; and, in France, hypnotism became a medically
respectable tool

(though

was

it

By

still

viewed suspiciously

the time of Freud’s visit, Charcot had

sometimes followed a major trauma such
artificially

just as he

German-speaking countries.

in the

begun a study of the paralyses

as a railway accident.^*

He was

that

able to

produce, remove, and modify these paralyses through the use of hypnotism,

had been able

to

provoke and remove the symptoms of the grand hysterical

attack through hypnotism, and he concluded that traumatic paralyses

must be a form of

hysteria. Charcot speculated that naturally occurring traumatic paralyses developed

the stricken person

was

in a state

of auto-hypnosis and that the subsequent paralyses

(which might not become apparent for days or weeks) could be seen as analogous
effect

when

of post-hypnotic suggestion

in his hysterical patients.

to the

Charcot argued that the

“Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor
SE I, 168. In this paper, Freud argues that the “lesion” must be a

^‘’Freud,

Paralyses” in

psychological

phenomenon

^^Freud, “Preface to

rather than a physiological

Bemheim”

in

SE

I,

one (170).

76.

^*Such “traumas” were frequently a matter of law suits for the recovery of
or for insurance claims. It became a matter of controversy as to whether these

damages

traumatic paralyses were a matter of malingering or constituted an actual (psychological)
injury.
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ultimate cause of traumatic paralyses (and
grand hysteria)
the nervous system (a

“dynamic

could be precipitated by ideas
consciousness yet were

lesion”);

that,

and he believed

seemed

a hereditary

that the onset

firmly planted within a second region of the

to support this

weakness of

of symptoms

because of this lesion, remained isolated from nonnal

fashion of parasites” at the time of the trauma.^^
that

was

One

mind”

as in “the

peculiarity of traumatic paralyses

connection between idea and symptom was that the symptoms

of traumatic paralyses were delimited, not by the anatomy of the nervous
system, but by
the layman’s everyday ideas about the body.

When

Freud,

who had glimpsed

the important implications of such a lack of

correspondence between anatomy and symptom, proposed a research project
that not only traumatic paralyses

hysteria as well,

confinn

and grand hysterias, but the symptoms of common

were marked by the same disregard

agreed that this was most probably

He remained convinced

to

true.

for anatomical correctness, Charcot

But the project was of no

that ultimately hysteria

was

a

real interest to him.^°

fomi of degeneracy caused by

hereditary factors;^’ and his primary interest lay not in psychology, but in nosology and

pathological anatomy.^^

^^Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind, 34.
^°See Freud,

Paralyses” in

SE

I,

“Some

Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical

160-72 for Freud’s eventual publication of such a study.

^'Freud, “Hysteria” in

SE

I,

50.

“An Autobiographical Study” in SE XX,
Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena” in SE III, 27-29.
^^Freud,

22

13-14. Also see Freud,

“The

Nevertheless, the time spent with Charcot proved
to be a major turning point in

Freud

s life.

His medical training

anatomical localization.

It

was

changed from neuropathology
hysteria could be found in

in

to

in

Vienna had emphasized nerve functioning and

Charcot’s clinic that the major focus of Freud’s interest

psychopathology.” Charcot’s demonstration

men proved

that the disease

was not

that

the result of a disorder of

female sexual functioning. His discovery that hysteria obeyed lawful
regularities made
a legitimate field of medical investigation.

functioning and the hysteric’s

hysterical

it

The discrepancy between anatomical

symptoms pointed

the

way

to the psychological nature

symptoms. His use of hypnosis not only demonstrated

of

that there could exist

powerful mental processes which nevertheless remained hidden from conscious
awareness, but the technique of hypnosis

itself

provided the

development of Freud’s technique of free association. And,
that

look

Freud learned the habit of careful
at the

same

it

work was very much
in

halting step in the

finally,

clinical observation, or as

it

was from Charcot

he was

to later put

it

“to

things again and again until they themselves begin to speak.’’” This

debt acknowledged,

Back

first

must nevertheless be recognized

his

that Freud’s use

of Charcot’s

own.

Vienna, Freud opened his medical practice, gradually abandoning the

treatment of organic nervous diseases and concentrating instead on patients suffering

”Sigmund
editor’s note

on page

^“^Freud,
is

Freud,

On

“An Autobiographical Study”

in

SE XX,

11-14. See also

9.

the History’ of the Psychoanalytic Movement,

SE XIV,

appropriate to Didier Anzieu’s contention that while Charcot worked

Freud would

move

listening.” (See

to

22. This quote

in “visual space,”

“organize ‘psychoanalytic space’” in terms of “distance and

Freud’s Self-Analysis (London: Hogarth Press and the

Psychoanalysis, 1986), 48.
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Institute for

from neuroses such as

hysteria.^^

There was

little in

the

way of effective

could be offered for such disorders: electrotherapy,
administered
office; a referral to

an

treatment that

in the physician’s

institute offering hydrotherapy; or hypnosis.

Freud soon

discovered, however, that the process of electro-therapy
“had no more relation to reality

than

some ‘Egyptian’

patients away, he

dream-book,”^*^ and, therefore, unless he wished to refer

was forced

to resort to the less

all

of his

orthodox method of hypnosis. Freud

therefore began experimenting with hypnosis, but as he relates in
his autobiographical
study,

from the very first 1 made use of hypnosis in another
manner, apart from hypnotic suggestion. I used it for
.

.

.

questioning the patient upon the origin of his symptom,

which

in his

waking

imperfectly or not

state

he could often describe only very

at all.^^

Freud’s inspiration for using hypnosis in this alternate manner was a case

confided to him by his older colleague and friend, Josef Breuer.
his early years

As

a student and during

of practice, Freud was on intimate temis with Breuer, a prominent

^^Freud actually returned

home

to a dual career.

In addition to his private practice

he became director of the neurological department at the Institute for Children’s Diseases.
Freud remained in this position for many years, spending several hours three times a

week

at the hospital.

including his

first

He

book.

published a number of works on neurology from

On Aphasia: A

Critical Study, in 1891

;

a

this position,

number of articles

WWdiXoV s Encyclopedic Handbook of Medicine between 1888 and 1891; a 220-page
monograph dealing with unilateral paralyses of children, written with Dr. Oscar Rie,

for

in

1891; the 327-page section on “Infantile Cerebral Paralysis” in Nothnagle’s encyclopedia

number of other important articles on the neurological
of children. According to Jones, by 1895 Freud had become “the leading
on the subject of children’s paralyses” (see Life and Work, 212-19).

of medicine
disorders
authority

in

1897; and a

^^Freud,

“An Autobiographical Study”

in

SE XX,

16.

^^Freud,

“An Autobiographical Study”

in

SE XX,

19.
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Viennese physician with a distinguished seiemific
background. Even before Freud’s
to Paris,

Breuer had discussed with him the strange case
of a gifted patient

whom

trip

Breuer

had treated with some success by hypnosis, the case of
“Anna O.”^*

“Anna O.” was
became

ill

after

young woman of twenty-one

in the fall

spending several months caring for her dying

symptoms included
food.

a

of 1880 when she

father.

Her

initial

a gradually increasing state of weakness, anemia, and distaste
for

A severe cough

forced her to give up her post

and she was overcome by the need

at

her father's side in the sickroom,

for rest in the afternoon.

These early symptoms were

the precursors of more severe afflictions, including headache, visual
disturbances,

paralysis of the neck, and contraction and anaesthesia of the right extremities.

There were psychic disturbances as well, with two

becoming more

distinct as her illness progressed.

though depressed and anxious;
around

her,

snakes.

Upon emerging from

in the

In the

states

first,

of consciousness

she appeared nomial,

second, she became angry and abusive to those

and she suffered from hallucinations such as seeing her hair ribbons
these hallucinatory states, she had no

as black

memory of what had

occurred during her altered stated of consciousness, experiencing only an absence or gap
in the

normal flow of consciousness. These absences eventually governed most of her

day, and were broken by only brief periods of normal consciousness which were

themselves increasingly marked by confusion and anxiety. Anna O. suffered also from a
severe deterioration in her ability to use language. At

first

she merely had difficulty

important to note that Breuer did not set out to use hypnosis as a curative
treatment for this patient. Rather, he took advantage of a regularly occurring state of
^*It is

auto-hypnosis into which the patient entered each evening.
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finding the right word," but gradually she
lost

all

sense of grammar and syntax, and her

speech was patched together out of four or five
different languages. For two weeks she

was unable

to

speak

at all,

and when her power of speech returned,

for the first eighteen

months she could speak only English, not her native German.”
Breuer treated Anna O. between 1880 and 1882 through a
method

that

was

arrived at almost accidentally and that the patient herself
called “the talking cure” or

jokingly referred to as “chimney sweeping.”'^'’ During the course
of her

Anna

illness,

O.’s

absences during the day were marked by delirium, hallucinations, and
personality
changes. In the afternoon she became very tired and napped, eventually falling
into a

deep sleep
be
to

that lasted about an

in a state

make

of auto-hypnosis

hour during the early evening.

Upon waking,

she would

that she referred to as “the clouds.” If the doctor

was able

use of her self-induced hypnosis by repeating the phrases that had accompanied

her earlier hallucinations, he was able to stimulate her recall of the details of the
hallucinations which she then put into words. This practice helped to quiet her psychic
distress,

and eventually a similar process was used

each symptom back through
precipitating event, at

its

to alleviate her

every occurrence, the patient eventually arrived

which time the symptom disappeared.

O. showed a remarkable

symptoms. Tracing

memory

for events that

had no place

at the

In this hypnotic state,

in her

nomial

state

Anna

of

consciousness. At one point, she was able, under hypnosis, to “relive” the events of each

day of the preceding year

^^Josef Breuer and

“^^Josef

in chronological order

on the corresponding date of the current

Sigmund Freud, Studies

Breuer and Sigmund Freud, Studies
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Hysteria,

SE

II,

55-62

in Hysteria,

SE

II,

30.

in

year.

It

was possible

for

Breuer

confimi enough of his patient’s memories through

to

independent sourees that he was confident they were
accurate.^' This process was
exhaustively time consuming, but Breuer found that any
attempt to shorten the procedure

by asking the
ineffective.

patient directly about the

He

first

instance of a

also discovered the curious fact that merely

events that eventually produced her

symptoms did not

was only when her memories were accompanied by
with them, that she experienced
Inspired

own

patients,

remembering

Anna

relieve

the treatment

the traumatic

O.’s symptoms.

It

the discharge of the affect associated

relief.''^

by Charcot and

desire to help his

by Breuer’ s strange case no

intrigued

Freud

his technical skills as a hypnotist.

translated

symptom rendered

two of Charcot’s books

by

his

out to improve his understanding of hysteria and

set

Subsequent
into

less than

to his visit to the Salpetriere

German: the

3'^'^

Freud

volume of Lessons on

the

Diseases of the Nervous System (German translation, 1886) and Tuesday Lectures

(Gennan

translation with Freud’s preface and footnotes, 1892-1894).“^^ In the meantime.

seems clear that insights derived from this case are due in large part to
intellectual gifts of the patient. Her extraordinary memory and active imagination
rendered clear connections that might well have been lost to an ordinary mind.

the

^^After a lengthy and seemingly successful treatment, Anna O.
Pappenheim) suffered a relapse that Freud would eventually diagnose

Bertha

It

erotic transference (Jones, Life

Eventually, however, she

was

and Work,

vol.

able to live a

1,

full

224). This will be discussed below.

and productive

Sulloway, “She spent twelve years as director of an orphanage
she founded a League of Jewish

and she traveled widely

Women

in Russia,

in

1904 and a home

Poland, and

(in real life

as an unresolved

Rumania

in

life.

According

in Frankfurt

for

to

(1895-1907);

unwed mothers

in 1907;

order to help orphaned

children and to investigate the widespread problems of prostitution and white slavery’’

{Freud: Biologist of the Mind, 37).
'‘^Sigmund Freud,

“An Autobiographical Study”
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SE

III,

10.

Hippolyte

Bemheim and Bemheim’s
Nancy an

established in

old teacher,

Ambroise Auguste Liebeault"" had

alternate school for the treatment of hysteria
through the use of

“suggestion” (of which they considered hypnotism to be
merely one fonn.)
Liebeault had begun from the premise that the state of
hypnosis was essentially a

normal

human

state

much

like the state

of sleep, and

Bemheim and

Liebeault argued that

all

beings, not just hysterics and neuropaths (as Charcot maintained),
were

susceptible to hypnotic suggestion.

They considered

the causes of hypnotic effects to be

conscious ideas, and they therefore also opposed Charcot’s belief that hypnotism,
and
thus hysteria as well, were primarily physiological phenomena. Freud had
translated

Bemheim’s book. Suggestion and
his

own

While

two

to the

for the

work

in

its

Therapeutic Effects (1888), adding a long preface of

which he compares Charcot’s findings with those of Bernstein.

most part favoring Charcot, Freud nevertheless attempted

positions,"*^ for

it

seemed

to

him

that

while Charcot had concentrated on anatomy

the exclusion of psychology, Liebeault and

direction. Referring to Liebeault’s

to reconcile the

Bemheim were

comparison of hypnosis

to

prejudiced in the opposite

to sleep,

Freud asks:

How does this

affect the antithesis between the psychical
and physiological phenomena of hypnosis? There was

meaning

by suggestion was understood a
by the physician which
forced any symptomatology it liked upon the hypnotized
subject. But this meaning disappears as soon as it is realized
that even suggestion only releases sets of manifestations which
a

in

it

so long as

directly psychical influence exercised

"’“^Liebeault
1

was

the author of the book.

Of Sleep and Similar States,

published in

866. (See Sulloway, Freud, Biologist of the Mind, 46).

^^The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904, ed.
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1985), p. 17 footnote.
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are based

upon the functional

peculiarities of the hypnotized
nervous system, and that in hypnosis characteristics of
the
nervous system other than suggestibility make themselves

felt

as well.'*^

Despite his reservations, however, Freud determined to go
to Nancy to leam what

he could of the techniques of this
found,'** and, in

Suggestion,

Charcot

s

new

school.^'

He was

apparently impressed by what he

1890, he translated a second of Bemheim’s books, Hypnotism,

and Psychotherapy.

In the long run,

Bemheim’s views would

prevail and

demonstrations of the connection between grande hypnotisnie and grande

hysterie with their physiologically detemiined stages

would be disproved.

“Review of August Forel’s Hypnotism" Freud admits

In his

1889

as much."*^

Charcot’s discovery of the discrepancy between anatomical functioning and the

symptoms of traumatic

paralyses, however, remained unchallenged, and

it

provided Freud

with an important clue. In 1893, Freud published an account of the research project that

he had begun seven years

“Some

earlier

while he was

still at

Charcot’s

clinic.

Freud’s paper

Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor Paralyses’’

clarifies

what was inherent

vulnerable.

The

'^‘’Freud,

first

in

Charcot’s researches, and

it

critiques Charcot

where he

is

three sections of the paper detail the discrepancies between

“Preface to the Translation of Bemheim’s

De La

Suggestion"

in

SE

I,

77-85. (The quote appears on page 84.)

“An Autobiographical Study’’
two weeks at the Nancy clinic.)

*^Freud,

Freud spent

in

SE XX,

The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, 17 note.
“^^See

“^^Freud,

“Preface to Bemheim’’ in

SE

I,
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98.

to

17.

(In the

summer of 1889

Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904,

ed.

m hysterical paralyzes as only a neurologist could describe them;

symptoms and anatomy

these sections were almost certainly written between
refers to

1

886 and

1

The

888.

final section

Freud and Breuer’s “Preliminary Communication” and thus
could not have been

written very

much

before 1893.^° Freud points out that the “dynamic” lesions
posited by

Charcot as the ultimate basis of hysteria cannot,

in fact,

be linked

to

anatomy but must be

explained psychologically;

Since there can only be a single cerebral anatomy that is true,
it finds expression in the clinical characteristics
of

and since

the cerebral paralyses,

it is

clearly impossible for that

anatomy

to

be the explanation of the distinctive features of hysterical paralyses.
For that reason we must not draw conclusions on the subject of
cerebral

anatomy

that are

based on the symptomatology of those

paralyses.^'

Freud therefore proposes that Charcot’s dynamic lesions be understood as an “alteration
the conception, the idea, ” of the affected part of the anatomy.

defines as a change in the ability of the idea to

come

This alteration he further

into associative contact with other

ideas.

Considered psychologically, the paralysis of the arm consists
in the fact that the conception of the ann cannot enter into
association with the other ideas constituting the ego of which
the subject’s

body forms an important

part.

The

lesion

would

“Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor
SE I, 157-59 (editor’s introductory note). Strachey speculates that this

^°Freud,

Paralyses” in

extended incubation period

is

the result of the “position occupied

by

this

paper on the

watershed between Freud’s neurological and psychological writings.”

“Some Points
SE I, 168.

for a

Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor

“Some Points
SE 1, 170.

for a

Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor

^'Freud,

Paralyses” in

^^Freud,

Paralyses” in
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in

therefore be the abolition of the associative
accessibility of the
conception of the ann/^

This idea of associative accessibility became key to
the conception of hysteria
forth

by Freud and Josef Brener

been called Freud’s
exploits to

first

its fullest

in Studies

on Hysteria, published

truly psychoanalytic work.

It is

also the

in 1896.

work

the gain to be obtained from hypnotism, and then

in

set

This book has

which Freud

comes up

against

the inherent limitations of hypnotic technique.

Studies on Hysteria

is

comprised of a

first

chapter that consists of a revised version

of Freud and Breuer’s jointly written “On the Psychical Mechanism of Flysterical

Phenomena: Preliminary Communication” [which had been

first

published

in 1893]; five

case histories; a theoretical section by Breuer; and a final section on the psychotherapy of
hysteria

by Freud.

Breuer’s only case study

is

that

of Anna O. About his

own

contribution of four additional cases, Freud writes:

I

have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other

neuropathologists,

I

was

trained to

and electro-prognosis, and
that the case histories

and

.

reactions

The fact is
lead nowhere
.

it still

strikes

me myself as

strange

write should read like short stories

.

that local diagnosis
in the study

and

electrical

of hysteria, whereas a detailed

description of mental processes such as
find in

local diagnoses

one might say, they lack the serious stamp of

that, as

science.

I

employ

we

accustomed to
the works of imaginative writers enables me, with the
are

“Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor
SE I, 170. Freud, at this point, attributes the inaccessibility of a concept to

”Freud,
Paralyses” in

the “free play” of association with other concepts to an emotionally charged prior
association. He offers as an intuitive example of this kind of psychic functioning the
comic story of the man who having shaken hands with the sovereign refuses thereafter to
use the hand for any lesser purpose. He also points to the custom of breaking the glass
from which a marriage toast has been drunk, or to the practice of “savage tribes in
antiquity who burnt their dead chiefs horse, his weapons and even his wives along with
the dead body” in obedience to the idea that no one should touch them after him (170-71)
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use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain
of insight into the course of that affection.^*’

at least

Indeed, Freud’s case histories do read like short
stories,

drama.

He

relates the case

of a young governess. Miss Lucy

full

R.,

some kind

of suspense and

who

chronically recurring suppurative rhinitis, fatigue, and depression.
She
the hallucinated smell of burning pudding. Katharina,

while on vacation

in the Alps, suffers

whom

afflicted

is

is

by

also plagued

by

Freud met and interviewed

from a smothering sensation and horrifying

hallucinations of an evil face. Fraulein Elizabeth von R.
legs and difficulty walking or standing. Frau

is

tormented by severe pain

Emmy von N.

is

given to sudden

in her

terrors;

animal phobias; stammering; hallucinations; difficulty eating; physiological disturbances
including muscular pains, neck cramps, and anaesthesia of the right leg; and a peculiar

clacking of her mouth that Freud

tells

us his friends describe as sounding like the call of a

capercaille.

As

a medical practitioner,

how

does one

treat the

symptoms of a

plagued by the smell of burning pudding or one whose speech

is

patient

who

is

constantly interrupted by

bird calls? Despite their differences, the practitioners at both Charcot’s clinic and the

Nancy school found

the primary therapeutic value of hypnotism to

suggestion. (For example, a patient

hypnosis and

told,

^‘^Breuer

in the case

the effects of

whose ann was paralyzed would be placed under

“You can now move your

provided by Breuer

lie in

right

arm

freely.”)

Following the lead

of Anna O., however, Freud gradually abandoned the

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

32

II,

160-61.

method of suggestion and
tracing hysterical

for

instead used hypnotism^^ to assist the
patient’s

symptoms back

to the

which the symptoms had come

circumstances

to stand as

in

which they had

mnemic symbols

.

memory

in

originated, and

Comparing

their

findings to those of Charcot in his study of traumatic
paralyzes, Brener and Freud write:

Observations such as these seem to us to establish an analogy
between the pathogenesis of common hysteria and that of
traumatic neuroses, and to justify an extension of the concept
of traumatic hysteria. In traumatic neuroses the operative cause
of the illness is not the trifling physical injury but the affect of
fright— the psychical trauma. In an analogous manner, our

investigations reveal, for

many, if not for most, hysterical
symptoms, precipitating causes which can only be described
as psychical traumas. Any experience which calls up distressing
affects-such as those of fright, anxiety, shame or physical painmay operate as a trauma of this kind; and whether it in fact does
so depends naturally enough on the susceptibility of the person
affected (as well as on another condition which will be summed
up later). In the case of common hysteria it not infrequently
happens that, instead of a single, major trauma, we find a number
of partial traumas fonning a group of provoking causes. These have
only been able to exercise a traumatic effect by summation and they
belong together in so far as they are in part components of a single
story of suffering.^’

Freud and Breuer further argue

that there is a continuing intimate relationship

between the traumatic memory and the symptom,

memory and

for

when

the patients have revisited in

recounted every incident that contributed to their traumas and have released

the emotional affects associated with these memories, the

^^Freud’s exploration of his patient’s inaccessible

hypnotism. However, he was forced
technique of his

own

(see below)

On

in Studies

To

the

memories began with

Hysteria,

failed.

SE

II,

90.

^^Breuer and Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The

Phenomena”

disappear.

abandon hypnotism and instead used a modified

to

when hypnotism

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies

symptoms

on Hysteria, SE

II,

6-7.
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objection that such

cures” might be the result of mere suggestion, they reply
that the case

of Anna O. went back

to 1881, a “presuggestion” era in hypnosis.

case of hysteria [the case of Anna O.],

“A

highly complicated

wrote Breuer and Freud “was analyzed

in this

way,

and the symptoms, which sprang from separate causes, were separately removed.
This
observation was

made

possible by spontaneous auto-hypnosis on the part of the patient,

and came as a great surprise

to the

Freud and Breuer sum up

observer

their observations with the following fonnula:

“Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.

memories

that

make

hysterics so

ill?

But what causes the persistence of the

Freud and Breuer observe

that, in the

nonnal course

of events, memories fade, either when whatever affect associated with them has been
discharged through an “energetic

complex of [the

may

patient’s] associations”

contradict or rectify

it,

over the entire network and
contrast,

reaction,”'^'’

where

and where the
dissipated.*’'

or

when

it

the

comes

memory

into contact with other ideas that

affect attached to the idea is gradually spread

The traumatic memories

have not “faded” but remain astonishingly

fresh.

They

^^Breuer and Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The

Phenomena”

in Studies

^"^Breuer

Phenomena”

Phenomena”

in

II,

resulting in hysteria,

are

by

memories of insults

Mechanism of Hysterical

7 (italics mine).

and Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The Mechanism of Hysterical

in Studies

*’*'Breuer

on Hysteria, SE

enters the “great

on Hysteria, SE

II, 7.

and Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The Mechanism of Hysterical
Studies on Hysteria, SE II. “By ‘reaction’ we here understand the whole

class of voluntary and involuntary reflexes-from tears to acts of revenge-in which, as
experience shows us, the affects are discharged” (8). The technical term they use for this

dispersal of affect

is

abreaction.

‘"Breuer and Freud, “Preliminary Communication:

Phenomena”

in Studies

on Hysteria, SE

II, 9.
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that

were not answered

at the

time of their original occurrence, and the affects
associated

with them were not discharged. Moreover, these memories
are unconscious, and therefore
they have not entered the

web of associations throughout which

might subsequently have been dispersed.^^

memories correspond

to

traumas that have not been

What would prevent
offer

two

According

to

their

dammed

Freud and Breuer, "[TJhese

sufficiently abreacted.

the abreaction necessary to forestall neurosis?

possibilities: the first

psychic state of the individual

concerns the nature of the trauma

at

up affect

the time of the trauma.

Of the

itself

The authors

and the second the

first possibility,

they

write:

In the first

group are those cases

in

which the patients have

not reacted to a psychical trauma because the nature of the

trauma excluded a reaction, as in the case of the apparently
irreparable loss of a loved person or because social circumstances

made

a reaction impossible or because

it

was a question of

things which the patient wished to forget, and therefore
intentionally repressed from his conscious thought and

inhibited and suppressed.

It is

earliest

this possibility that

Freud found most persuasive, and

mention of the concept of “repression”

that

in Studies

on Hysteria, SE

in Studies

‘""'Breuer

Phenomena”

on Hysteria, SE

II,

Mechanism of Hysterical

10.

and Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The Mechanism of Hysterical

in Studies

on Hysteria, SE

II,

10.

They conclude

distressing things of this kind that, under hypnosis,

phenomena

Mechanism of Hysterical

II, 9.

^^Breuer and Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The

Phenomena”

encounter here the

Freud would eventually make the

^^Breuer and Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The

Phenomena”

we

we
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it

“is precisely

find are the basis

(e.g. hysterical deliria in saints and nuns, continent

up children”!

that

women

of hysterical

and well-brought-

cornerstone of his psychoanalytic theory.
explanation. Miss

realize that

Lucy had

Freud’s case histories offer support for

fallen in love with her

he did not return her affections, and

The smell of burning pudding
took the place of the painful

that

employer, was forced by his cruelty

tried to

accompanied her

memory

in her

this

simply “put

first

it

out of her

to

mind.”^’*’

recognition of the true situation

conscious thoughts. The affects of fatigue and

depression remained, but they, too, had been detached from the painful situation that

caused them. Fraulein Elizabeth was thwarted

in her efforts to re-establish her family

firm footing after the death of her father, and she

was made unpleasantly aware of her

for her brother-in-law as she stood at her sister’s deathbed.

on a
love

Forcing these painful

memories out of consciousness, she found herself “not being able

to take a single step

does not contradict the assertion that the dynamic unconscious is the most
important of Freud’s discoveries, for repression is merely the view of the dynamic
‘’^This

unconscious as seen “from above.”
^^’Breuer

analysis had

why

employer,

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

made

II, 1

17.

Freud asked her

after

knew you loved your
know-or rather I didn’t want

clear the cause of her affliction, “But if you

didn’t

you

tell

me?” She answered,

“I didn’t

wanted to drive it out of my head and not think of it again; and I believe
latterly I have succeeded.” Freud remarks of this exchange, “I have never managed to
give a better description than this of the strange state of mind in which one knows and
does not know a thing at the same time. It is clearly impossible to understand it unless
one has been in such a state oneself I myself have had a very remarkable experience of
this sort, which is still clearly before me. If I try to recollect what went on in my mind at
the time I can get hold of very little. What happened was that I saw something which did
not fit at all with my expectation; yet I did not allow what I saw to disturb my fixed plan
in the least, though the perception should have put a stop to it. I was unconscious of any
contradiction in this; nor was I aware of my feelings of repulsion, which must
nevertheless undoubtedly have been responsible for the perception producing no
psychical effect. I was afflicted by that blindness of the seeing eye which is so
to

know.

I

astonishing in the attitude of mothers to their daughters, husbands to their wives and
rulers to their favorites” (17, note).
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forward,

not having anything to lean on,” and her
hysterical

as severe pains in her legs

and the

inability to walk.

The case of Katharina demonstrated
trauma.

It

was not when her

true relation

by

calling

especially clearly the situation of sl delayed

father [in the first editions of this work, Freud
disguised the

him her “uncle”]

developed, because she did not realize
after she

at

first tried to

the time

as

to her.

It

was only

she began to hallucinate his

it

had actually been, but

to breathe.

of these three cases, Freud attributed the symptoms

which a psychical trauma was transformed
its

sister that

“remember” the weight of his body, not

simply as a feeling of smothering, not being able
In each

seduce her that her symptoms

what was happening

had seen him having intercourse with her

distorted face and

symptoms were expressed

to a physical

to a

“conversion”

symptom which took

in

the place of

conscious memory. Sometimes a convenient physical condition could be used to

symbolize'’^ the trauma (as, for instance, Fraulein Elizabeth’s intensification of a pre-

existing arthritic condition to symbolize her inability to “take a step”); at other times a

physical condition that accompanied the trauma

was

isolated to symbolize the entire

experience (Katharina’s sense of smothering); alternatively, the reason for the distressing
affect

might be repressed, while the

affect remained,

connected to an occurrence

insignificant in itself (as in the case of Miss Lucy’s depression and hallucinations of

burning pudding). The case of Emmy von N. was the most complicated. Multiple

symptoms

lead back to a myriad of traumatic memories; however,

it

was only

the detached

^^As Freud points out in his Project for a Scientific Psychology, the hysteric’s use
of symbolism is different from normal symbolism in that the symbol has wholly taken the
place of what

it

symbolizes, whereas nonnally a symbol indicates a relationship, both

aspects of which are available to consciousness (SE

37

I,

349).

affects

of

and horror, along with a host of inexplicable phobias,

fright

symptoms

that

were accessible

by

and

to her conscious awareness.

Freud and Breuer also considered the possibility
forestalled

inhibitions,

that abreaction

might be

the psychic state of the individual at the time of the traumatic incident.
In

particular, if a patient

normal consciousness

was already
at

in a

“hypnoid”

state, that is, a state split

the time of the trauma, the ideas

would remain

off from

isolated and

inaccessible to abreaction.

For

we

under hypnosis, among the causes of hysterical

find,

symptoms, ideas which are not in themselves significant, but
whose persistence is due to the fact that they originated during
positively abnormal psychical states, such as the semi-hypnotic
twilight state of day-dreaming, auto-hypnoses, and so on. In

such cases

it

is

the nature of the states

which makes a reaction

to the event impossible.*’*

This explanation, in line with Charcot’s reasoning, was the one that Breuer favored
(probably because

been willing

to

it

most closely

advance

it

in the

fit

his experience with

Anna

who had

O.), but Freud,

“Preliminary Communication” written in 1892, was

already having doubts about both hypnosis and the nature of hysteria by the time his

concluding theoretical chapter

to Studies in Hysteria

(“Psychotherapy of Hysteria”) was

written in 1894.

In “Psychotherapy of Hysteria,” Freud breaks with Breuer’s position

importance of the hypnoid

state

and argues

the neuroses. Freud had encountered

could duplicate Breuer’s findings

for

two main

in the

what

is

on the

essentially a transfomred theory of

difficulties

when he

case of Anna O. The

first

set out to see if

was

that not

Sigmund Freud, “Preliminary Communication: The
Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena” in Studies on Hysteria, SE, II, p. 11.
^*Josef Breuer and
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he

everyone

who

exhibited

symptoms of hysteria could be hypnotized. The second
was

that

many who

could be successfully hypnotized and treated with
the cathartic method were obviously
suffering from neuroses other than hysteria.

mechanism revealed by

the ‘Preliminary

He

therefore concluded that “the psychical

Communication’ could not be pathognomonic

for

hysteria.”'’^

To
neuroses

bring clarity to the situation,

in

it

was necessary

for

Freud

to categorize all

terms of their aetiology and psychical mechanism. To accomplish

needed a method

that

would allow access

to the altered

of the

this,

and nomially inaccessible

he

states

of

consciousness that hypnosis was only sometimes able to uncover.
Freud’s solution to the problem of method came from a demonstration that he had

witnessed while visiting Bemheim.

somnambulism, was induced

to

One of Bemheim’s

patients, while in a state

have a “negative hallucination”

that

presence invisible to her even though he attempted vigorously to

Once she had awakened, he asked her
hypnosis and she was unable

to

do

so.

to describe

Bemheim

“And

lo

to recall the events that

attract

insisted, laying his

that,

her attention.

and behold! she ended by describing everything

that she

'’'^Breuer

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

II,

^‘’Breuer

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

II,

256-57.

1

09-1

1 1

this

state

compulsion, she

of consciousness:

had ostensibly not

perceived during her somnambulism and ostensibly not remembered

state.

hand upon her

under

had taken place during her altered
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made Bemheim’s

what had happened while she was under

forehead to help her remember. Freud reports his surprise

was able

of

in

her waking

Taking
patients

who

this lead

from Bernstein, Freud abandoned attempts

did not easily

fall

into a hypnotic state.

Instead he had

and concentrate” as he asked the same questions

their eyes,

them under hypnosis. Once he had reached

that

where the

a point

to

hypnotize those

them

lie

down, close

he would have asked

patient insisted that he or

she remembered nothing further, Freud would exert pressure
on the patient’s head,
insisting that

something would come

what came

mind were mental

to

to mind.’’

pictures,

though

highly stylized symbols.^^ Ordinarily, however,
that the patient

remembered, but an intermediate

Invariably, something did.

it

it

Most

often

might be only isolated key-words, or

was not

link

the scene of the original trauma

between the current symptom and

the traumatic situation.

It

was only by

the laborious process of tracing these associations back through

prior associations that the instigating trauma

was eventually discovered. This was

accomplished without a great deal of effort on the therapist’s
this effort

was necessary

to

combat

a psychical force in the

only be characterized as resistance. This resistance had
experience with patients

Freud

who

part,

and Freud reflected

mind of the

made

not

that

patient that could

itself visible earlier in his

refused even to try hypnosis. Furthemiore,

that the resistance encountered in the therapeutic process

it

occurred to

was simply another

manifestation of the same psychic force that had lead to the repression of the pathogenic
ideas and the generation of the neurotic

symptoms

in the first place.

Thus, Freud came

understand resistance as the clinical expression of repression and he had no difficulty

^'Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

268-70.

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

273-78.
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to

understanding

its

motivation, for he had already found

it

in the traumatic ideas

uncovered

in earlier analyses.

my disposal a few completed analyses in
had come to know examples of ideas that were pathogenic, and had been forgotten and put out of consciousness.
...

I

already had at

which

From

I

these

I

recognized a universal characteristic of such

were all of a distressing nature, calculated to arouse
the affects of shame, of self-reproach and of psychical pain,
and the feeling of being banned; they were all of a kind that
one would rather forget. From all this there arose, as it were,
ideas: they

automatically, the thought of defence

Freud concluded

that ideas

become pathogenic

precisely because they are

unacceptable to the ego and therefore are repressed and barred from entering the nonnal

web of associations. Complicating
was not

a single

symptom

matters

the fact that

what Freud typically found

that related to a single trauma, but rather “successions

traumas and concatenations of pathogenic
neurosis, Freud found he

was

trains

of thought.

oi partial

In order to understand the

must follow the structure of the psychic material

itself

case of Anna O., each thematic train of thought would be temporally ordered.

It

As

in the

would

also be “stratified concentrically round the pathogenic nucleus” in terms of the degree of

resistance

it

aroused.

zagging in a “broken

And
line

it

would be arranged “according

which would pass along

surface to the deepest layers and back, and yet

would

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

names these

the

SE

to

thought content,” zig-

most roundabout paths from
in general

II,

269.

On

the

advance from the

the

same page, Freud

painful ideas “incompatible” ideas, and he attributes their banishment from

consciousness to a “censorship” that guards the unity of ideas
^“^Breuer

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

41

II,

288.

in the ego.

periphery to the central nucleus, touching

Attempting
impossible.

made

at

every intermediate halting-place.”^^

to penetrate straight to the nucleus

The meaning of the trauma

in the process

core, the “patient

lay precisely in the

of its discovery. Even

would not know what

of a pathogenic organization was

if the analyst

could guess

at the

do with the explanation offered

to

would not be psychologically changed by

web of associations

that

were

pathogenic

to

him and

it.”^*^

Insofar as those suffering from the psychoneuroses ordinarily

came

to

Freud

seeking remedy for their illnesses, the alleviation of symptoms was a primary goal.
Freud
found, however, that the

treatment.

symptoms

As he approached

symptom would

offered a valuable guide to the progress of the

the pathogenic core of a

symptom’s

aetiology, he found the

increase in severity. Freud referred to this as the symptom’s “joining in

the conversation.”

The

intensity of the

symptom

(let

us take for instance a

desire to vomit-increases the deeper

we

penetrate into

one of the relevant pathogenic memories; it reaches its
climax shortly before the patient gives utterance to that

memory; and when he has

finished doing so

it

suddenly

diminishes or even vanishes completely for a time.

owing

If,

to resistance, the patient delays his telling for a

long time, the tension of the sensation-the desire to vomit-

becomes unbearable, and
to

if

speak he actually begins

we

cannot force him [the patient]

to vomit.

In this

way we

obtain

a plastic impression of the fact that ‘vomiting’ takes the place

of a psychical act

(in this instance the act

of utterance), exactly

as the conversion theory of hysteria maintains.

SE

II,

288-89. (Compare to hypertext

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

292.

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

296.

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

connections in

HTML.)
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Freud found

that

such visible, objective indications often lent support to
the verbal

associations his patients were presenting.
as facial expressions

had

He

also pointed out that physical indicators such

be taken into account.’* Therefore the method demanded a

to

close observation of the patient’s physical states as well as
attention to the threads

connecting psychic themes.

A

further complication of this technique that impressed itself on Freud
even at this

early stage

was

the necessity of managing the relationship that developed between patient

and doctor. For himself, he
psychical

mechanism of a

stated: “I

cannot imagine bringing myself to delve into the

hysteria in anyone

who

struck

me

as

low-minded and

repellent,

and who, on closer acquaintance, would not be capable of arousing human sympathy;

whereas

I

can keep the treatment of a tabetic or rheumatic patient apart from personal

approval of this

kind.”’*^

their personal relation to

the foreground.

At

Of the
him

first

patients,

he admits: “

.

.

.

[I]t is

almost inevitable that

[the doctor] will force itself, for a time at least,

impatient with this complication, Freud

came

The most astonishing

overcoming

aspect of the patient’s relationship to the doctor

“transference” of [often erotic] ideas on to the person of the doctor. Just as the

or an innocuous

accompanying phenomenon provided

into

to realize that the

patient’s relationship to the doctor could be a powerful motivating force in

resistance.

unduly

was

symptom

the occasion for a symbolic

representation of incompatible ideas, so, too, did the solicitous presence of the doctor

SE

II,

294.

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

II,

265.

SE

II,

266.

’*Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,
’‘^Breuer

*”Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,
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the

during treatment provide the occasion for a renewal
of repressed ideas of an erotic nature.

This transference could be interpreted, just
It

seemed

to

make no

like

that

difference if the interpretation took place in tenns of the
original

relationship or the transference relationship in

The

any other symptom, and Freud found

which he himself so prominently

transference, like everything else connected to the treatment,

became

figured.*'

yet another

subject of analysis.*^

Having devised a workable technique
psyche

that

of the patient’s

had previously seemed accessible only under hypnosis, Freud

exploring the neuroses. His
transference as well,

factor.

for penetrating those areas

was

first

observation, supported

that the aetiology

by

set

about

the evidence of the

of all neuroses was

to

be found in a sexual

In other words, his patients’ associations lead to the conclusion that the traumatic

events from which they suffered had been sexual in nature.

He

next attempted to

differentiate the various neuroses in terms of the precise role that sexuality played in their

formation, and, in this manner, he was able to separate out neurasthenia, obsessional
neurosis, and anxiety neurosis. Neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis he classed as “actual”

neuroses; that

is,

he attributed them

to current sexual practices that

had deleterious

physical effects. With an actual physical basis, these conditions could not be “cured”

through psychotherapy; they had no “psychical mechanism.” In obsessional neuroses, on

*'Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

303-04.

*^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

304.

The equivalent danger

for

the physician-the use of the current situation to symbolize or act out old desires-would

not

become

clear to Freud for

some

time.

Unacknowledged unconscious reactions could
Dora case. In the work of the object-

seriously disrupt an analysis as Freud learned in the

relations theorists, interpretation of countertransference as well as transference

phenomena became an important

analytic technique.
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the other hand, Freud found “a complicated
psychical mechanism, an aetiology similar to
that

of hysteria and an extensive possibility of reducing

it

by psychotherapy.

Hysteria

and obsessional neurosis, Freud classified as psychoneuroses.

Freud found

that hysteria itself rarely

symptoms previously

attributed to

it

appeared

in a

pure fonn and that

many of the

(such as “perversion and degeneracy”) ought to be

separated out from the essential definition of the disorder. In the normal
patient, neuroses

would be “mixed,” and symptoms would be more
psychotherapy according
psychoneuroses.

to their status as

in the

R., “a

to treatment

at

by

or

the case histories he had reported in Studies

case of Emmy von N., “an anxiety neurosis which

originated from sexual abstinence and had

Miss Lucy

amenable

symptoms of actual neuroses

Looking retrospectively

on Hysteria, Freud found

or less

become combined with

marginal case of pure hysteria”; and

of anxiety neurosis and hysteria.”

Two

of the cases,

in that

that

hysteria”; in that of

of Katharina, “a combination

of Fraulein Elizabeth von R. and

that

of Anna O. herself had not been investigated as sexual neuroses, and so

was

less clear.*^

While the picture presented

in Studies

on Hysteria

is still

very

far

their aetiology

from the mature

theory of psychoanalysis, a number of key psychoanalytic concepts, including defense,

resistance, repression,

and transference make an appearance

in this early

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

257-58.

^^Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

SE

II,

258-59.

^^Freud’s later discovery that

pregnancy

Anna

O.’s treatment had ended in a hysterical

that she attributed to the attentions

underlying sexual neuroses

in

work. The

of her physician Breuer confirmed an

her case as well.
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technique of free association

recognized as

is

shown

mnemic symbols open

in

to

its

developmental stages, and symptoms are

an interpretation that leads back

to ideas that

been repressed. With the notion of repression, we have the
beginning
of psychical functioning (though
of sexual trauma and comes

to

this will not

be complete

until

have

dynamic theory

Freud rethinks the notion

an understanding of infantile sexuality.) All of these

concepts, however, are but variations of a single theme, and that theme

is

the problem of

the relationship of consciousness to psychic functioning in general.

There
in

is

terms of the

another

way

that psychoanalysis looks at psychic

circulation and distribution of an energy

capable of increase, decrease and equivalence.”**^

economic point of view, and
the

economic point of view

it,

too, is a

that the

.

.

.

that

phenomena, and

can be quantified,

This perspective

key concept

in Studies

need for abreaction

is

that is

is

known

i.e., is

as the

on Hysteria, for

it is

from

theoretically justified.

The work of Helmholtz and du Bois-Reymond had

fimily established the principle

of electric conduction through the nervous system, and both Breuer and Freud had been
educated by Briicke

which stimulation

at

who

argued that the entire nervous system worked as a “reflex arc”

one extremity of the system

to the other end, the “efferent” nerves,

was thus seen
According

*^J.

as setting

to Briicke,

it

was discharged

such excitation could pool

J.-B. Pontalis,

& Company,

at

I

am

in action.*’

“transferred”

Stimulation

various points as a “summation of

The Language of Psycho-Analysis (New York;

1973), 127.

*’Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education”
9-20.

was

up a flow of electrical “excitation” through the nervous system.

Laplanche and

W.W. Norton

where

(the “afferent” nerves)

indebted to this work for

my

in

Psychological Issues, vol.

understanding of the extent of Briicke and

Meynert’s influence on Freud.
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in

14,

stimuli

until sufficient quantity

of the stimulus. At

was

Briicke

this point the

to effect the appropriate action for

system would return

to its previous state

of rest.**

it

came

to the

physiology of the brain. Meynert, too,

subscribed to the reflex arc theory of nerve functioning, even within the brain

argued that

“.

there

.

.

removal

essentially interested in the peripheral nervous system and deferred
to

Meynert when

the psychiatrist

was reached

is

itself,

and

nothing more certain about the functions of the cerebral organism

than that the centripetal sensory nerves are the keys which wind up the mechanism

connected with the muscles, and excite the

latter to action.”*^

Meynert differentiated between cerebral and subcerebral functioning
that

to the extent

he thought that subcerebral pathways were innate, while cerebral pathways were

up over the lifetime of the individual. The cerebral cortex,

like other parts

built

of the nervous

system, connected afferent and efferent peripheries; however, within the cortex, the
excitations laid

down permanent

rapid succession

“images,” and images laid

became connected through

down

“association bundles”

simultaneously or

(i.e.,

in

nerves which

connect one part of the cortex with another). Meynert believed that the ego or “nucleus of
individuality”

was

built

up from

this

network of associations, and

**Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education”

in

that intelligence

Psychological Issues, vol.

was

14,

14.

**^Theodore Meynert, Psychiatry^ trans. B. Sachs

(New York:

G. P. Putnam’s

Sons), 1985, 139, quoted in Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education” in

Psychological Issues, wo\. 14, 24.
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demonstrated by the

ability to

match new

excitations or perceptions with those already laid

down.^°

Meynert and Briicke
parallelism

(like others

which allowed them

partly in psychological terms.

to

of their time) assumed a psychological/physical

speak of mental phenomena partly

in physical

and

Thus, Meynert had no problem equating “excitations”

with “images” and he saw the functioning of the cerebral cortex
as the perfect physical
parallel to the association

Meynert was able

psychology

to

which he subscribed.

to describe both

terms of these cortical networks.

He

normal and pathological nervous functioning

believed

that, in infancy, associations

be random and confused, while over time, experience would

would tend

stabilize associative

in

to

pathways

through the elimination of random connections. In mental illness more recently
established pathways

confusion.

He

would break down, leaving

the

mind

in its original state

attributed “Meynert’s amentia,” a disease process characterized

hallucinatory confusion, to just such a breakdown of the strong ideas which
stable ego,

of

and argued

that the

by

made up

the

same kind of breakdown could be seen under conditions of

physical exhaustion such as during sleep.

^°Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education”

in

Psychological Issues, vol.

14,

^'Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education”

in

Psychological Issues, vol.

14,

’^Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education”

in

Psychological Issues, vol.

14,

^^Amacher, “Freud’s Neurological Education”

in

Psychological Issues,

21-35.

p. 16.

27-41.

37-41.
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vol. 14,

In Studies

functioning, in

excitation

)

on Hysteria, Breuer argues

for a

modified reflex arc theory of mental

which a physiological regulatory principle works

in the brain at a constant

optimum

excitation available to the brain.

excitation

is

relatively high

When

keep the energy (“tonic

Breuer attributed the varying

level.

psychical states between deep, dreamless sleep and

to

full

the individual

wakefulness to the level of tonic

is

awake, the level of tonic

and conduction throughout the system

is facilitated.

[E]very act of will initiates the corresponding movement;
sense-impressions become conscious perceptions; and ideas
are associated with the

whole

store present in potential
consciousness. In that condition the brain functions as a
unit with complete internal connections.

On

the contrary, while the individual sleeps, the level of tonic excitation

conductive capability diminished. This diminished conductive capability leads
dissociated character of dreams (where, for instance,“

person without remembering that he

we have

is

dead.”)^^

we

low and

to the

find ourselves talking to a dead

At the two extremes of tonic

excitation,

the total unconsciousness of dreamless sleep on the one hand, and the extinction

of thought and perception

in

an overpowering affect such as

Breuer suggests that periods of sleep allow the brain
depletion of the energy available to

it,

has risen to the point where discharge

system

is

itself is

fear, rage, or lust

to recover

on the

other.

from a too great

while spontaneous awakening signals that the level

is

again sought. Thus, Breuer argues that the

capable of producing excitation and that a mechanism of self-regulation

^'’Breuer

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

II,

193.

“^^Breuer

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

II,

193-95.
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gives the organism a ‘“tendency to keep
intracerebral excitation constant.

supporting evidence for this hypothesis, Breuer
cites the pain of boredom
discharge mental energy) and the pacing of a
person under
necessity to regulate intracerebral excitation

warm-blooded organism
organism has a need

is

stress.

As
(i.e.,

the need to

Breuer argues

that this

no more mysterious than the need of a

to regulate its temperature.^’

It is

this

assumption

to regulate intracerebral excitation that lies

that the

behind Freud and

Breuer’s insistence on the pathogenic nature of traumas that
have not been abreacted.

Thus,

we

patients treated

find in Studies on Hysteria not only the case histories
of the neurotic

by Freud and Breuer, but

also the rudiments of a theory of nomial

psychical functioning based on physicalist and economic principles. Freud
would expand
this enterprise in his Project for

a Scientific Psychology, written just a few months after

the publication of Studies on Hysteria, but not published during his lifetime.
In the
Project, Freud seeks to found psychology as a natural science, or, as he says in his

introduction, “to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of
specifiable material particles.”'^*

In a letter written to

Freud further describes the Project as an attempt

Wilhelm

Fliess

on

May

25, 1895,

to

discover what fomi the theory of psychical functioning will

'^‘’Breuer

and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE

Freud. Strachey points out that this

is

the

first

II,

197. Breuer attributes this idea to

explicit enunciation

of Freud’s ‘principal

of constancy’.
^’Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria,

tend to maintain the

exceeded

is

optimum of excitation and

SE

II,

198. “That the organism should

to return to that

optimum

after

it

has been

not surprising, but quite in keeping with other regulating factors in the

organism.”
^^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,
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SE

I,

283.

take if a quantitative line of approach, a kind
of economics
of nervous force, is introduced into it, and, secondly, to
extract

from psychopathology a yield

Though Freud eventually abandoned
its

[was] achieved in

It is

its

normal psychology.

the Project as a hopelessly difficult endeavor,

influence can be seen throughout his writing

Analysis. In fact, Richard

for

Wollheim goes so

all

the

far as to

way

to the

1938 Outline of Psycho-

claim that “most of his greatest work

shadow.

not surprising that Freud would turn to his medical training for this

first

attempt to systematize his clinical discoveries. Freud had discovered that
“[pjrocesses

such as stimulus, substitution, conversion and discharge” which were necessary

to a

description of his clinical findings “directly suggested the conception of neuronal
excitation as quantity in a state of flow.”'®' Thus, inspired

by the

fit

between

his

psychological observations and the understanding of nervous functioning being developed
at that time,'®^

Freud hypothesized a psychical system which consisted of two elements:

^®Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology),

'®®Richard Wollheim,

SE

I,

283.

Sigmund Freud (London, Cambridge University

Press,

1971), 59.
'®'Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology),

SE

I,

295-96.

'®^Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind, 115-16. Sulloway points out the many
similarities between the model of the mind presented in Freud’s Project and Theodore

Exner’s Sketch of a Physiological Explanation of Psychical Phenomena published
1894.
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in

Q,

(understood as a flow of energy or “excitation”) and the
neurone (conceived as the

basic building block of the nervous system.)

To

this

he added the principle of “neuronal inertia” which could
be stated simply

as the fact that “neurones tend to divest themselves of

Of course,

this principle

gives rise to the well-known reflex arc; however, while the reflex
arc

may

understand simple actions such as withdrawal from painful stimuli,

does not adequately

it

be sufficient

to

account for a complex organism’s ability to engage in higher-level responses.
Therefore,

Freud argues,

it

is

specifically the somatic needs of a

complex organism-the need

for

nourishment, respiration, sex-that force the system to modify the principle of neuronal
inertia.

certain

Instead of decreasing the

amount of Q’r|

in

endogenously generated

amount of Q’r|

Even

stimuli.

A rise in Q’rj

while the discharge of Q’r|

Freud explains

system

is

forced to retain a

order to generate the “specific actions” that relieve these

trend to divest itself of Q’r| in that

rather than at zero.

to zero, the

is

it

so, the

now

above

system continues

to follow the original

attempts to maintain Q’r|

this constant

minimum

is

at

a constant

minimum

experienced as pain

experienced as pleasure.

that his

second postulation-that of the neurone-was borrowed from

the recent discovery of the anatomical neurone;

[T]he nervous system consists of distinct and similarly
constructed neurones, which have contact with one

another through the

’°^Freud’s use of

idea seems to be that

Q

and Q’p

Q refers to

medium of a

is

foreign substance, which

inconsistent and

somewhat confusing. The

Quantity in general and Q’r| refers to the quantity of

excitation within a neurone or within the neuronal system.

’^‘^Freud,

general

Project for a Scientific Psychology^
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SE

I,

p.

296.

terminate upon one another as they do upon portions
of
foreign tissue, [and] in which certain conditions
are

down

laid
in so far as they [the neurones] receive
[excitations]

through cell-processes [dendrites] and [give them
an axis cylinder [axon].’°^

Combining

i.e.

one

that is filled with a certain

the unmodified principle of neuronal inertia,

it

was discharged

of retaining the constant

assumes

that in

through

the account of neurones with the idea of
Q’ri, Freud

of a cathected neurone,

another, until

off]

motor

action.

minimum of Q’t]

some neurones

These resistances, Freud

in

Q would

came

to the notion

amount of Q’r|. According

flow freely from one neurone

However,

in

to

to

keeping with the necessity

necessary to perfomi “specific actions,” Freud

resistances will prohibit the complete discharge of Q’rj.

attributes not to differences in the

neurones themselves, but

to

differences in the substance that connects them. Thus, he posits the existence oicontactbarriers'^^ that will in varying degrees inhibit the flow of Q’r) from

others to

among

which

it is

one nerve

connected. This difference in permeability of the contact barriers

neurones, Freud attributes to the process of conduction

itself,

assuming

time the passage of Q’r) wears away the resistance offered by a given contact

Freud uses

this idea

completely permeable to Q’r| and unaltered by

its

(the

(|)

passing. Therefore

SE

'^^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology,

a train.

that over

barrier.

of the differential permeability of the contact barriers

two systems representing perception and memory. Perception

editors’.

cell to the

I,

system)

new

SE

I,

“synapse” was introduced by Foster and Sherrington
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model

is

perceptions are

297-98. The brackets are the

The Project was never finished and polished-indeed parts of it were
Therefore, some sections exist in rough, almost note form.

'^^Freud, Project for a Scientific Project,

to

298, editor’s note

in 1897.

3.

written on

The term

not disturbed by residual images from past
perceptions.

world by way of the sensory organs and

Q

T|

also reaches

Memory

(the

ij;

is

reaches

transmitted as

4>

from the external

Q’p through ^

to the

system.

iji

directly from stimuli arising within the interior of the
body.'^*

iji

system)

is

characterized

by

resistance to the flow of Q’r| such that the

passing of Q’r| leaves permanent changes in the system (called
“facilitations”), and these

changes encode memories. Freud assumes
in the

still

lowering of resistance between

more

correctly that memory’

between the

i|;

neurones.

is

that the

changes

to the

i|;

“We

neurones, or, as he states,

i|;

represented by differences

Freud further supposes

can therefore say

in the facilitations existing

that (through the “basic

association by simultaneity”) facilitations will most often be laid

psychic representatives of specific needs and the

system consist mainly

law of

down between

memory of experiences of satisfaction

through which the tension connected with these needs was discharged.’'” The

‘”^Breuer had accounted for the

of perception and of memory

same necessary

in Studies

reflecting telescope cannot at the

the

distinction

on Hysteria. As he put

same time be a photographic

it,

free flow

of

between mechanisms
“The mirror of a

plate” (188-89).

'”*These endogenous stimuli will eventually provide the basis for Freud’s theory

of the

instincts.

'””Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology,

SE

I,

298-300. (Quote on page 300.)

””Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

318-19. Freud

is

modeling

here the “compulsion to associate” in consciousness things that happen simultaneously.
If one

assumes

that

two ideas (represented by “neurones”) have at some time been
is the same as assuming that the pathway between the

cathected simultaneously, that

neurones has been

facilitated.

Freud

states, “It

follows in terms of our theory that a Q’r|

easily from a neurone to a cathected neurone than to an uncathected one.

more
Thus the cathexis of the second neurone operates
one. Once again, cathexis is here shown to be the

passes

Q’ri, to facilitation” (319).
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like the increased cathexis

of the

first

equivalent, as regards the passage of

Q’ti without interference along such facilitated paths to
discharge Freud tenns the primary

function of the

laid

the

ij;

system

down between
or

(J)

ij;

“primary process.”)

(later the

experiences of pain

Similarly, facilitations will be

sudden eruptions of large quantities of
Q

(i.e.,

into

systems) and memories of the hostile object associated with
the pain. Freud

calls the “residues”

of these two experiences

experience of pain)

Both

affects

and wishful

states are

[of quantity] in

(i.e.

states.”

the experience of pleasure and the

According

to Freud,

of the greatest importance for the passage

for they leave behind them motives of a
compulsive kind. The wishful states result in a positive
attraction towards the object wished-for, or, more precisely,
towards its mnemic image; the experience of pain leads to a
i|j,

repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile

mnemic

image cathected. Here we have primary wishful attraction
and primary defence [fending off]."^
Freud also hypothesizes

that a certain subset

of the

i[;

neurones will remain

constantly cathected, and the memories associated with these cathected neurones will be

bound

to

in a stable relationship to

one another. These permanently cathected and bound

"‘Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology,

SE

1,

300-01

"^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

321

.

While

understand wishful attraction, the mechanism of primary defence

Freud had intended

to write a fourth section to the Project that

is

would

it

is

easy enough

more

obscure.

deal with

repression, but apparently gave up as no such section has ever been found. At this point

he offers a description only:
fact that a hostile

“It is

mnemic image

harder to explain primary defence or repression-the

is

regularly abandoned

possible. Nevertheless, the explanation should

of pain were brought

to

lie in

by

its

cathexis as soon as

the fact that the primary experiences

an end by reflex defence. The emergence of another object

place of the hostile one was the signal for the fact that the experience of pain was
end, and the

i|/

system, taught biologically, seeks to reproduce the state in

marked the cessation of pain” (322).
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\j/

at

which

in

an

neurones constitute the
a

way

that

is

able to channel the energy at

can perfonn the specific actions necessary

system

may

inhibition.

disposal in such

somatic needs.

It

does

neurone

be controlled. This secondary mechanism Freud terms side-cathexis
or

The
"

possibility of side-cathexis Freud attributes to the hypothesis
that a “Q’ri

will

go not only

in the direction

of the contact-barrier which

facilitated,

but also in the direction of the barrier which

side.”"'^ In

an inhibition or side-cathexis, the ego

Q’r| (seeking discharge)

by

this

Q

to fulfill

its

through the use of a secondary mechanism by which the flow
of Q’rj throughout the

this

in

it

The ego

Tj

would take

if

it

were

to

is

is

best

cathected from the further

alters the

course that a quantity of energy

simply follow prior

facilitations.

raising the level of the cathexis of adjacent neurones through the use of

its

It

does

store

of

and thus “attracting” the flow toward the newly cathected neurones and away from

the previously facilitated path.“^ This use of inhibitions to direct the flow of Q’r| Freud

terms the secondary process.

"^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

322-23. Freud attributes the

“store” of energy at the disposal of the ego to the constant flow of Q’r| arising from the
interior

the

of the body.

body

On

pages 315-16, Freud

calls this

flow of Q’n from the interior of

the “mainspring” of the psychical mechanism. This flow of endogenous energy

will eventually

be theorized as

writes, “If now

we

instinct.

In “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” Freud

apply ourselves to considering mental

from a biological point of
between the mental and the

life

view, an ‘instinct’ appears to us as a concept on the frontier

somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the

organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind
work in consequence of its connection with the body” (SE XIV, 121-22).
"‘^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology^,

SE

I,

319.

"^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology,

SE

I,

323-24.
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for

Now

it

is

why

easy to see

critical to the effective

the ability to override primary process facilitations

is

operation of the system, for the pathways that are
facilitated in the

primary process are between representatives of bodily needs and
memories of experiences

of satisfaction.

When

the rising

satisfaction in the cathected

unless

some

endogenous tension again seeks discharge,

memory

it

will look for

rather than through an object in the external world,

indication of reality alerts the ego to inhibit the primary process
facilitation.

Similarly, facilitations exist between

memories of objects

that

have caused pain and key

neurones that signal the release of Q’rj from the interior of the body. This release of Q’rj
is,

it

of course, experienced as unpleasure which
is

is

capable of escalation into pain."^ Again,

necessary for the psychical system to be able to differentiate between the

hostile object

and the actual presence of one,

if the

arousal of pain

memory of a

to serve a real

is

biological purpose."^

Where does

this indication

representing perception and

(the o) system). This

of reality come from? In addition

memory, Freud adds

system

is

systems

a third to represent consciousness

excited by temporal characteristics of the flow of Q’r| as

well as by very small amounts of Q’r|

"^It is interesting that

to the

itself.

These temporal excitations allow the

Freud pictures these two

sets

co

of facilitations as working

in

reverse order. In the case of a positive experience, the re-aroused need again seeks the

memory of the

satisfying object, while in the case of pain, the

memory of the

hostile

object arouses a somatic charge experienced as unpleasure or pain. This postulation of

“key neurones”

kind

is,

fits

neatly with Freud’s later theory of signal anxiety.

’’^Sigmund Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology, SE

I.

Let us suppose that a

is

however a decided advantage

to

i)/.

“Inhibition of this
a hostile

mnemic

image and b a key-neurone to unpleasure. Then, if a is awakened, primarily unpleasure
would be released, which would perhaps be pointless and is so in any case [if released] to
its full amount” (324).
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system to generate conscious sensations of quality which
are accompanied by the
discharge of the minute amounts of Q’r|.‘'* These discharges
of excitation from

perceived by

as indications of reality."'

ij;

down, however,

for

it

is

only

if the

It is at

cathexis of a

inhibition, that the criterion holds good. If a

hallucination,

it,

too, will

be perceived by

w

this point that the

mnemic image

mnemic image

is

as having quality

if the

cathexis of the

mnemic image

is

the indication of reality will be reliable.

which the mind may

are

system can break

takes place subject to

cathected to the point of

and the same discharge and

indication of reality will ensue as if the perception had been an external one.

only

o)

It is

therefore

controlled through inhibition by the ego that

Freud has thus demonstrated two ways

in

function.

Wishful cathexis

to the point

of hallucination [and] complete

generation of unpleasure which involves a complete expenditure
of defence are described by us as psychical primary^ processes;

by contrast, those processes which are only made possible by
a good cathexis of the ego, and which represent a moderation
of the foregoing, are described as psychical secondary processes.
It will be seen that the necessary precondition of the latter is
a correct

employment of the indications of reality, which
when there is inhibition by the ego.'^’

is

only possible

The
functioning

difference between primary process functioning and secondary process

became

a central tenet of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory.

these processes, as Freud did of the

4)

and

i|j

We might ask of

systems, were they invented or were they

"*Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

308-09.

"'Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

325.

'^Vreud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

326.

‘^'Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology,

SE

I,

326-27.
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discovered?'^^ In any case they provided the link that
allowed

phenomena

as diverse as dreams,

him

to assimilate

symptoms, jokes, and works of art

to a single

explanatory scheme.

According

to Paul Ricoeur, the Project

stands as the greatest effort Freud ever

mass of psychical

made

to force a

facts within the

framework of a quantitative
by way of the absurd that
the content exceeds the frame .... Nothing is more dated
theory, and as the demonstration

than the explanatory plan of the ‘Project,’ and nothing more
inexhaustible than its program of description. As one enters
more deeply into the ‘Project,’ one has the impression that

framework and the neuronic support recede
background, until they are no more than a given and
convenient language of reference which supplies the necessary
the quantitative
into the

constraint for great discoveries.'^^

In the Project,

we

see the bare bones of Freud’s thought.

clothed in flesh and blood,

we must

compressed ideas of the Project

are

look to his

expanded

Interpretation of Dreams, for example, Freud

dynamic aspect of the

later

into a

is

To

find this skeleton

work where many of the highly
more

accessible form. In The

able to present far

more

clearly the

interaction of the psychic systems, positing an unconscious that

seeks the expression of sexual or infantile material, a preconscious that opposes this

expression because of the “unpleasure” thus produced, and a conscious that has been

reduced to “a sense organ for the perception of psychical

summarizes

his position in

SE

I,

303.

Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on

Interpretation,

Yale University Press, 1970), 73.
'^^Freud,

As Freud

“On Dreams”:

'^^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology,
'^^Paul Ricoeur,

qualities.

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 614-15.
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(New Haven:

Our hypothesis

is

that in our mental apparatus there are

two thought-constructing agencies, of which the second
enjoys the privilege of having free access to consciousness
for its products whereas the activity of the first
is in itself

unconscious and can reach consciousness only by way of the
second. On the frontier between the two agencies, where
the first passes over to the second, there is a censorship,
which only allows what is agreeable to pass through and
holds back everything
then,

what

is

rejected

else. According to our definition,
by the censorship is in a state of

Under certain conditions, of which the state
one, the relation between the strength of the
two agencies is modified in such a way that what is repressed

repression.

of sleep

is

can no longer be held back.
Since, however, the censorship

is never completely
eliminated but merely reduced, the repressed material must
.

.

.

submit

to certain alterations

features.

which mitigate

What becomes conscious

between the intentions

its

offensive

compromise
of one agency and the demands of
... is a

the other.

While

his

that there

work with
is

a realm of psychical functioning that takes place outside the arena of

consciousness,

in far

more

patients suffering from neuroses had lead Freud to the recognition

in his

detail.

study of dreams he was able to study the nature of this “other scene”

Positing the conflict and ensuing

preconscious and unconscious systems
strange nature of dreams,

it

in the

compromise between

the

fomiation of dreams not only explains the

also provides insight into psychic functioning other than

rational discursive thought nomially associated with consciousness. Freud argues that

associated with the preconscious and unconscious psychic systems are two very different

sets

of principles which govern the functioning of these two systems.

the unconscious system

'^^Freud,

is

On

the one hand,

characterized by “primary process” thought, while the

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 676.
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preconscious (and conscious) systems operate
according

to the principles

of “secondary

process” thinking.

The unconscious,

as the

more primitive of the systems, has

establishment of a “perceptual identity

.

.

.

i.e.,

its

aim the

with the idea upon which an original

experience of satisfaction has conferred a special value,” and
shortest available route,

as

by means of hallucinatory

it

seeks this identity by the

reproduction.'^^ Because

it

not heed the constraints of reality, the primary process thinking
of the unconscious

need

is

by displacement, condensation, compromise formation, and

further characterized

superficial associations that stand in stark contrast to secondary process
thinking.

The conscious and preconscious systems, by
with the earlier source of pleasure, that

of pleasure through “waking thought,
action” which are the

is,

contrast, seek a “thought identity”

the establishment in reality of the earlier source

attention,

judgment, reasoning and controlled

mark of secondary process

thinking.'^*

While the primary process functioning of the unconscious
principle of “unpleasure,”

affects), the

(i.e.,

is

governed by the

the avoidance of all thoughts associated with painful

secondary processes associated with the preconscious must modify

avoiding unpleasure

at all costs if

it

is

to

be successful in

hallucinatory satisfactions. Thus, the preconscious

is

its

of

search for real as opposed to

able to contemplate (“cathect’) even

'^^Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 339-40.
'^^Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 597.

'^*Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 588-609.
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this rule

potentially unpleasurable thoughts so long as

it

is in

a position to control or “inhihit” the

development of any unpleasure which might proceed from

them.'^*^

The primary processes of the unconscious, however,

are primary not only because

of their relatively primitive functional efficiency, but also because
of their chronological
priority in the

development of the individual.

Therefore, says Freud,

the core of our being, consisting of unconscious wishful

impulses, remains inaccessible to the understanding and
inhibition of the preconscious; the part played by the latter
restricted once and for all to directing along the most
expedient paths the wishful impulses that arise from the
unconscious.
is

Among

this core

of infantile wishful impulses are some which are unacceptable

to the

preconscious and whose fulfillment would not generate an affect of pleasure but rather of
unpleasure

if

allowed into consciousness. In the case of such wishes, there ensues a

struggle between the unconscious in

its

drive to

fulfill

the wish that

is

unacceptable to

consciousness and the preconscious which, because the unpleasurable affect of the wish
lies

beyond

become

its

control, turns

associated with

it.'^^

away from

the wish and from any thoughts

However, says Freud,

from the moment

at

which the repressed thoughts

are

strongly cathected by the unconscious wishful impulse
and, on the other hand, abandoned by the preconscious
cathexis, they

become

subject to the primary psychical

process and their one aim

is

motor discharge,

’^^Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 601.

'^‘’Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 603.

'^'Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 603.

’^^Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 605.
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or, if the

which have

path

is

open, hallucinatory revival of the desired perceptual

image.'”

It

is

precisely this process that results in the fomiation of
the dream.

unconscious wishful impulses that motivate the dream, Freud

The

calls the “latent

dream

thoughts”; the primary process “disguises” that seek to elude
the censorship of the

preconscious constitute the
available to conscious

interpretation,

that

one

is

dream work

memory

able to

is

;

and the part of the dream

the “manifest dream.”

move from

the manifest

that

becomes

Through the process of

dream through

a chain of associations

have been disguised by condensation, displacement, symbolization and considerations

of representability back
of the dream will inhere
Thus,

it

in the entire

impulses of the unconscious. The “meaning”

network of associations thus constructed.

not merely the conflict of the two systems, but the different nature of

is

their functioning

to the latent wishful

which must be understood

if

one

is

to

make

sense of the bizarre and

perplexing nature of dreams. Freud calls the aim of the unconscious

in its search for

perceptual identity with ideas associated with earlier sources of satisfaction a “wish,” and

it is

the ascendancy of primary process thought in the

definition of the dream: “a

dream

is

dream

states that leads to his

a (disguised) fulfillment of a (suppressed or repressed)

wish.”'”

According

to Freud, a similar interplay

results in the formation

of unconscious and preconscious thought

of hysterical symptoms, and they, too, are

'”Freud, The hiterpretation of Dreams,

SE V,

'”Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams,

SE

63

605.

IV, 160.

to

be regarded as the

fulfillment of unconscious wishes.

Freud argues, for example,

that

“
.

.

.

the

pathological mechanisms which are revealed in the
psychoneuroses by the most careful
analysis have the greatest similarity to
as

“above

all

discontinuous.

dream

processes.”'^"

What becomes conscious

associations, but only separate stopping points in

it,”’^^

is

He

describes the dream state

not a whole succession of

and, in a parallel manner, the

hysteric fails to bring to consciousness those links in the
associative chain of ideas which

would render her compulsions

intelligible.'^*

Despite the gap between the richness of Freud’s clinical observations and the
ability

of the Project to theoretically systematize those observations,'^*' Freud argues

both dreams and neurotic symptoms rely on displacement and symbol fonnation

that

to

disguise the wishes that motivate them.*'"' In each case, an interplay of conscious (or

preconscious) and unconscious ideas

phenomenon-dream
is

unified in the production of a single psychic

or symptom. Thus, two unities are posited in the Project. The

that different psychic

phenomena

psychic functioning. The second

'*^Freud,

is

are explicable in terms of the

is that

the individual psychic

same

first

principles of

phenomenon

itself is

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 569.

'^^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

336.

'^^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

1,

341.

'^*Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

SE

I,

348-9.

'^^Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind, 118-131. Sulloway details Freud’s
difficulties in representing pathological repression within the

framework of the Project,

pointing to the missing fourth section of the work which was to have dealt definitively

with this problem, and which was apparently never completed to Freud’s satisfaction.
'“"'Freud,

Project for a Scientific Psychology,

64

SE

1,

360.

expressive of a unification of thoughts which are derived
from unconscious as well as

conscious sources.

Above
fact,

all,

the Project posits a self that cannot be equated with
consciousness. In

the insights grounded in Freud’s

work

in

psychopathology and systematized

in the

Project render the self problematic to consciousness, not merely in the
dream state or as a
hypnotist’s trick, but practically and systematically.

The

hysteric suffers from the

compulsions generated by those ideas repressed from consciousness,'**’ and Freud’s theory
postulates a consciousness

possible extremes.

theory,’’

On

whose

role in the total functioning of the self falls

between two

the one hand, Freud writes, within “an advanced mechanistic

consciousness might be seen as a “mere appendage to physiologico-psychical

processes and

its

omission would make no alteration

in the [passage

of psychical

events];’’

on the other hand, consciousness might be seen as “the subjective side of all psychical
events and

developed

.

.

.

thus [as] inseparable from the physiological mental process.’’ The theory

in the “Project,” says Freud,

lies

between these two. Here consciousness

is

the subjective

side of one part of the psychical processes in the nervous

system, namely of the

o)

processes; and the omission of

consciousness does not leave psychical events unaltered
but involves the omission of the contribution from

Within

this passage,

Project,

in

making

Freud breaks through the professedly physicalist orientation of the

clear

its

nature as a model of psychic functioning, and allowing us to see

embryonic form the mature theory of the unconscious

that will evolve

Project for a Scientific Psychology\

SE

I,

350-51.

'*^Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology^

SE

I,

3

'“*'Freud,

65

1 1

from

it.

Faced

with the problem of constructing a model that would
demonstrate an unbroken associative
chain of thought making sense of the hysteric’s compulsions,
Freud could not equate

thought with consciousness.

He

could have posited an unbroken chain of physical
events,

of which thought was a mere accidental and inessential appendage,
or a theory of the
mental events of consciousness interspersed with and connected by
non-mental (neuronal)
events, but such a

is

move would have made

the Project the reductive caricature of thought

it

often portrayed to be. Freud’s insistence that only a theory of unconscious mental

events will serve his purpose

is

the result of a clear differentiation between mental and

physical events, even in the face of the Project

's

physicalist framework.

In the final

section of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud quotes with approval Lipps’ observation
that “the

the

problem of the unconscious

problem of psychology.
is

in

psychology

as

a psychological problem than

“The unconscious,’’ writes Freud,

the true psychical reality; in

it is

is less

its

innermost nature

much unknown to us as the reality of the
and it is as incompletely presented

external world,

his

book On Aphasia (1891), Freud asked

take a nerve fiber, which for the whole length of

its

rhetorically, “Is

it

justifiable to

course has been a purely

physiological structure and has been subject to purely physiological modifications, and to

end into the sphere of the mind and to fit this end out with a presentation or a
mnemic image?’’ In that paper, he argued for a psycho-physical parallelism which, while
sharply differentiating psychological and physiological events, nevertheless subscribed to
plunge

its

a kind of “appendage theory” of consciousness, with “presentations” (or “psychical

phenomena”) being regarded as “dependent concomitants” accompanying some
physiological events {SE XIV, 207-08). Thus the Project’s position on unconscious
thought represents an advance toward a fully psychological theory. In his 1915 paper on
“The Unconscious” Freud explicitly rejects psycho-physical parallelism.
''^^Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 61
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1

by the data of consciousness as is the external world
by the communications of our sense organs}'^^

How do works

of art and aesthetic processes

psychoanalytic exploration?

As

constant presence, assuming

now one

I

fit

into this early stage of

read through Freud’s work, the author’s voice

now

persona,

another; there

is

is

a

Freud, the

conquistador, taking possession of new territory; Freud, the archeologist,
uncovering the

buried past; Freud, the somewhat authoritarian physician, “into whose hands’’
his patients
are “delivered.”

Perhaps the strongest voice

of riddles. Wherever there

is

hear, however,

I

evidence of mind, there

no more than introduced a patient or a dream than he
up one
that

Is

train

of thought

after another, trying to

he himself has posed. Freud approaches

a novel like a dream?

What makes

us sad?

Is

that

of Freud, the solver

a riddle to be solved; and he has

is

is

is

probing, interrogating, following

answer a question, or a

art

series

and aesthetic processes

a dream in a novel like a real dream?

in just this

Why does

the portrayal of tragic events on stage enjoyable?

of questions,

beauty make

How does a

of literature produce a feeling of uncanniness? Why does Hamlet delay? What
relation between the artist

's

life

and

his

the question, then endlessly complicates

that ties

up

all

it,

In each case,

we have

the Freud

is

work

the

who

asks

and then triumphantly finds the neat solution

of the loose ends or uncovers another

What we discover
series

work?

way.

in Freud, therefore, is not so

much

set

of questions

to

be answered.

a fully developed theory of

art as a

of riddles and answers.

There

is

another

way

to think about Freud’s

vividly being given a microscope as a child.

'“^^Freud,

Under

approach

the microscope,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, 613.
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to aesthetics.

I

remember

whole new worlds

my

appeared, and

new

focused his

mind and then

sisters

I

were

in a delirium

of discovery. In a similar way, Freud

instrument, psychoanalytic theory and technique, on

another, providing

The theory

questions.

and

new answers

to old questions

first

one aspect of

even as he uncovered new

elucidated the phenomena, and he looked to the

phenomena

for

confirmation of the theory. In this way, enabled and constrained by the
possibilities of his
instrument, Freud assimilated

Now,
reminded

if

we

general view of psychic functioning.

think back to Freud’s formulations in the Project,

that the sole

Furthermore,

art to his

we have

purpose of all mental processes

is

we

are at once

the fulfillment of wishes.

learned that these wishes are equivalent to the memories of

experiences of satisfaction resulting from the successful discharge of psychic energy
arising

most

from the stimuli associated with endogenous needs. Some of these wishes

part infantile egoistic and sexual wishes)

have been subjected

to repression

(for the

because

they are incompatible with that group of ideas that forms the mature ego. This means that
they have been barred from association with that group of ideas which

and are they are therefore unavailable
contrasting

modes of operation

in the

to consciousness.

make up

the ego

Freud has also differentiated two

psychic apparatus: the primary process, which

functions solely according to considerations of pleasure and unpleasure; and the secondary

process, which, in

its

search for satisfaction, takes into account the demands of reality.

Freud has also made further discoveries
There

is,

for

satisfaction

that

we have

not examined as closely.

example, the tendency of that which has been repressed

even while

repression has

left

the

in the repressed state.

now

isolated idea (and

to continually seek

Because the process of undergoing

its

accompanying

subsequently free to link up with any other idea that

68

is

affect)

“unbound,”

it

is

not safely bound by the ego. Such

may be found among

ideas

others that have been repressed or

have merely escaped the ego’s

most

attention.

These

links

among

into consciousness in a disguised fomi.

or

associated affect into consciousness the “return of the repressed.

its

symptoms
emerged

A

are

calls this irruption

ideas that

the loosest and

may make

back

Freud

many

may be formed upon

of associations, and through them the repressed idea

irrational

the

its

way

of a repressed idea

two examples of these derivatives of unconscious wishes

Dreams and
that

have

re-

into consciousness.''^^

special kind of unconscious derivative

formation that shares in

many of the

but nevertheless operates

at

is

the fantasy, a highly organized

qualitative aspects of a secondary process production

an unconscious

level.'"'*

To begin

with, a fantasy

is

a

scenario, a kind of dramatization representing the fulfillment of an unconscious wish.

Freud

first

encountered fantasies in the stories of sexual seduction related

to

him by

his

neurotic patients, stories that he later understood to represent not actual scenes of

seduction but fantasies associated with infantile sexual wishes.

He

also considered

unconscious fantasies to be the starting point of the process of dream formation, and he

SE XIV,

'^'’Freud,

“Repression”

'"'Freud,

“The Unconscious”

in

SE XIV,

180-95.

'"*Freud,

“The Unconscious”

in

SE XIV,

190-91. In this work, Freud writes,

in

154.

“Of

such a nature are those phantasies of normal people as well as of neurotics which we have
recognized as preliminary stages in the formation both of dreams and of symptoms and

of their high degree of organization, remain repressed and therefore cannot
become conscious” (191). As Laplanche and Pontalis point out, however, Freud does not
always differentiate sharply between day-dreams and fantasies {The Language of PsychoAnalysis, 316). If we were to make day-dreams analogous to dreams, we might suppose
which,

in spite

that fantasies are

unconscious formations on which the conscious day-dream
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is

based.

considered day-dreams to be intimately connected with
unconscious fantasies as well.

One of the

characteristics peculiar to fantasy

The

a temporal order.

is

relation of a phantasy to time

We may say that

it

hovers, as

it

is in

general very important.

were, between three times-the

moments of time which our ideation involves. Mental
work is linked to some current impression, some provoking
three

occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one
of the subject’s major wishes. From there it harks back to a
memory of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in

which

this

wish was

and

fulfilled;

it

now

creates a situation

which represents a fulfilment of the
is a day-dream or phantasy, which
carries about it traces of its origin from the occasion which
provoked it and from the memory. Thus past, present and
future are strung together, as it were, on the thread of the wish
relating to the future

wish.

What

that runs

it

thus creates

through

them.''^^

In “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming,”'^*^ Freud

child’s play, noting

how

compares creative writing

each “re-arranges the things of his world

in a

to

new way which

pleases him.” Freud observes that, while the child takes his play-world very seriously, he

does not mistake

he

it

likes to link his

real

for real. In fact, the child retains a lively interest in the real

imagined objects and situations

world.” Freud then argues that

this linking

to the tangible

ceased to play,” however, he
but “instead of playing, he

may once

and visible things of the

of play with the objects of the

the only thing that distinguishes play from fantasy.

Once

the child has

that

is,

real

world

own making,

he day-dreams. Freud observes

that

while the adult “cherishes” these day-dreams as among his “most intimate possessions,”

he

is

nevertheless ashamed of them and “would rather confess his misdeeds than

tell

in

SE

IX, 147-48.

'^‘'Sigmund Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming” in

SE

IX, 143-153.

'“'‘^Sigmund Freud, “Creative Writers

and Day-Dreaming”
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is

“grown up and

again seek pleasure in a world of his

now phantasies,"

world “and

anyone

his phantasies.”

Both play and fantasy express wishes.

play expresses the wish to be grown up and enjoy
adult.

In the adult,

on childish wishes

all

the perceived prerogatives of an

however, fantasies are generally egoistic or
that the adult has long since repressed.

creative writer simply one

who

In the child’s case, his

erotic,

and they are based

Now, Freud

asks himself,

has substituted child’s play with fantasy?

“May we

is

the

really

attempt to compare the imaginative writer with the ‘dreamer in broad daylight’,
and his
creations with day-dreams?”

Considering

and short

first

the

works of “the

Freud argues

stories,”

fact that all

of the

of invulnerability

characteristic

immediately recognize His Majesty the Ego”
every story.” The

of novels, romances

have the stamp of the day-dream. The

that they all

whose “revealing

invincible hero through

less pretentious authors

women

is

we

can

“the hero alike of every day-dream and of

in the

novel invariably

fall in

love with this

hero “can hardly be looked on as a portrayal of reality.” Freud concludes that the formula
that

governs the creation of a dream or symptom applies

[Sjome strong experience
writer a

memory of an

his childhood)
its

in the present

to these literary creations as well:

awakens

earlier experience (usually

from which there

now

in the creative

belonging to

proceeds a wish which finds

fulfilment in the creative work.'^’

If there is a

dreamer, however,

way
it

is

in

which the creative writer may be sharply contrasted

to the day-

through the two-faceted observation that the creative writer

willing to share his day-dreams

and we

are not repelled

by them. Freud suggests

through the incentive bonus or fore-pleasure of fonn, that the reader
the writer’s fantasy. According to Freud,

‘^‘Freud, “Creative Writers

all

is

is

that

it

enticed into sharing

of the purely aesthetic pleasure the writer

and Day-Dreaming”
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in

SE

IX, 151.

is

offers

IS

due

to this pleasure in form,

work provides us with

content of the

while the sharing of the fantasy that underlies the
a “greater pleasure arising from deeper psychical

sources,” the “liberation of tensions in our minds.”

We can derive a whole
paper.

The work of art

is

agenda of Freudian studies

themes

that transcend time

Much

and place.

over us can be understood as being the result of the
are

somehow engaged by

change
art

may be

details

interpreted just like a

its

energy.

of the power that works of art have

fact that

There

our

own

repressed fantasies

work of art involves

also implied the notion that a

is

dream or symptom;

thus,

deeper meaning. (Conversely,

unconscious can speak directly

without our understanding
sharing of fantasies

question what

life

this short

the artist’s disposal the great

we

are

prompted

of the work for evidence of the condensation and displacement

disguise or obscure

artist’s

at

the artwork, and that response to the

economy of psychic

in the

from

seen to be the result of an interweaving of conscious and

unconscious mental processes. “Primal fantasies” place
literary

in aesthetics

how

somehow

to

we might

to

look

There

is,

acts to legitimate them.

at

the

that the

our own, allowing the work to weave

this occurs.)

work of

that are likely to

assume

also

a

its

magic

furthemiore, the notion that the

And,

finally,

we

are lead to

experiences or qualities of character differentiate the creative writer

from the ordinary person who hides

his or her fantasies

and would only succeed

in

repelling us if he or she did not?

On

the other hand, the limitations of a Freudian aesthetics are

evident than in these ten pages.

artist’s creation

We

find over

nowhere more

and over the unbridgeable gulf between the

and the external world. Freud loses track of the important connection

between child’s play and

reality, [i.e., that the child “likes to link his
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imagined objects and

situations to the tangible and visible things of the
real world”],
as the successor to child’s play. Fantasy,

IS

who have

indulged in by those

by contrast

when he

introduces fantasy

to child’s play, is secret, shameful.

It

not learned “to suppress the excess of self-regard” that

they enjoyed in the “spoilt days” of childhood.

It is

only the “unreality of the writer’s

imaginative world” that allows intrinsically distressing situations to
be represented as
exciting.

Even worse, Freud
There

tells us.

a great deal

is

phantasies; but

I

to certain points.

more

that could

be said about

will only allude as briefly as possible
If phantasies

become

over-luxuriant

and over-powerful, the conditions are laid for an onset
of neurosis or psychosis. Phantasies, moreover, are the

immediate precursors of the distressing symptoms
patients. Here a broad by-path

complained of by our

branches off into pathology.
In assimilating the

work of the

creative writer to the

loses sight of the fact that the artistic creation

fantasy like a

symptom

or dream, but

is

is

a work.

It

symptom

does not “produce

a “continuation” of child’s play

is

not to say that

it

is

him

to the significance

otherwise— to the construction of the

To say

out of

To say

that creative writing

nothing hut child’s play. Freud’s

theoretical premise that there exists a sharp differentiation

external reality, blinds

itself’

the result of a process that requires intellectual

analysis and synthesis, effort over time as well as inspiration.

is

or dream, Freud

between wishful fantasy and

of the contributions of mind-artistic and

real world.

that first-phase or “classical” psychoanalysis, with

its

emphasis on the

dichotomy between conscious and unconscious aspects of mind, cannot provide
foundation for an ontologically significant aesthetic theory does not

'“Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming”
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in

SE

mean

IX, 148.

that

it

the

does not

offer significant insights within the

one of the most

lasting

the psychological

framework of its self-imposed

of Freud’s contributions

to aesthetics will

limitations."^ Perhaps

be his interpretation of

dynamics of those two masterpieces of Western

literature,

Oedipus Rex

and Hamlet. Having discovered within himself the intense love of his
mother and jealousy
of his father that he would

same primal

later

formulate as the Oedipus complex, Freud advanced the

fantasy as the key to the emotional

power of these two

plays.

Of Oedipus

Rex, he writes to his confidant, Wilhelm Fliess:

.

.

.

the

Greek legend seizes upon a compulsion which everyone

recognizes because he senses

one

in the

its existence within himself Everyaudience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy and

each recoils in horror from the dream fulfillment here transplanted
into reality, with the full quantity of repression which separates
his infantile state

In the Interpretation

from his present

of Dreams, Freud extends

one.""*

this insight to

“another of the great creations of tragic poetry’’ that “has

Oedipus Rex.

its

Shakespeare’s Hamlet,

roots in the

same

Freud’s interpretation oi Hamlet, extended by Ernest Jones,

upon the understanding

that

Hamlet

is

his

moral duty,

to

is

predicated

caught between a powerful conscious inhibition and

an equally powerful unconscious fantasy. As Jones puts

It is

soil as

which

it:

his father exhorts him, to put

an end to the incestuous activities of his mother (by killing

"^See for example Freud’s contribution

to Aristotle’s

theory of catharsis in

“Psychopathic Characters on the Stage” or his elucidation of the framing assumptions
that lead to the experience of “uncanniness” in “The Uncanny.” In both cases it is the
interplay of conscious and unconscious

modes of thought

that

produce the described

effect.

Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1 904,
translated and edited by Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, 272. (Letter of October 15, 1897)
"^Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams,
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SE

IV, 264-66.

Claudius), but his unconscious does not want to put an end
to them (he being identified with Claudius in the situation),
and so he cannot. His lashings of self-reproach and remorse
are ultimately because of this very failure,
his guilty wishes to

undo

the sin.

By

i.e.

the refusal of

refusing to abandon his

own

incestuous wishes he perpetuates the sin and so must endure
the stings of torturing conscience. And yet killing his mother’s

husband would be the equivalent to committing the original sin
himself, which would if anything be even more guilty. So of
the two impossible alternatives he adopts the passive solution
of letting the incest continue vicariously, but at the same time
provoking destruction at the King’s hand.‘^^
Freud concludes his discussion
that just as

symptoms and dreams

to be, if they are to

chapter,

we

will

in

I

The Interpretation of Dreams by admitting

are “capable of being ‘over-interpreted’ and indeed need

be fully understood, so

of more than a single impulse
interpretation.”'^^

Hamlet

in the poet’s

all

genuinely creative writings are the product

mind, and are open

to

more than

will conclude this chapter with that thought as well,

examine another

interpretation of Hamlet,

made

and

a single

in the next

possible by advances in

the theory of psychoanalysis itself

'^"Emest Jones, Hamlet and Oedipus

(New York: W.W. Norton

1976), 90-91.
'^^Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE IV, 266.
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& Company,

CHAPTER

2

ART AND THE STRUCTURAL THEORY
Freud’s clinical work had forced a preoccupation with the distinction between

conscious and unconscious thought. The realization that ideas not available to

consciousness could

make

his patients

ill

made

the study of the unconscious the earliest

concern of psychoanalysis. With the 1923 publication of The Ego and the

Freud introduced a major revision

to his theory

of psychoanalysis.

maintain that the “division of the psychical into what

conscious

is

however,

While continuing

conscious and what

is

to

un-

the fundamental premiss of psycho-analysis,”' he nevertheless

acknowledged
a quality

is

Id,

that

which we

unconsciousness “becomes a quality which can have

make,

are unable to

as

we

should have hoped

many meanings,

to do, the basis

of

far-

reaching and inevitable conclusions.”^

As we have
was based

seen, Freud had fomiulated a description of mental functioning that

in large part

consciousness.

on the relationship of various psychical subsystems

He had named

to

the transient and fleeting condition of immediate

perception the system conscious (Cs. or Pcpt.-Cs.), pointing out that an idea that

conscious

back

at

one point

may have

disappeared a

moment

into consciousness after an interval, during

Freud had discovered

that,

while

this

which

later,

it

is

only to be brought

“—we do

period during which an idea

'Freud, The

Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

13.

^Freud, The

Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

18.

^Freud, The

Ego and

the Id,

SE XIX,

14.

is

is

not

know

what.”^

not immediately

conscious but

is

different

is

latent or capable

from other

states

of becoming conscious

is

descriptively unconscious,

of unconsciousness “in which mental dynamics play a

These dynamics are made apparent by powerful ideas which have the same
mental

life

as ordinary ideas, yet are not available to consciousness. That

actively repressed, and he found that this repression

as resistance.

into the

is

it

part.”*^

effects in

is,

they are

manifested during psychoanalysis

Freud divided these two areas which are both descriptively unconscious

systems preconscious (Pcs.) and unconscious (Ucs.), with the Pcs. consisting of

ideas that are latent but capable of becoming conscious and the Ucs. consisting of ideas
that are repressed

and actively resisted during

analysis.^

Freud further ascribed differing characteristics

to

Pcpt.-Cs. functioning according to the reality principle

demands of secondary process thought and
according to the pleasure principle

primary process ideation.)^

(i.e.,

in

each system, with the Pcs. and

(i.e.,

in

accordance with the

the external world) and the Ucs. functioning

accordance with instinctual demands and

In addition, he

saw the

Pcs. as the site of the “censor” that

determined whether or not an unconscious (repressed) idea might enter into
consciousness. His studies on aphasia and work with hysterics lead him to believe

in order for

first

an unconscious element (a “thing presentation”) to become conscious,

be (re)connected with language

(i.e.,

The Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

^Freud, The

^See Chapter

One of this

it

must

“hypercathected” through attachment to a

“word-presentation”), and that, alternatively,

“^Freud,

that,

when an

14.

14.

dissertation.
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idea

is

repressed, the link between

the idea and the corresponding

word

broken.^

is

He argued

that

it

is

through the

reconnection of language and repressed thought that psychoanalysis
can help to recover
for consciousness that

which has been rendered unconscious.

According

to Freud,

only something which has once been a conscious
become conscious, and
anything
arising from within (apart from feelings) that seeks to
.

.

.

perception can

.

become conscious must

first

external perception: this

.

.

transfonn itself into an

becomes possible by means of

memory-traces.*
In this

way

the

memory of new

experiences becomes the vehicle by which older

(unconscious) memories or fantasies are hypercathected and thus
consciousness. In the optimal case of psychoanalysis, these
verbal

(i.e.,

word-presentations); however, in

some

available to

new memory

traces will be

special cases (e.g., hallucinations or

dreaming) “optical mnemic residues, when they are of things"
a special kind of “visual thinking”

made

may

where “what becomes conscious

provide the means for

...

is

as a rule only

the concrete subject-matter of the thought.”^ In the case of such visual thinking, the

relations

between the elements of the subject matter are not given expression, and

unconscious thoughts are not brought

^Freud, The

Ego and

the Id,

to

complete consciousness

SE XIX,

21

.

(see, for

the

example,

how

In a clarifying discussion of this

admittedly obscure process, Hans Loewald suggests that very early experiencing takes
place in a conaesthetic “flow” of which language is simply one of many sensory

components.

It is

only with the

later acquisition

of language as symbol

that early

experience can be articulated into its component elements and reconnected at a higher
level of mental organization that becomes “perceptible”, i.e. available to secondary
process consideration. See Hans W. Loewald, “Primary Process, Secondary Process, and

Papers on Psychoanalysis, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980),
There is no problem in understanding how thought and word can become
1 78-206.

Language”

in

disconnected after language has achieved
*Freud, The

*^Freud,

its

symbolic function.

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

20.

SE XIX,

21.

The Ego and the

Id,
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the

day residue provides

latent

dream thoughts only

partial

and disguised access

to

consciousness). Thus Freud saw no direct link between the Pcpt.-Cs. and
Ucs. Their
relationship

By

was always mediated by

1923, a

the Pcs.

number of considerations

lead Freud to the conclusion that the

relationship of psychic subsystems to consciousness

was no longer adequate

the intricacies of his clinical observations. Perhaps the

considerations

was

the realization that not only

is

to capture

most decisive of these

the repressed material of the Ucs.

unavailable to consciousness, the resistance to the discovery of such material

is

unavailable to consciousness as well. In order for his theory of intrapsychic conflict to

work, the repressive forces had

to

be assigned

secondary process and opposing the impetus

to a

for

energy that reigns within the Ucs. This meant
that

would adequately account

his patients.

while

Cs.

its

Its

for the

yet,

immediate discharge of instinctual

that there

was no place

in

Freud’s theory

unconscious resistance that was demonstrated by

opposition to instinctual discharge meant

unavailability to consciousness

And,

system operating under the rules of the

meant

it

it

could not be part of the Ucs.,

could not be part of the Pcs. or Pcpt.-

such unconscious resistance was undeniable. Thus,

it

became

clear that the

simple principle of availability to consciousness provided an insufficient basis for
defining mental structures.

Freud began his reformulation of psychic functioning by considering the “ego,” a
term he had loosely associated with the Pcpt.-Cs. and Pcs.

in his earlier system.

We have

formed the idea that in each individual there is a
coherent organization of mental processes; and we call this
his ego. It is to this ego that consciousness is attached; the
ego controls the approaches to motility-that is,
charge of excitations into the external world; it

agency which supervises

all its
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own

to the disis

the mental

constituent processes, and

which goes

to sleep at night,

censorship on dreams.
too,

though even then

From

it

exercises the

ego proceed the repressions,
sought to exclude certain trends
this

by means of which it is
mind not merely from consciousness but

in the

also from

other forms of effectiveness and activity. In analysis these
trends which have been shut out stand in opposition to the
ego, and the analysis is faced with the task of removing the
resistances

which the ego displays against concerning

with the repressed.

Now we

find during analysis that,

itself

when

we

put certain tasks before the patient, he gets into difficulties;
his associations fail when they should be coming near the
repressed.

but he

is

We then tell

quite

him that he is dominated by a resistance;
unaware of the fact, and, even if he guesses

from his unpleasurable feelings that a resistance is now at
in him, he does not know what it is or how to describe
it.
Since, however, there can be no question but that this

work

we find
We have come upon

resistance emanates from his ego and belongs to

ourselves in an unforeseen situation.

something

in the

ego which

is

exactly like the repressed-that

without
before

it

itself

also unconscious,
is,

it,

which behaves

which produces powerful

effects

being conscious and which requires special work

can be made conscious.

From

the point

of view of

analytic practice, the consequence of this discovery

is

that

we land

endless obscurities and difficulties if we keep our habitual forms
of expression and try, for instance, to derive neuroses from a conflict
between the conscious and the unconscious. We shall have to
in

substitute for this antithesis another, taken from our insight into

the structural conditions of the mind-the antithesis between the

coherent ego and the repressed that

Freud thus abandons his

first

is split

offfrom

it.‘°

theory-the topographical theory-which

is

based on

the relationship of the subsystems Pcpt.-Cs, Pcs., and Ucs. to consciousness; in

he puts a second theory-the structural theory-which

“’Freud, The

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

is

place

based on the “antithesis between

17 (italics mine).
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its

the coherent ego and the repressed that

is split

off from

The

it.”‘'

split-off part of the

mind, “unknown and unconscious,” Freud tenns the “id

At
the

id,

this point, the structural theory portrays the

mind

as divided into the ego and

with parts of the ego being conscious (or preconscious) and parts of it (the forces

responsible for resistance and repression) being unconscious. The ego (which has

its

“nucleus” in the former system Pcpt.-Cs. and extends to include the earlier system Pcs.)
rests

upon the surface of the

id

and merges

into

it.

Clearly, the ego and the id are not

subject to the strict differentiation that held between the systems Cs. and

Freud argues

that “it is easy to see that the

ego

is

that part

modified by the direct influence of the external world.
to the reality principle

’‘Jacob A.

Structural Theory,
distinction

and seeks

to

impose

(New York:

name them

They

As

id

such,

on the

which has been
it

id in

functions according

which the pleasure

Arlow and Charles Brenner, Psychoanalytic Concepts and

the

International Universities Press, Inc., 1964), 6.

between these two theories

not actually

this principle

of the

Ucs.-, in fact

is

The

a matter of accepted nomenclature. Freud did

as such.

sometimes distinguished as the “first” and “second” topography.
See Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 449-453. Laplanche and
Pontalis point out that the various subsystems of both of these theories have “distinctive
are also

and a specific position vis-a-vis the others, so that they may
metaphorically speaking as points in a psychical space which is susceptible of

characteristics or functions

be treated,

figurative representation.” Freud specifically refutes the idea that the “topographies”

“anatomical localization of function.” They cannot, however, be
“isolated from the dynamic view, equally essential for psycho-analysis, according to
which the [sub] systems are in conflict with one another” (451-52).

correspond

to the

XIX, p. 23. Freud borrows this term from Georg Groddeck who argued that
we are “‘lived’ by unknown and uncontrollable forces” which he called das Es. The
German das Es literally translates as the it, an impersonal tenn that captures the feeling of
“otherness” inspired by the unconscious. In the Standard Edition, das Es is translated
^^SE,

into the Latin Id.

’^Freud, The

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,
81

24-25.

principle “reigns unrestrictedly.”'" Despite

its efforts,

however, the ego remains under

the control of the id in tenns of its basic aims.
While the ego controls access to motility,

Freud likens

it

to a

horseback rider

who

has to control a horse that

is

much more

powerful

than himself:

Often a
is

he

is

not to be parted from his horse,

obliged to guide

it

where

rider, if

same way

the ego

is in

will into action as if

The ego accomplishes

this

it

some

Freud’s reformulation of the

level

first

revision.'*^

ethical functioning-ideas

its

own.'^

become conscious

to

word- or thing-

and, through conformity to the

of satisfaction.

was not

resistance

the only consideration that forced

topographical system.

what he termed a

motivating factor in his

to go; so in the

by linking unconscious thoughts

The anomaly of unconscious

analytic situation

wants

the habit of transforming the id’s

were

presentations and thus allowing them to

reality principle, achieve

it

“far stranger”

He had

phenomenon

Freud observed

encountered within the

that also

that certain aspects

became

a

of moral and

which should be completely ego-syntonic and thus

available to

consciousness-often function in an unconscious and self-punitive way.'^ In his 1917
paper.

Mourning and Melancholia, he pointed

'"Freud,

The Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

'^Freud,

The Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

out that in such cases:

25.

this later

would revise this assessment of
and Anxiety (SE XX, 91-100.) In

25. Freud

the ego’s strength in 1926 in Inhibitions, Symptoms,

work, he posits a greater amount of strength

control of motility and consciousness and to

points out in this

work

its

that the ego, as a part

'^Freud,

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

The Ego and the

Id,

of the

26.

SE XIX, 26-21
82

which he

attributes to

nature as an organized structure.

id itself to effect repression.

"’Freud, The

to the ego,

id,

may draw upon

the

He

its

also

powers of the

one part of the ego
it

sets itself

critically, and, as

we

are here

it

over against the other, judges

were, takes

it

as

its

becoming acquainted with

called conscience

;

we

shall

count

it,

is

object.

.

.

.

the agency

What
commonly

along with the censorship

of consciousness and reality-testing, among the major institutions
of the ego, and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can

become diseased on
Freud had theorized

up an object, identifies

its

own

that in cases

itself

account.’*

of melancholia, the ego,

with the object and thus draws to

in the process

itself the instinctual

cathexis formerly lavished on the object. This identification of self and object

possible by a regression from a genetically

earlier stage

of narcissism, a stage

extent that ambivalence

is

in

of giving

is

more advanced form of object-choice

which the ego takes

itself as its

own

made
to the

object.'^

To

the

a part of the original object relationship, libidinal pressures

that help to enact the narcissistic identification will

be accompanied by feelings of hate

directed toward the part of the ego identified with the lost object.^’’

In

The Ego and the

Id,

Freud expands

this

notion of a special agency within the

ego through the formulation of the “super-ego” as a

third

subsystem of the psyche. He

begins with a statement that generalizes his observation of the processes that had

become obvious

in

first

mourning and melancholia:

When

it

happens

that a

person has to give up a sexual

object, there quite often ensues an alteration of his ego.

‘*Freud,

“Mourning and Melancholia”

''’For a fuller

SE XIV,

SE XIV,

discussion of narcissism, see

73-102. “Thus

the ego, from

in

we fonn

which some

is later

“On

247.

Narcissism:

An

Introduction” in

the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of

given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists

and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the
We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between
pseudopodia which it puts out.
ego-libido and object-libido. The more of the one is employed, the more the other
.

becomes depleted”
^"Freud,

.

.

(75-76).

“Mourning and Melancholia”

83

in

SE XIV,

250-51.

which can only be described
inside the ego, as
that

by

it

as a setting

up of the object

occurs in melancholia

this introjection,

which

is

....

It

may

be

a kind of regression to

mechanism of the

the

oral phase, the ego makes it easier
be given up or renders that process
may be that this identification is the sole

for the object to

possible.

It

condition under which the id can give up

any

its objects.
rate the process, especially in the early phases of

development,
to

suppose

is

a very frequent one, and

that the character

of the ego

abandoned object cathexes and

that

it

is

makes

it

At

possible

a precipitate of

contains the history

it

of those object choices.^’

Not
one

that is

surprisingly, Freud argues the “first and

formed through the child’s relationship

most important

to its parents,^^

complicated and evolving relationship which culminates

in the

identification”

and

enmeshed

hatred and rivalry toward the parent of the same sex.

of the male

child,

we

find that

it

is

is

If,

with the two

accompanied by feelings of

we

for simplicity,

only the recognition that his father/rival

take the case

is

powerful than he, and, furthermore, capable of exacting horrific punishment
persists in his love attachment to his mother, that persuades

The

him

to give

up

more

if the child

his claim.

child does this, in part through identification with his powerful father from

“borrows” the strength

to effect his renunciation.

^‘Freud, The

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

29.

^^Freud, The

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

3

identification process]

of an object-cathexis;

is
it

apparently not in the

is

a direct and

1

.

But, as Freud points out, this

first

and mother seem nonnally to find their outcome
thus reinforce the primary one.”
would
and
kind,

84

is

only

instance the consequence or outcome

than any object-cathexis. But the object-choices belonging to the

of this

whom he

“This [primary pre-oedipal

first

immediate identification and takes place

relating to the father

this

simplest fonn,

its

in a triangular relationship

parents in which love of the parent of the opposite sex

the

Oedipal stage of psycho-

sexual development that Freud derives the genesis of the super-ego. In
the Oedipal stage will find the child

from

is

it

is

earlier

sexual period and
in

an identification

one side of the

picture, for the

little

boy

also loves his father and

is

engaged

in a rivalry

with his mother for the father’s affection.'' This “negative”
aspect of the Oedipus

complex

boy

is

the result of the bisexuality inherent in each individual.
In this case, the

will protect himself (and in part satisfy his longing for
his father’s love)

identifying with his mother.

It is

little

by

through the renunciation of each of the parents as a

sexual object, accomplished in part through an identification with
the parent of the

opposite sex of the desired parent, that a “resolution” of the complete Oedipus
complex
effected.

As Freud

is

concludes:

The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated
by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the

forming of a precipitate
identifications in

in the ego, consisting

some way united

of these two

with each other.

This
modification of the ego retains its special position; it confronts
the other contents of the ego as an ego ideal or super-ego.^'^

Thus, according to Freud the super-ego, fomied through the dissolution of the Oedipus

complex,

is

the heir and representative of powerful id impulses as well as of internalized

parental prohibitions.

As such

it

"Freud, The Ego and the

and Anxiety”

in

SE XX,

1

is

Id,

more

closely related to the repressed unconscious than

SE XIX,

31-34. See also “Inhibitions, Symptoms,

01-1 18 for examples of the positive Oedipus

Complex

(“Little

Hans”) and the negative Oedipus Complex (“The Wolfman”). Freud
specific fear that prompts the renunciation of the desired parent in each case as the

also identifies the
fear

of

castration.

"Freud, The Ego and the
that the “super-ego
id;

it

is,

Id,

SE XIX, 34

however, not merely

(Italics Freud’s).

Freud also points out

a residue of the earliest object-choices

also represents an energetic reaction-fonnation against those choices.

Its

your

relation to

is not exhausted by the precept: ‘You ought to be
the prohibition: ‘You may not be like this (like your father)— that
comprises
also
may not do all that he does; some things are his prerogative.”

like this (like

the ego

85

of the

father).’ It
is,

you

to the

ego and

it

is

capable of combining the energy of instinctual
forces with the

punishing identification that was the basis of its

Freud brings one more consideration

initial institution.^^

to bear in his formulation

In accordance with his belief in an “archaic
inheritance” through

vicissitudes are preserved in individual

memory, he argued

of the super-ego.

which phylogenetic

that in the id,

“which

is

capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of
the existences of countless egos;
and,

when

the ego fomis

its

super-ego out of the

id,

it

may perhaps

only be reviving

shapes of former egos and be bringing them to resurrection.”^^
Thus Freud sees the
super-ego as gaining

id strength, not

(or perhaps, following

Hand

in

only from libidinal energy but also from prehistoric

Laplanche and Pontalis, a-historic)

hand with Freud

s

racial

memories

that

oppose

it.

revised model of psychic functioning went a revised

theory of the instincts. Prior to 1920, Freud had divided the instincts into
the ego

^^Freud, The

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

48.

“The super-ego owes

its

special

position in the ego, or in relation to the ego, to a factor which must be considered from
two sides; on the one hand it was the first identification and one which took place while
the ego

was

feeble,

still

and on the other hand

it is

the heir to the Oedipus

complex and

has thus introduced the momentous objects into the ego.”
^‘’Freud,

The Ego and the

primal horde and

its

Id,

SE XIX,

38.

It is

specifically Freud’s notion of the

relation to the “father-complex” that he has in

mind

here.

See also

Totem and Taboo and Group Psychology’ and the Analysis of the Id for a further
Arlow and Brenner (1964, p. 68) point out that Freud’s
explanations “based on regression to phylogenetic antecedents are nowadays regarded as
hardly acceptable from the scientific point of view.” However, Laplanche and Pontalis,
discussion of this notion.

(The Language of Psycho-Analysis, 332-33), in their discussion of ‘Primal Phantasies’,
“Whatever reservations may be justified as regards the theory of an hereditary,

argue,

genetic transmission, there

is

no reason,

that structures exist in the phantasy

in

our view, to reject as equally invalid the idea

dimension

(la fantasmatique)

which

are irreducible to

the contingencies of the individual’s lived experience.” This issue will provide a major

point of differentiation between Winnicott and Klein (see Chapter Three of this
dissertation).
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instincts

and

libidinal (sexual) instincts.^'

With the publication

Beyond

the Pleasure

Principle in 1920, he conceded that arguments he
had advanced in support of this duality

could not be sustained

ego

itself is

in the face

of the narcissistic stage of development

in

which the

taken as an libidinal object thus obviating the difference
between ego and

sexual energy.

This collapse of the earlier duality, (plus clinical observations
that

included the repetition compulsion and sadism), lead him to propose
a
duality between Eros (the

life instinct,

new

comprising both ego and libidinal

opponent, the death instinct (manifesting

The

itself in destructiveness).^*

instinctual

instincts)

and

its

self-destructive

tendencies which Freud had begun to examine closely in his 1915 paper. Mourning and

Melancholia, pointed a

way

to the integration

drive theory. In answer to his

own

of the structural theory and the revised

question of why the superego manifests itself in such

criticism and harshness toward the ego, Freud writes:
If we turn to melancholia

first,

we

find that the excessively

strong super-ego which has obtained a hold upon consciousness

rages against the ego with merciless violence, as

if

it

had taken

possession of the whole of the sadism available in the person
concerned. Following our view of sadism,
the destructive

^^Freud,
instincts as
that there is

“On

component had entrenched

we

should say that

itself in the

super-ego

An Introduction” in SE IV, 77-79. Freud sees the two
common distinction between hunger and love. He also argues

Narcissism:

embodying

the

a biological basis for their distinction: the ego instincts

work

for the

preservation of the individual and the sexual instincts for the preservation of the species.

^*In

The Ego and the

Id,

Freud describes the hypothesis of the death

instinct as

based on theoretical considerations, supported by biology. From a biological point of
view, he saw all life as comprising two contrary trends. On the one hand is the trend that
leads from the organic to the inanimate state; on the other

and more far-reaching combination
dispersed.”

On

the physiological level,

is

a trend

“which seeks a more

which living substance is
he compared these two trends to the processes of

of the particles into

anabolism and catabolism (40-41).
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and turned against the ego. What
super-ego

is,

as

it

is now holding sway in the
were, a pure eulture of the death instinct
.

Freud saw the

life

and death

instincts as “fused, blended,

.

and alloyed”

individual, and he suggested that instinctual
energy could be “neutralized.”^®

in

each

He

speculated that the primary mechanism for such
neutralization was the already
established procedure

been invested

in objects.

store of libido”

where
and

it

by which

He

the ego takes back to itself libidinal energy

hypothesized as “plausible” the notion that

which has

this “narcissistic

“desexualized Eros”) could become active in both the ego and
the

(i.e.,

would be “employed

to facilitate discharge.”®'

in the service

of the pleasure principle

id

to obviate blockages

In the id, the service of this displaceable energy

would be

manifested in the “looseness” of primary process functioning where the
object of
instinctual satisfaction

is

often a matter of indifference. In the ego,

manifested in sublimations

purpose

(that

thinking or

object

is

in

which desexualized

of “uniting and binding”)

artistic

is

made

libido

which

still

it

would be

retains

its

primary

available for such nonsexual processes as

production. Similarly, in inherently ambivalent situations where the

invested with both love and hate, Freud speculated that neutralized energy could

be added to either impulse, again,
that if instincts could

in

order to facilitate discharge. Furthermore, he argued

be fused, they could also be defused.

He saw

later

phases of

®®Freud, The

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

53.

®°Freud, The

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

44. Freud thus envisioned three kinds of

psychic energy: erotic and destructive impulses deriving from instinctual sources would

be qualitatively differentiated, while “neutralized” energy could be added to either
“augment its total cathexis.” We see that Freud speaks of energy in two ways:
qualitatively

and quantitatively. Freud speculated

that the qualitative aspect

might be a function of its temporality.
®'

Freud, The

Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

44-45.
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to

of energy

psycho-sexual organization as marked by a fusion
of instincts dominated by Eros, while
regressions to earlier phases entail a defusion of
instincts with a “marked emergence of
the death instinct”

We thus
picture that

[i.e.,

aggression or destructiveness].^^

see Freud’s structural theory of psychie funetioning
as presenting a

is far

more

fluid

Eaeh of the three psychic

and complicated than

structures

merely a differentiated part of the
contact with reality).

of early object
instinctual

And

earlier topographical theory.

when

part of the ego in the sense that

of the

id in that in derives its

it

is

by

is

its

a precipitate

energy from

may

be unconscious.

they are not met with resistance, are available to

the ideas of instincts themselves has changed. Instead of the

of self-preservation [‘ego-instincts’] and libido [‘sexual

and the death

The ego

the part of the id that has been altered

Elements of both the ego and the super-ego

Derivatives of id impulses,

instincts

is

relations, but also part

demands.

consciousness.

(i.e.,

The super-ego

of the

intimately connected with the others.

is

id

that

instinct, the first

instincts’],

we

find Eros

tending to unification and binding together and the second

toward dissolution and destructiveness. Energy from these

instincts

may be

fused or

defused, with regression to earlier psycho-sexual stages tending to promote defusion and

maturation to the

This

was

its

new

full genital

orientation dramatically changed the aim of psychoanalysis.

task simply to

Freud was

stage of psycho-sexual development promoting fusion.

make conscious

that

which had been unconscious. Rather,

to write in 1936:

At the present time we should probably define the task
of analysis as follows:

knowledge of all the

to acquire the fullest possible

three institutions of which

we

believe the psychic personality to be constituted and

^^Freud, The

No

Ego and the Id, SE XIX,

41-42.
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longer

as

Anna

to learn

what

are their relations to

the outside world. That
to explore

contents,

is to

one another and

to

say; in relation to the ego,

boundaries, and its functions,
of its dependence on the outside
world, the id and the superego; and in relation to the id,
to give an account of the instincts, i.e., of the id
contents
and to follow them through the transformations which

and

its

its

to trace the history

they undergo.

Anna Freud

know

continues by arguing that

make themselves

felt in

only through the ego that

“Now

sense of guilt. She concludes:

always the

this

it

produces in the ego”

means

to

only the

id are

becomes

as, for instance, in the

that the proper field for our observation

thus set out the agenda for what

conceptual

shift,

we

enter

seems unlikely

that the

The Ego and the

Id,

ego should

became known

as

ego psychology.

what Norman Holland has termed “second-phase”

psychoanalysis in which the primary polarity

menaced by

of the

we come

ego.”^'^

Anna Freud
this

we know

the ego, and, likewise, the superego

perceptible only through “the state which

With

is

anything about the other two agencies. What

derivatives that

is

it

command

in that

between ego and non-ego. At

such attention.

It is,

first

as Freud describes

it

it

in

“a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently

three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the

the severity of the superego”.^^

id,

and from

But Freud had already recognized the control of

perception and motility as major ego strengths. And, in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and
Anxiety, published three years after The

Ego and the Id, he demonstrated

that the affect

^^Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, Revised Edition,
(Madison, Connecticut: International Universities Press, Inc., 1966), 4-5. (First
published

in 1936.)

^'’Anna Freud, The

^^Freud, The

Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense,

Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

56.
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2.

of

anxiety also serves as a powerful ally in the ego’s
struggle to maintain equilibrium
the

among

competing psychic systems.
Freud’s early observations of cases of hysteria had lead
him to believe that the

repression of instinctual representatives lead to the
transformation of the libidinal energy

with which they had been invested into the affect of anxiety. As

Repression

Freud reiterated the formulation

energy would be

1915

late as

that a possible vicissitude

paper

in his

of instinctual

transformation (through processes of repression) into affect,

its

especially anxiety.^^ In Inhibitions,

Symptoms and Anxiety, however,

two cases of animal phobia

‘Little

of

[that

the consideration of

Hans’ and the ‘Wolf Man’] forced Freud

into a

radical reversal of his former position:

Here, then,

is

our unexpected finding:

the motive force of the repression

The

was

in

both patients

fear

of castration.

ideas contained in their anxiety-being bitten by a

horse and being devoured by a wolf-were substitutes by
distortion for the idea of being castrated
.

.

.

But the

affect

by the

father.

of anxiety, which was the essence of

the phobia, came, not from the process of repression, not

from the

libidinal cathexes

from the repressing agency
to the

of the repressed impulses, but
itself

The anxiety belonging

animal phobias was an untransfonned fear of

was therefore a realistic fear, a fear of a
danger which was actually impending or was judged to be
a real one. It was anxiety which produced repression and not,
as I formerly believed, repression which produced anxiety?^
castration.

Anxiety thus came

It

to

be understood as a danger signal

that alerts the

ego

to activate

defensive measures-in the case of hysteria, repression, and in the case of phobia,

avoidance of the substitute
the ego reacts Freud

^'’Freud,

that has replaced the instinctual danger.

more generally defined

“Repression”

^^Freud, The

in

SE XIV,

as

''di

growing tension due

153.

Ego and the Id, SE XIX, 108-09
91

The danger

(Italics

mine).

to

which

to need, against

which

it

[the ego] is helpless.”'' Prototypical

examples of such anxiety-provoking

situations are birth, the absence of the mother, the fear
of castration (or, in the case of the
girl,

It

an analogous

or punish

it

loss), and, finally, the ego’s fear that the

or cease to love

superego will “be angry with

Thus, symptoms and inhibitions fonn

it.”'^

in reaction to

anxiety generated by fear of being overwhelmed or annihilated,
abandoned, or punished.

Such

fears

may stem from

the

demands of objective

reality, libidinal instincts, or

superego prohibitions. The signal of anxiety serves not only

to

warn

the ego to activate

defensive measures, but also, by arousing the pleasure-unpleasure regulatory principle

throughout the psyche, helps the ego to co-opt the id’s assistance
instinctual process

which

is

placing the ego in

in diverting the

danger.'’'^

While Freud had originally used the terms “repression” and “defense” without
clearly differentiating them, 'm Inhibitions, Symptoms,

as “a general designation for

which may lead

the techniques

all

to a neurosis”.

He

and Anxiety, he

defines “defense”

which the ego makes use of in

conflicts

retains the term “repression” for the special

defense which had become apparent in his early studies of hysteria.**'

form of

In repression,

exciting ideas of an instinctual nature are excluded from consciousness and

become

"Freud, The Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

137. (Italics are Freud’s).

"Freud, The Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

137-143. Freud traced the physiological

characteristics of anxiety to the physiological reaction to the process of birth.

other “realistic” fears are set in motion by peremptory id demands.

It is

Each of the

evident that these

fears appear with the progression of maturational stages; however, earlier fears are not

replaced but reinforced and extended with each

new

stage.

The Ego and the Id, SE XIX, 125. “We have said that as soon as the ego
recognizes the danger of castration it gives the signal of anxiety and inhibits through the
pleasure-unpleasure agency (in a way we cannot as yet understand) the impending
‘^''Freud,

cathectic process in the id.”

“^’Freud,

The Ego and the

Id,

SE XIX,

163.
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evident in disguised fashion as symptoms, dreams, slips
of the tongue,

Other

etc.

defensive techniques that Freud describes in the same paper
include regression, reaction
formation, isolation, and

undoing

(all

In an earlier paper, “Jealousy, Paranoia

derived from his study of obsessional neuroses).

and Homosexuality” (1922), he describes the

defenses of introjection, or identification, and projection; in “Instincts and
Their
Vicissitudes” (1915), he introduces the processes of turning against the self and
reversal;"'^

and from “Mourning and Melancholia”

we

learn of sublimation, (“the

displacement of instinctual aims” onto culturally sanctioned
In

activities).

The Ego ami the Mechanisms of Defense, Anna Freud attempts

to

summarize

and systematize the concept of defense. In the process she adds a number of additional
defense mechanisms including identification with the aggressor, denial
in

word and

fact, restriction

of the ego,

“altruistic surrender,”

and asceticism of puberty.'*^ Particularly striking

many

limits.

She also points out

id processes as well as

against attack only if

it

is

that the

ego processes:

built

up on

this

and the intellectualization

her analysis

defenses originate in activities that are normal

normal within
from

in

at

in fantasy, denial

is

the recognition that

an earlier stage and

may

remain

form of defense mechanisms evolves

“We may

conjecture that a defense

is

proof

twofold basis-on the one hand, the ego and on

the other, the essential nature of the instinctual processes.

Roy

Schaefer extends the

fonnulation of this double nature of defense mechanisms:

Mechanisms of Defense,

'’^Anna Freud, The

Ego and

'^^Anna Freud, The

Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense,

the

44.

69-172. She attributes

the term “altruistic surrender” to Bribing.

‘^‘^Anna Freud,

The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, 175.
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I submit that the study of the
defense mechanisms will
remain incomplete so long as they are regarded
chiefly
as wardings off, renunciations and negative
assertions;

their study will

have

to be rounded out with an account
of defenses as implementations, gratifications and

positive assertions. In other words, they must be
viewed
as expressing the unity of the ego and id and not
just the
division and enmity of the two.

Thus, defenses have come to be recognized as more than the “compromise
formations” that hysterical symptoms were recognized to be. They

are,

more broadly

speaking, solutions to psychic problems and ultimately encompass an almost endless

range of activities which are on a continuum with the activities of nonnal
defensive function

is

part of

its

tendency toward unification.

tease out the conflicting impulses;

functioning

It is

structure.

is

the

when

When

life.

defenses

The ego’s

fail,

we

can

they work, “nonnal,” efficient psychic

result.'*'’

important also to note the part played by defense in the creation of psychic

The

institution

Oedipus complex

‘*^“The

is

the

of the superego as a precipitate of the dissolution of the

most obvious example. Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein

further

Mechanisms of Defense” in International Journal of Psychoanalysis,
comments should be read in a larger context of criticism of the

vol.

49, 1968. Schafer’s

limitations of the structural approach to psychoanalysis.

*'’Both

Roy

Schafer and

Anna Freud

cite R.

Waelder’s important theoretical paper,

“The Principle of Multiple Function: Observations on Over-determination” in The
5, 45-62. In this paper, Waelder writes: “According to
this principle of multiple function the specific methods of solution for the various
problems in the ego must always be so chosen that they, whatever may be their
immediate objective, carry with them at the same time gratification of the instincts.” His
principle of multiple function went further than just a consideration of ego and id
functions, however. He saw the ego as solving problems placed before it by the id,
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, vol.

superego, and the compulsion to repeat. In addition, he argued, the ego sets
for itself certain problems: namely the attempt to achieve ever greater integration with
each of the other agencies without being “swamped” by the demands of any of them.

reality, the
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elaborate this mter-relationship of defense

mechanism and psychic

structure in their paper

“Formation of Psychic Structure”:

The term defense should not suggest

the misapprehension

that the process here referred to is either
pathological or only

of a negative importance. Rather is it correct to say
that the
human personality is formed by psychic mechanisms which
serve, also, the purpose of defense.

Some of these mechanisms
operate in other areas; thus projection and introjection
are used in order to establish the distinction between
the self
first

and the non-self; regression, as a regular and temporary transformation of psychic functioning, accompanies the daily cycle
from awakeness to sleep; and denial of the unpleasant represents
probably an initial phase in the elimination of all disturbing

These and other mechanisms, which in the infant’s
life serve the function of adjustment and may be rooted
in the
reflex equipment of the newborn, may later function as
mechanisms of defense and thus produce changes in the child’s
stimuli.

personality.''^

Anna Freud

describes

how

these processes

may become

pathological through reference to

Wilhelm Reich’s Charakterpanzerung (“armor-plating of character”)
attributes

such as stiffness and

contemptuous,

ironical,

rigidity, personal peculiarities

in

which “bodily

such as a fixed smile,

and arrogant behavior” are understood

to

be “residues of very

vigorous defensive processes in the past which have become dissociated from their
original situations (conflicts with instincts or affects) and have developed into permanent

character traits

.

.

Such

“petrified” character traits

become obvious within

the

analytic setting, along with the “living flow” of symptoms, resistances, and

transformations of affect.'^^

“^^Heinz

Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph M. Loewenstein, “Comments on the

Formation of Psychic Structure”
28

in

The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,

.

''^Anna Freud, The

Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense,

33.

‘'^Anna Freud, The

Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense,

34.
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vol.

II,

1946,

Under

the impulse of the above considerations, ego
psychology (Holland’s

“second-stage psychoanalysis”) expanded to include character
analysis and the analysis

of resistance and defense. Instead of merely seeking

to

uncover repressed material by

eliminating resistance (as for example through hypnotism), the
analyst attempts to trace
the history of id and superego events

choices of defense.

by understanding the

In her discussion

structure of the ego and

of defenses, Anna Freud argues

association must be recognized as an impossible demand, but

opportunities for a deeper understanding of the psyche in

value of free association

by

its

lies

all

its

that free

very failures provide

of its manifestations. The

not only in the unconscious material that

is

brought to

adoption, but also in the conflict which results from any attempt to follow

unwaveringly. At the point where associative material

is

met with

encounters ego material to be analyzed. Similarly, not only

its

id

resistance,

light

it

one

impulses but also the ego’s

attempts to defend against them are met with in the transference and both become
material for analysis.

Thus,

we

can see that the fonnulations of second-stage psychoanalysis capture

more comprehensively

the complicated

of first-stage psychoanalysis. Even

so,

phenomena of psychic functioning than do

many of Freud’s

those

theoretical constructs remained

unsysteniatized and unevenly developed.^' The most thorough-going attempt to bring

precision and order to Freud’s later

work was undertaken by Heinz Hartmann who

spent a

lifetime attempting to clarify and synchronize Freud’s concepts into a general

^°Anna Freud, The Ego ami the Mechanisms of Defense, 18-22.
^'Roy Schafer, A

New Language for Psychoanalysis (New

Press, 1976), 58.
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Haven: Yale University

psychology

and, in the process,

made

a

number of theoretical advances

that

would prove

crucial to a sophisticated theory of aesthetics.

In his

most important work. Ego Psychology’ and the Problem
of Adaptation,

Hartmann looks

at

psychic functioning from the point of view of adaptation to

environmental requirements for survival. From
a conflict-free

at

ego sphere, the term

any given time exert

that

this

he applied

vantage point, he derived the idea of

to “that

their effects outside the region

ensemble of functions which

of mental conflicts.””

Among

such functions, he included “perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking,
language, recall-phenomena, productivity,” as well as “the well-known phases of motor

development, grasping, crawling, walking,” and “the maturation and learning processes
implicit in

did not

at

all

mean

these [activities].””

that they cannot

By

calling such functions “conflict-free”

become involved

in intra-psychic conflict, but rather, that

any given time, they may be operating outside the area of mental

Hartmann argued

that

“memory,

Hartmann

conflict.

associations, and so on, are functions

Moreover,

which cannot

possibly be derived from the ego’s relationships to instinctual drives or love-objects, but
are rather prerequisites of our conception of these and of their development.””

Functions, such as intelligence, which can be used defensively

(e.g.,

Anna

Freud’s

intellectualization as a defense in puberty), are likely to arise originally as adaptations to

”For a critical overview of Hartmann’s contributions, see Roy Schafer, “An
Overview of Heinz Hartmann’s Contributions to Psychoanalysis” in A New Language for
Psychoanalysis, 57-101.

^^Hartmann,

Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation,

8-9.

^“^Hartmann,

Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation,

8.

^^Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation,
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15.

reality.

On the

conflict

and become an automatized action which “through a change of function

from a means

other hand, a defense, over time,

into a goal in

Hartmann

its

own

may

lose

its

connection with instinctual

turns

right.

also introduces the biological principle of “fitting together” and cites

A.E. Parr’s definition of fitting together as an ‘“organization of the organism’ by which
[is

meant] ‘the lawful correlation of the organism’s individual parts.’” Hartmann finds the

psychoanalytic correlate to this principle in the ego’s synthetic function^^ and he applies
the idea of “fitting together” to the notion of the regulatory principles governing ego

functioning. Freud had postulated that the reality principle retains as

satisfactions

the

demanded by

demands of reality.

in the

its

aim the

the pleasure principle— though doing so while acknowledging

But, as

Hartmann points

out,

it

cannot be this “reality principle

narrow sense” which guarantees the adaptiveness of the organism

to

its

environment.

No

instinctual drive in

man

guarantees adaptation in

and of itself, yet on the average the whole ensemble of
instinctual drives, ego functions, ego apparatuses, and

meet the average
expectable environmental conditions, do have survival
value. Of these elements, the function of the ego
apparatuses ... is “objectively” the most purposive.
The proposition that the external world “compels” the
organism to adapt can be maintained only if one
already takes man’s survival tendencies and potentialities

the principles of regulation, as they

for granted.^*

^^Hartmann,

term for

this

achievement

^^Hartmann,

Problem of Adaptation,,
“secondary autonomy.”

Ego Psychology
is

cind the

Ego Psychology and

the

26.

Problem of Adaptation, 40.

^^Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, 46.
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Hartmann

s

Hartmann argued

that these “survival tendencies

and potentialities”

may

be found

in all

aspects of psychic structure and function, but the most important
of them arise from the
conflict-free sphere

of ego functioning.

It is,

for

example, the function of anticipating the

future (which develops in the conflict-free sphere) that guarantees that the
reality
principle (in the narrow sense) will replace the pleasure principle in
those cases where

operating solely according to the pleasure principle would be dangerous. This wider

tendency of the organism

Hartmann

to regulate itself in

calls the “reality principle in the

independent ego functions that guarantee

accordance with survival principles,

broader sense,” and he suggests that the

this adaptability

can themselves become

secondarily sources of pleasure.^^ (An example of this would be the pleasure that one

may
in

take in the process of thought.)

Hartmann points out

that the sources

of this pleasure

ego functioning will change as the individual matures and develops, and he argues

for

the need of a “characterization and qualitative differentiation of the various categories of

pleasure experiences.” Thus, Hartmann expands the individual’s pleasure potentialities

far

beyond the

satisfaction of the id’s instinctual

demands on which Freud had

concentrated. According to Hartmann:

First,

those feelings of pleasure which have strong

somatic reverberations (primarily sexual ones) could

be distinguished from the pleasure qualities of the
aim-inhibited, sublimated activities. But even these
could be further subdivided, as in Scheler’s (1927)
classification: sensory feelings or experience feelings;

somatic and

vital feelings;

pure psychic feelings

(pure self-feelings); mental feelings (personality feelings).^®

^^Hartmann, Ego Psychology’ and the Problem of Adaptation, 46.
Psychology’ and the Problem of Adaptation, 46-47. Hartmann s
ertethik,
to M.F. Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale

^’^Hartmann,

reference

is

Ego

W

(Bern: Francke, 1954), 344ff
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Furthermore, Hartmann argues that the newborn infant encounters
the world not

only with the drives of the

development.

These

id,

but also with the “constitutional factors important in ego

factors include a developing tolerance for anxiety, intelligence,
and

tendencies toward structuralization and unification (which in turn imply
differentiation

and integration). Differentiation “finds psychological expression not only
formation of the mental institutions, but also

in reality testing, in

in the

judgment,

in the

extension of the world of perception and action, in the separation of perception from

imagery, cognition from

affect, etc.”

development also increases the

However,

lability

as

Hartmann points

out, structural

of the mental apparatus, “and, therefore,

we must

expect temporary (and occasionally enduring) dedifferentiation phenomena.” Both
differentiation

and synthesis

may

serve adaptation, depending on the external

circumstances, and Hartmann refers to the adaptive return to dedifferentiated states as

These fonmilations mean

“regressive adaptation.

that

not only in terms of the ego’s ability to regulate tensions

structures (id, ego, and superego), but also

we

can speak of ego strength,

among

the various psychic

by way of its “purposive coordination and

rank order of functions-in tenns of adaptation, differentiation, and synthesis-w/Z/i/zi the

ego.”“

Hartmann

also attributes a “process of progressive ‘internalization’” to the course

of evolution, and he argues

becomes

that the “inner

world” resulting from

a “central regulating factor” in psychic processes.

^'Circumstances

in

which undifferentiated

The

this internalization

inner world with

states are adaptive

may

its

include

consolation in nature (Freud’s “oceanic feeling”), the culmination of the act of love, and
aesthetic experiences in relation to

works of art.

^^Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, 53-56.
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associated functions of perception,

memory, imagery,

taken together, intelligence-hsis great

thinking, and action-ultimately and

utility for adaptation.

Intelligence, as an

organizing principle, or regulatory function guarantees “an equilibrium
of the whole
person.

”
It

adherence

reality,

allows neither immediate response to external or instinctual stimuli, nor

to

an impoverished rationality. Instead,

but also insight into

its

own

it

strict

takes into account, not only external

role in the total personality.

It is

this “superordinate

organizing function of intelligence,” this maintenance of equilibrium, that serves
adaptation.

While based

in the structural

system

set forth

by Freud

in 1923,

Hartmann’s work also ineludes major advances within psychoanalytic theory. The
concepts of a eonflict-free sphere of ego functioning, change of function, secondary

autonomy, regressive adaptation, pleasure

in functioning, differentiation

and synthesis,

the hierarchieal organization of psychic functioning, and psychic equilibrium have far-

reaching consequences that not only extend, but, in some cases, challenge Freud’s work.

The question now becomes:
expanded psychoanalytic theory

into

How are we

to integrate the insights

our understanding of art and the aesthetic

processes? For a systematic and sustained attempt
seeond-stage psychoanalysis,

Ernst Kris.

we

to derive

an aesthetic theory from

will turn to Psychoanalytic Explorations in

As one of Hartmann’s

^^Hartmann,

of this

Arf^ by

chief collaborators as well as a major theorist of

Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation,

^“^Emst Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art.

Universities Press, Inc., 1965).
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(New York:

57-75.
International

psychoanalysis and

art in his

own

Kris describes early psychoanalytic

right,

explorations of art as focusing on three areas of inquiry:
first, the
ubiquity” in mythological and literary tradition
of certain themes known from or related to the fantasy
life of the individual; seeond, the close relationship
between
.

.

.

the artist’s

history in the psyehoanalytic sense and his
work; and, third, the relationship between the working of
life

ereative imagination, the productive capaeity of man, and

thought processes observed in clinical study.
Kris

inquiry.

felt that

The

significant progress

a

done

little to

of these areas of

in the first

universality of id impulses both elucidated and

thematic constancies found in

done

had been made

was confirmed by

Kris argued, however, that while psychoanalysis had

art.

good job of exploring universal phenomena associated with

to

it

had

Kris believed that ego psyehology would address these speeifics

answer the question: “Under specifie

during any given period of history or

each period,

id functioning,

explain the unique contributions of specific individuals under specific

historical conditions.

and help

the

how have

in the

eultural

and soeioeconomic conditions,

work of any one of the

great creators within

the traditional themes been varied?”^^

Kris also argued that limitations inherent in Freud’s approach to the relationship

between the

artist’s life

and work

left

key issues unaddressed. Even given Freud’s

reconstruction of the constellation of experiences and patterns of defense evident in

‘’^Norman N. Holland, Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare,
Hill

Book Company,

as “the
a

most

brilliant

1964),

7.

Holland refers

of psychoanalytic

major analysis of caricature, and

drama, and dance as well as

(New York: McGraw-

to art historian turned

psychoanalyst Kris

literary theorists after Freud.” Kris is

his aesthetie formulations

encompass the

for

plastic arts,

literature.

^‘’Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art”

in

Psychoanalytie Explorations

in Art, 17.

^^Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art, 18.
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renown

Leonardo

become

example,

s life, for

a great

artist.

we

still

have no answer as

Instinctual drives

why Leonardo was

and patterns of defense cannot

in

destined to

themselves

explain magnitude of talent. Kris argued that the “frame of reference in which
creation

enacted”

is

the historical and social forces shaping the function of art in a particular

(i.e.,

period) must be considered as integral to the relationship between an artist’s

life

and

work. According to Kris, not only the stringencies^* of this framework, but also “the

freedom

to

modify these stringencies

achievement

is little

The

presumably part of the complex scale by which

being measured.”^'^ Here again, he found psychoanalysis mute:

is

which psychoanalysis has

framework

are

itself;

third

.

there

.

as yet contributed to an understanding of this

the psychology of artistic style

approach

“.

to a psychoanalytic

is

unwritten.

understanding of art-the study of creative

imagination-Kris considered to be most fully worked out in psychoanalytic studies of
literature as art.

But, again, Kris argued, “[r]ecurrent themes in the works of certain

writers, treatments

of certain conflicts and avoidance of others,” while yielding valuable

insights, cannot in themselves afford an adequate theoretical foundation for an

understanding of creative imagination.^'

'’*Emst Kris

Explorations

in Art,

and Abraham Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”
252.

They define

in

Psychoanalytic

stringencies as restrictions on the “possible

of behavior by which [a] problem may
stringencies are maximal. In art, they are minimal, and

modes

be ‘legitimately’ dealt with.” In science,

as a

this

allows

room

for the use

means of expression.
'’“'Kris,

“Approaches

to Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, 19-21.

^"Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

’'Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art, 23.
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21.

of art

Kris therefore set out to formulate a systematic theory which
would integrate the
insights already

to

avoid

won and

fill

those gaps which ego psychology could address.

abridgments and simplifications,” he attempted

to create an aesthetic theory

based on “synthesizing hypotheses which have been formulated during the
the development of psychoanalysis.”^^

incorporates Freud’s insights on

As

Seeking

total

course of

a sophisticated reader of Freud, Kris carefully

own

art into his

formulations. But he goes beyond Freud

and considers aesthetic productions and processes from the point of view of individual

endowment, the

cultural

and socioeconomic

historical situation,

and the complex

functioning of the total psyche, including autonomous ego functions as well as strategies

of defense.
Kris takes as his starting point and most basic premise the idea that “art
specific kind of communication from the

communication, there

is

one

to the

many,” and

a sender, there are receivers, and there

that, as

is

is

a

with any

a message.’'^

Distinguishing the nature of artistic communication from that of the propagandist (who

calls for action), the priest

(who

and the educator (who works

communication
invitation to

in

common

spiritual experience),

to enlighten his pupils’ insight), Kris argues that artistic

our civilization refers to another function: “The message

common

^^Kris,

invites participation in a

an

is

experience in the mind, to an experience of a specific nature.

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

1

6

.

See also

on page 31 “We propose to take structural, dynamic, and economic
changes which seem to be characteristic of what one might call the aesthetic experience

his statement

:

into account.”

’^Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art, 29.

^“^Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art, 16.

’^Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art”

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art, 39.

in
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How does Kris

give substance to this abstract definition?

He

begins with the tale

of a small boy who, when frightened by an large Alsatian dog, runs
away screaming.
Kris speculates that the child might integrate this incident into his
general store of

experiences in any number of ways.

He might dream

about

it

at

night and during the day

transform the actual incident into a daydream in which he tames the dog

who

becomes

of danger and

mastery

a special friend and protector.

in play

He might

act out these fantasies

then

with his toys or incorporate them in games with other children. This

preoccupation with thoughts of the dog might get mixed up with other concerns that

occupy

may

his mind.^^ Eventually, as he

preserve

some

derivative of

it

grows

in his choice

continually seek out situations of danger.

behavior.

Or he might become

order on this

memory and

offer

older, he

may

forget the

of occupation.

He might become

whole

He might

incident, or he

in his adult life

a scientist of animal

a writer, and, as a writer, he might impose a narrative

it

to others in a guise

which allows them

to share his

experience. In doing so, he will take pleasure in his fantasy of mastering danger and in

the action of reproducing and elaborating the experience in such a

share in this pleasure.

way

that others

The admiration and approval of those who respond

will provide yet another source of pleasure.

As

may

to his story

Kris concludes:

Let us assume that our subject was one of the endowed
individuals, a poet,
this

may come

by whatever

interaction of factors

about; then in his account the age-old

theme of child against beast may be transposed into a
world where Mowgli lives, abandoned by man, protected

^^See Freud above on the relationship between animal phobias and the Oedipus
complex. Kris elaborates: “The trauma of the scene of our model is therefore itself the
result

of experiences rooted

in the

successive phases of earliest childhood,

when

the

demand for love and protection, the response of the environment of these demands, and
the striving of independence in the child, first mold the human personality (32).
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by wolves, pursued by Shir Klran-the
and

pet of the jungle

later its master.’^

Kris contrasts this scenario to others in which fantasy
cannot rise to the level of
art

because

it

remains too close to the level of immediate instinctual
gratification

engender anything but disgust

in

to

an audience. (Productions of such raw material will

remain pornography or propaganda;

that

is,

not invitations to a mental experience, but

calls to action.)

At the other end of the spectrum, Kris places the productions of psychotics. Such
productions cannot be considered
reverberate in others.”^*

and repetitive as the
to that

art

because they are not communications; they “do not

The productions of psychotics become increasingly

illness progresses,

stereotypical

and the significance of these productions shrinks

of a private system of delusion whose function changes from communication

magic. For example, Kris gives an account of a schizophrenic patient
identify himself with

who came

to

to

God. The patient produced a number of works which he “signed”

with a triangle that pointed sometimes up and sometimes down: “He studied them

[his

drawings] as documents that indicate the course of events. They were verdicts of

damnation and announcements of salvation. And the signature indicated the prevailing

^^Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

also important to note here that a fantasy has

become

in Art, 31-39.

shareable in part because

it

It is

has been

verbalized.

^^Kris,

“The ‘Creative

Spell’ in a Schizophrenic Artist” in Psychoanalytic

Explorations in Art, 168. Kris considers that a comparison of the productions of the
“add[s] precision to Plato’s distinction” between
processes. “Art as an aesthetic-and therefore as a
pathological
“productive insanity” and

insane with those of the

social-

phenomenon

is

artist

linked to the intactness of the ego” (169).
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intention: the triangle with the

of destruction.’

‘If

I

am

peak turned downward

in the patient’s

words, ‘the sign

merciful,’ he added, ‘the triangle points upward.’”’^

We thus have a continuum
reality

is,

of experience that stretches between untransfomied

and outright delusion. At some point along

experience that Kris terms “the aesthetic

illusion.’’

this

continuum

The idea of the

lies a

form of

aesthetic illusion

intimately connected with the philosophical problem of the proper “distance”

work of art

appreciated,

is

but Kris derives

it

considerations. For Kris, the aesthetic illusion

at

is

which

a

exclusively from psychoanalytic

is

rooted in the derivation of art from

magic*' and also in the child’s ability to “‘evoke’ the need-gratifying object” during the

developmental period
line

in

which the pleasure principle reigns supreme and

between need and perception

lives

on

in

imagination and

(i.e.,

may be

there

is

no fimi

hallucination). This blurring of need and reality

expressed in the child’s play (which also serves the

tendency to actively repeat through processes of identification what has been passively

On

experienced).

the side of adaptive defense, imaginative play fosters the identification

of the child with his or her parents and helps the child

’^Kris,

Explorations

from the

Spell’ in a Schizophrenic Artist” in Psychoanalytic

in Art, 159.

*°Kris,
this

“The ‘Creative

to sort out the real

“Approaches

to Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, 46.

Kris traces

notion of distance to an important problem in the philosophy of art since Kant and

Schiller and the idea that “the dispassionate spectator alone can appreciate beauty.” E.

Bullough theorized

that “underdistance” results in a “too strong” participation

on the part

of the audience, while “overdistance” refers to a lack of interest leading to detachment.
Kris speculates that overdistance may arise when there is no point of identification

between work and the audience, or when there

is

insufficient “incentive for energy

discharge” (46-47).
*'Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

account of the development of Greek dramatic
Art, ”(40) and his discussion of “image magic”

coauthored with E.H. Gombrich, (189-203).
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art

in

in Art.

See his

magic in “Approaches
“The Principles of Caricature
from

ritual

to

But denial may also be operative, and an understanding

possible.

that the play

world

is

only “make believe” can co-exist with a belief in the “reality of play.”
“Here,” says Kris,
“lie the roots

of aesthetic

illusion.”*^

In the realm of aesthetic illusion the magical thought and intense
wishes and fears

of childhood
child

live on,

becomes able

“adapted to but

still

to accept, in place

unhampered by

of his

own

At some point the

reality.”

fantasies, the fantasies

of others, and

thus in stories and fairy tales, the child finds “a pattern for his emotional reaction offered
to

him with

the consent of adults.”*^ This step

adult world the ability to take pleasure in

It is

in the

in this sense that

the bridge to

what

will

become

in the

art.

can speak of art as an “invitation

to

common

experience

mind, an experience of a specific nature.” The artwork invites a regression

earlier psychic state in

with great intensity.

(in the

apply).

Under

we

is

which the primary process held sway and

Members of the audience

sense that while under

As

in

its

thus experience the

spell they are in a state

where

work of art

reality testing

an

was

felt

as “real”

does not

childhood play, the process of identification becomes a key element.

the influence of the aesthetic illusion, primary process

one encounters
operative.

instinctual life

to

in

And,

modes of thought such

dreams-symbolism, condensation, and displacement— tend

yet, the regression takes place

that are released in the

become

under the control of the ego. The tensions

enjoyment of the work of art are controlled

of the situation and the structure of the artwork

to

as

itself

and

in part

in part

by the

structure

by the ego’s recognition

of the possibilities afforded by the situation and the work of art. In the articulation and

Approaches
*^Kris,

to Art” in

“Approaches

to

Psychoanalytic Explorations of Art, 41-42.

Art”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations of Art, 42.
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elaboration of the artwork (both in

its

creation and in

its

appreciation),

we

see ego

processes on display: the capacity for delay of discharge of instinctual
tension being the

most obvious. Furthermore, the
freedom from

guilt, since

it

is

fact that art is a socially

not our

own

fantasy

we

sanctioned activity “guarantees

follow.”*"^ Therefore, in art

not only the pleasure of release, but also the pleasure of control. Kris

of the ego

to use

primary process thought for

own

its

names

purposes regression

we

find

this ability

in serviee

of

the egof^

Explicit in Kris’s analysis

is

a

symmetry between

and the re-creative activity of the audience.
Schematically speaking

He

the creative activity of the

begins with the

we may view

artist

artist:

the process of artistic

composed of two phases which may be sharply
demarcated from each other, may merge into each other,

creation as

may

follow each other in rapid or slow succession, or

be interwoven with each other

them

in various

as inspiration and elaboration,

conditions:

One

type

is

we

may

ways. In designating

refer to

extreme

characterized by the feeling of being

driven, the experience of rapture, and the conviction that

an outside agent acts through the creator; in the other type,
the experience of purposeful organization, and the intent to

solve a problem predominate.**’

The process of creation,
the

therefore, involves both an active and a passive stage. In

stage, the creator relaxes the constraints of the ego and passively awaits the

first

to Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, 45-46.

*‘^Kris,

“Approaches

*^Kris,

“The Psychology of Caricature”

177. “Regression in service of the ego”

adaptation.”

Hartmann

is

in

Psychoanalytic Exploration

related to

attributes the possibility

of regressive adaptation

“superordinate organizing function of intelligence,”

in Art, p.

Hartmann’s idea of “regressive

i.e.

to the

to the conflict-free

ego sphere. In

“Approaches to Art” Kris makes the point that “regression in service of the ego,” a
“process in which the ego controls the primary process and puts it into its service-need be
contrasted with the opposite, the psychotic condition, in which the ego is overwhelmed

by the primary process”
**’Kris,

(60).

“Approaches

to Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, 59.
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“inspiration” that seems to

come from

without, but

is

actually the result of an eruption of

unconscious or preconscious ideas into consciousness. This passive
experience

accompanied by a feeling of intense excitement, often of a sexual
flow of ideas or fantasies from the unconscious
neutralized energy under

makes

elaboration and so

two
it

control,

its

it

looks

at

the

controlled

At

first,

there

is

in the process

this process, the

only the work and the

he “is” the work. In the second identification,

work “from

However,

this

by the ego, which, using

“works over” the material

communicable. During

different identifications.

in the sense that

is

kind.*^

is

the

of

ego disappears**

into

with

artist identifies

in so far as the artist

the outside,” he feels himself part of the audience.*^ Kris further

characterizes these “extreme phases of creative activity” as involving “shifts in psychic
levels, in the

degree of ego control and by

shifts in the cathexis

of the self and the

representation of the audience.

The

artist’s

audience, through a series of identifications, undergoes a parallel

experience involving shifts in psychic level. In the audience, however, the process

*^Kris,

“On

states (on the basis

my

is

Inspiration” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, 301-02. Kris

of clinical experience and biographical evidence from

artists), “it is

impression that in the fantasies connected with inspiration the genital elaboration of

pregenital experiences

is

evident, and that the pregenital layers constitute nothing

specific.”

**Although Kris does not use the term,
describing

may

be captured more clearly

in

I

Roy

think the essence of the process he

is

Schafer’s notion of reflective self

representation (see “Influence of Primary-Process Presences” in Aspects of
Internalization [New York: International Universities Press, Inc. 1968], 91-97.) During
the process of creation, the artist loses this reflective self representation and merges

first

with the work and then with the audience. Of course these two steps are perhaps better
described as positions, for during the process of creation each will be experienced many
times.

Inspiration” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, 293.

*‘^Kris,

“On

‘^"Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations
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in Art, 61.

reversed and “proceeds from consciousness, the perception of the

preconscious elaboration and to the reverberations of the
audience’s recognition of the work of art as art

The frame

a “frame.”''^

is

due

to

id.”'''

art

We can

making
in part

the

work

its

own. This identification opens the way

audience identifies with the
seeks to understand

“way

how

to id

it

in” and

experiences which are

artist (not as a person, but as creator

of the artwork) and

the artwork has been contrived to have the effect

artist’s creative activity also

to interplay

In a second stage of the process, the

process takes place under the control of the ego, and

in the

called

signals the invitation to “an experience of a specific kind,” and, in

“contained” by the structure of the work.

Thus,

speculate that the

In this stage, the audience identifies with the work, “taking

id.”''^

to

what Nomian Holland has

accepting the invitation, the audience relaxes ego control, opening a

with the

work,

it

is in

it

has. This

part a defense, just as the

served as a defense.

case of artist and audience, pleasure arises from a regulated

regression that permits the discharge of instinctual tension under control of the ego which

makes use of neutralized energy
Kris puts

it,

systems and

to control the

speed and intensity of the discharge. As

the “core of the process lies in the shift of cathexis between the psychic

in the function

^'Kris,

“Approaches

of the ego during those

to

shifts.”''"

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art, 62.

^^Norman N. Holland, Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare, (New York: McGraw1966), 27. “Jokes, for example, have a ‘frame,’ as serious literature
does, that marks them off from ordinary experience and leads us into an attitude of
playful attention, a special combination of involvement and distancing, the aesthetic
Hill

Book Company,

stance, just as the appearance of a

poem on

the page does.”

''^Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psyehoanalytic Exploration

''"Kris,

“Approaches

to

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations

Ill

in Art, 63.

in Art, 62.

But

we may

take the process one step further. These shifts in cathexis are

pleasurable in themselves, and Kris speculates that one
art is

“according to the responses they

noncontemporary, audiences,

i.e.

elicit

way we may

evaluate works of

from wide or limited, contemporary and

according to their survival value as

art.”

Critical to this

evaluation will be the “dynamic effectiveness of the experience in the audience.” Thus,
the continuing impact of Greek tragedy, for example,

its

themes, but also to the intricacy of psychic

shifts

is

due not only

experienced by

to the universality

its

of

audience. Kris

relates these psychic shifts to Aristotle’s concept of catharsis:

The process of catharsis Aristotle has in mind is determined
by the complexity of the tragedy as work of art and hence by
the variety of reactions it stimulates in the audience. They
all

can be described as

from

shifts in

activity to passivity,

psychic levels, as transitions

and as varying degrees of distance

in participation.^^

Thus,

we

can imagine the audience, identifying

the intense emotions provoked

first

with the tragic hero and experiencing

by primary process mental functioning;

“purging” or release would be the result of a

shift

away from

the primary process to

secondary process thinking. This would involve a “distancing”
identification but also signals a return to ego control with

of experience. The intense emotions evoked by the

and integrated into the

tragic

its

the cathartic

that not only lessens the

tendency toward unification

work can then be worked over

total personality.

Art” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, 62. Kris here
action, of a
quotes Aristotle; “Tragedy is the representation in dramatic form of a serious
magnitude, complete in itself, expressed in agreeable language, with pleasurable
^^Kris,

“Approaches

to

certain

accomplish its catharsis
accessories, with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to
revision of the
of such emotions.” Kris acknowledges that his“ view implies some
traditional interpretation

of this passage.”
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In “Aesthetic

Ambiguity,

written in collaboration with

Abraham Kaplan,

Kris

brings psychoanalytic insights to yet another traditional topic in aesthetics.
In this paper

they attempt to discover the kind of ambiguity specific to poetic language,
to relate

ambiguity
creation),

to poetic processes in general

and

(i.e.,

to processes

of artistic creation and

to establish explicit standards for the interpretation

this

re-

of ambiguity.'^’

Kris and Kaplan define the meaning of a word (or group of words) in terms of the
“clusters” of responses that

group of responses

in

may be

associated with

cluster is

which each term within the group, when used

each of the other members of the group.
clusters.

Each

it.

Any

given word

composed of a

as a stimuli, evokes

may evoke

a

number of such

Kris and Kaplan further differentiate between codes and symbols in terms of the

constancy of the clusters they evoke

meaning regardless of the

in different contexts.

context, while a

symbol

will

A code word will have a fixed

be context

sensitive.

speak, therefore of the meaning of any symbol, but can only specify

its

“One cannot

range of

responses and the clusters into which these tend to be grouped.”^* This functioning of

language as symbol, they refer
language, but rather to

its

to as ambiguity.

ambiguity does not necessarily refer

multiplicity.”

‘'^Kris

243 - 64

number of kinds of ambiguity, pointing out

to the “uncertainty

of meaning, but

[rather] to its

ambiguity disjunctive when the separate meaning clusters

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

.

‘^*Kris

243

call

of

.

‘’^Kris

242 - 43

They

to a failing

potential for expression.

Kris and Kaplan go on to specify a

that

Ambiguity does not apply

.
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function as alternatives (as, for example, with

homonyms

or amphibole.) In additive

ambiguity, alternative meanings are “no longer fully exclusive but are
to some extent

included one in the other”

(i.e.

there will exist a set of clusters with a

a varying range.) Conjunctive ambiguity occurs

effective in the interpretation.

when

common

center and

“separate meanings are jointly

In this case a single cluster will be comprised of paired n-

tuples with differing-perhaps opposed-meanings.

In conjunctive ambiguity, antithetical

responses will be evoked simultaneously (as occurs, for example, in irony or in jokes.)
fourth kind of ambiguity

when

“all

is

integrative.

A word or phrase results

in integrative

A

ambiguity

of its meanings evoke and support one another.” In tenns of meaning

clusters,

there will be a “stimulus-response relation between the clusters as well as within them.

[The clusters] interact

meaning

is

unified.

another, they give us a

in a

to

produce a complex and shifting pattern: though multiple, the

While these various forms of ambiguity shade off into one

way

to think

work of art without succumbing

meaning. In

fact,

of the complicated multiplicity of meaning inherent
to the belief that the

in projective

minimal, so that responses vary altogether with the

How

does ambiguity

have already seen

245 - 48

that the

fit

into the

work of art

ambiguity “clustering

interpreter.”'®^

communicative function of artistic

establishes

communication between

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

®®Kris

a “vague”

Kris and Kaplan specify a final type of ambiguity-/?ro/'ect/ve

ambiguity-which captures our notion of vagueness;
is

work has only

in

activity?

artist

We

and

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

.

'®®Kris

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

250.

114

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

audience on more than one psychic
artist into

level.

“Regression

in service

of the ego” brings the

contact with primary process thinking where
[t]he

symbols

.

.

are not so

.

much vague and

in-

determinate as ‘overdetermined,’ loaded down with
a variety of meanings. An action (including an act

of producing symbols) is said to be overdetermined
when it can be construed as the effect of multiple
causes.

Such overdetermination

of almost

when

characteristic

it is especially marked
which the behavior derives is
the primary process. Words, images, fancies come

the psychic level from

close to
to

is

purposive action; but

all

mind because they

are emotionally charged; and the

primary process exhibits

to a striking

degree the tendency

to focus in a single

and thereby

Now

it

is

clear that there

is

fulfill

symbol a multiplicity of references
at once a number of emotional needs.

a relationship between communicative ambiguity and the

overdetermination inherent in primary process thinking. In order to
relationship

symbol

more

specific, Kris

as the obverse side

to a multiplicity

make

this

and Kaplan introduce the concept of “the potential of a

of its overdetermination.” Whereas overdetermination

of causes, “a symbol has a high potential

be construed as cause of multiple

effects.”

An

in the

degree to which

it

refers

may

overdetermined symbol will not

necessarily correspond to a symbol with high potential.

Some primary

process

(overdetermined) symbols are highly personal and so do not have a potential to invoke

meaningful multiple effects

in the audience.

contrary to the artist’s intent.

aesthetic experience

'°'Kris

is that

it

Other symbols come

to

have a potential

But, in favorable cases, the symbolic contribution to the

provides a bridge between the

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

artist’s

experience and the

Psychoanalytic Explorations

re-

in Art,

254.

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity” in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art,
example.
255. They authors here point to the reading of Virgil as a Christian author as an
'°^Kris

115

creation of that experience in the audience.

More

overdetermined from the point of view of the

view of the audience-will evoke responses

symbol—

specifically, the

artist

and

of potential from the point of

full

that involve a sharing

of shifts

in

psychic

level.'''^

As discussed above,

An

distance.

shifts in

psychic level correspond to shifts in psychic

appropriate response to poetry will contain elements of identification and

psychic states related to trance and dream and elements of critical distance related
strict

and controlled

rationality.

Just as the psychotic artist

“unintelligible,” the overly rational artist

may

create

works

may produce works

that are

that are “uninspired.” In

neither case will processes of identification be stimulated. Similarly, an audience

over-intellectualize

creating

first

it,

or

it

its

response to the work of art, “reconstructing”

may be

caught up

case the audience will

fail to

form

achieve

is to

fail to

critical distance.

emphasize

in “blind rapture” if the

identify with the

to a

ego

work and

is

it

may

rather than re-

overwhelmed. In the

in the

second case,

it

will

Kris and Kaplan point out that one function of poetic

latent ambiguities

and thus point the way

to the appropriate shifts in

psychic level and distance that characterize the aesthetic response.

Given the necessity
to

for

ambiguity in the communication of an experience

be re-created rather than simply reacted

to,'*^^

that is

Kris and Kaplan turn to the problem of

'°^Kris

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

'°"Kris

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

255.

255-56.
'®^Kris

254-55. Kris and Kaplan argue that the work

“And

re-creation

is

is

re-created rather than merely reacted

distinguished from sheer reaction to the

that the person responding himself contributes

work

to the stimuli for his response.

116

to.

precisely by the fact

standards of interpretation.

How

does one guard against mere projection upon the work

of art? Kris and Kaplan propose three
i.e.

of reference

to subject matter outside

constrain the possible

certain

sets

myths or

its

of standards. Standards

of the artwork

meaning of ambiguities. Thus,

itself,

correspondence,

provide stringencies which

the reference within the artwork to

relationship to a particular poetic tradition

must be taken

into account.

Standards of intent limit possible interpretations by relating them to knowledge of the
or of his society.

artist

include whatever

sets

In contrast, standards of coherence

may be made

to “fit in” to the

of standards will be operative

at the

same

work

expand interpretations

as a unified whole.

While

to

all

three

time, in given situations one or the other

will predominate.’*^^

Kris and Kaplan point out that ambiguity
evaluation of a

may be

an essential element

work of art. Highly ambiguous works may remain open

in the

to re-creation

over longer periods of time because they allow for a wide range of interpretations. In
addition, highly

ambiguous works may be presumed

which contribute not only

to the

to

be close

form of the work, but also

to

primary processes

to its content:

Functional regression makes available as poetic material

themes, like love and death, which are directly related to
basic needs and desires, and which approach cultural
universality far

more

closely than the patterns of satisfying

such needs or the values structures controlling these
satisfactions.’”^

On

the other hand, however, if the ambiguity of the

the author’s intent,

’”*’Kris

259 - 62

relies

on external knowledge or

longevity will be curtailed. Therefore, Kris and Kaplan propose

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity”

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

.

’”^Kris

263

its

work

.

117

may

that “[sjurvival

thus be presumed to be maximal for those works which
have as high

a degree of interpretability as

is

compatible with containing within themselves their

own

sources of integration.

Thus, building on the work of Freud, Hartmann, and others, Ernst Kris has

expanded our understanding of the processes of inspiration and elaboration, the
identification

and the aesthetic

and the appeal of the artwork

illusion,

psychic functioning. With this discussion of shifts

in level

to various levels

new

tools

of works of art. His most important contribution, the formulation of

“regression in service of the ego”'°^ and the importance of this regression to both

production and

of

of psychic functioning and the

connection between ambiguity and primary process mentation, he has given us
for the evaluation

roles of

artistic appreciation, is a

major achievement

in

artistic

applying the insights of

second-stage psychoanalysis to an understanding of the aesthetic processes.

Norman

N. Holland has integrated

psychologists into his

will look at

that

how

own

interpretations of the

insights of Kris and other ego

works of Shakespeare.

Specifically,

we

Holland’s interpretation of Hamlet both encompasses and supersedes

of Freud and Jones. As

more

many of the

we saw

in

Chapter

1,

although the scattered elements of a

sophisticated theory exist piecemeal in Freud’s writings on aesthetics, he most often

'°*Kris

and Kaplan, “Aesthetic Ambiguity’’

in

Psychoanalytic Explorations

in Art,

263-64.

had spoken of “sublimation,” the change from Libido to desexualized
energy accompanied by a switch from a sexual object to one that is socially acceptable.
Hartmann and Kris used the idea of “neutralized” energy as a broader term for a similar
'°‘^Freud

process that could be applied to either aggressive or libidinal energy. In their view, not
only sexual energy but energy associated with destructiveness could be neutralized and
redirected. Neutralized energy, under control of the ego, could be used as a mechanism
energy
for psychic regulation, with the autonomous part of the ego allocating neutralized
in

such a

way

as to

promote aggressive,

libidinal, or fused energic discharges.
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used works of art as evidence for or confimiation of the theory
of unconscious mental
functioning that he

derived from the analysis of symptoms and dreams. Within

first

works of art, Freud points
author and
assessing

move

to the expression

of disguised infantile wishes that motivate the

the audience. Similarly, Freud treats stage characters as real people,

them psychoanalytically,

Hamlet, he shows

little

as

one might assess a

interest in the structure or

concentrates on the central character, Hamlet,

patient.

Thus,

in his analysis

of

language of the play, and instead

whose “oedipus complex” provides

stimulus for one of Freud’s most basic formulations.

By

contrast, Holland,

the

working

in

the tradition of second-stage psychoanalysis, examines the play not only from the point of

view of infantile wishes, but also from the point of view of the mature ego and
defensive and autonomous functions.

As Holland

puts

it:

Adult and child coexist; but the orthodox

critic

the adult mind, and the psychoanalytic critic,

sees only the child.

The

its

sees only

all

truth lies rather in the

too often,

continuum

between them. The religious, aesthetic, social, moral, or
intellectual themes the orthodox critic develops have their
roots in infantile fantasies and conflicts the psychoanalytic
critic

points out. Indeed,

it is

only because infantile basis

and orthodox superstructure exist in us together that these
intellectual concerns

that they

Holland argues

do

meanings

emotional power

unique contribution of psychoanalysis

continuum of mature and

creation and re-creation of the

scientific

at all the

in art."°

that the

ability to address the entire

can have

rich

and precise

such as “catharsis, sympathetic imagination, negative

capability, stock response, irony, etc.,” psychoanalysis provides a bridge

‘“’Holland, Psychoanalysis

its

infantile elements inherent in the

work of art. Furthermore, by giving

to literary terms

to aesthetics is

ami Shakespeare, 324.
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between the

external aims of the sciences and the internal aims of the
humanities.'” In order to carry

through

this synthetic

program, however, psychoanalysis must work not only

of identification with the central character, but
exploration of the

work

at

at the level

the multiplicity of levels inherent in the

as a whole, giving due consideration to an analysis of the fonnal

elements of the work.”^
In this spirit,

Holland rejects the question historically asked:

delay?” and begins his

own

analysis of Hamlet with the question,

and Guildenstem?”"^ According

to Holland, this question

into the play as a whole, not just to

“Why

“Why

does Hamlet

both Rosencrantz

has the ‘virtue of leading us

one character,” and he goes on

to point out that

it

is

not only the identical characters of Rosencrantz and Guildenstem that appear as doubles

in this play; the

waves

is

form of the play

itself falls naturally into

marked by the appearance of the Ghost

to

two “waves.” The

first

of these

Hamlet on the battlements, and

the

"'Holland, Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare, 348. See also Holland’s quote on

page 315
accordance with Kris’s principle that there are two aspects to aesthetic
creation and re-creation: inspiration and elaboration. The audience, who under the spell
of inspiration merely identifies with a central character fails to achieve the critical
”^This

is in

distance necessary to elaboration. That

is,

the audience does not go

the artist and attempt to understand the process
to

have the

effect

it

has.

However,

as Holland

by which

the

work

on

to identify with

whole was made
members of the

as a

points out, the fact that

audience, in one aspect of their experience of the work of art, do accept it as a form of
reality in its own right and experience the characters as real people inhabiting this world,

means

that

it

is

part of a legitimate critical approach to try to understand

effect is achieved.

To do

so

may

mean examining the character as a

how

it

is

that this

real person.

“Psychoanalytic analysis of character does not logically conflict with psychoanalytic
stress on a
criticism of the play as a totality: it simply represents a different accent, a
Shakespeare,
different side of the audience ’s reaction" (Holland, Psychoanalysis and
322, italics mine).

"^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 159-60.
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second by the appearance of the Ghost

to

Hamlet

mother’s bedroom. After the

in his

first

appearance of the Ghost, comes the part of the play marked
by words:

The first wave begins with the Ghost’s command to
Hamlet to “Revenge his foul and unnatural murther.’’
Hamlet responds by playing mad, saying a lot of odd
words; in

fact,

King responds
first

he says, “Words, words, words.’’ The
to Hamlet’s madness by setting on him

Rosencrantz and Guildenstem, then Ophelia, to
what is wrong with Hamlet. Again, a verbal

find out

Hamlet produces the play-within-the-play.
Again, words. The King tries to purge himself of his crime
by prayer. Again, words. Hamlet speaks words like
daggers to his mother. Finally, this verbal wave of
action.

action culminates in the false killing, the “play’’ killing
of Polonius, that creature of words who had served as
the King’s ally and Hamlet’s foil in the

The second wave of the

play, according to Holland,

is

first

the

wave.”'*

wave of action:

The Ghost’s second appearance marks the beginning
of the second wave of action, in which the King’s ally
and Hamlet’s

foil is

the

man of action,

Laertes. Laertes

returns and immediately whips up a revolution. Ophelia

drowns

herself.

grave. There

is

Hamlet and Laertes wrestle in Ophelia’s
a sea battle offstage. The King and

Laertes set up and carry out the crooked fencing match.
In that last, bustling scene,

murders

fairly

Laertes, the Queen, Claudius, finally

Holland points out

words and

that

it

is

action, but also the character of Hamlet.

On

who

of human character, of destiny, of philosophy, of life
Hamlet, the

man of action,

.

not only the play that falls into this disjunction of

the quick-witted punster, the scholar and courtier,

we have

abound:

Hamlet himself.

the one hand,

Hamlet,

speaks “exquisitely on the nature

after death.”'

fighting off Horatio and the

"^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 160.
"^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 160.
"^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 160.
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we have

On

the other hand,

watchmen

to see the

Ghost alone, stabbing Polonius, sending Rosencrantz
and Guildenstem

to their death,

fencing with Laertes.”^

The problem, according
words and

He can

action. His

to Holland, is that

words come

talk beautifully,

and he can

verbal plan and then bring

it

between words and action as the
in the

wave of the

in the first

problem of the play-a problem

in its central character.

Holland, “Action seems to turn around and strike back

at

Thought, on the other hands, seems

...

to inhabit action.

and action together make a kind of disease,
This theme of splitting
characters

who

is

reflect the split in

play; his actions in the second.

by action.”"* Thus, Holland sees

central

formal structure of the play and

to coordinate

on impulse, but he seems unable

act

into being

Hamlet cannot seem

in

the

to fomiulate a

this split

that is expressed

In this play, according to

man who

It is

thought

up.

it

almost as though thought

which each corrupts the other.”"^

further carried out through the use of secondary

Hamlet. Hamlet’s friend Horatio, the

man of words

who

lives to tell

who

takes Hamlet’s place on the throne of Denmark. Holland points out that each has

“succeeded”

Hamlet’s

in his

man of action”

lies

own

story, is contrasted to Fortinbras, the warrior

role at the end of the play, while Hamlet, “a

dead between

Laertes:

Hamlet pretends

efforts to

avenge

to

them.'^'*

We

also find

Hamlet

and

man

man

of action

of words and a

reflected in Ophelia and

go mad and Ophelia actually does go mad; Hamlet’s

his father’s death” are

thrown into

relief by Laertes’

"^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 161.

"^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 160-61.
"‘^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 161-62.
’^“Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 164-65.
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impetuous

“fitful

challenge of first the King and then Hamlet upon
the death of Polonius. Again, Holland
finds a

common

this splitting

action,

denominator

in death:

though Shakespeare were saying through

of Hamlet’s madness and his revenge into Ophelia
and Laertes,

whether

it is

real or just

In other cases, pairs

pretended action, “play,” ends

reality, formalities,

Claudius, seem to

that all

in the grave.”*^'

of characters bring together reverberating themes.
Gertrude

and Ophelia portray physical, earthy

tries to

“It is as

reality; Laertes

and Polonius represent “verbal

and shows.”’^^ Similarly, the two main antagonists, Hamlet and

embody

“the tension between external and internal reality.” Claudius

balance his interior guilt with his role as King; Hamlet

is

tom between

philosophical abstraction and the dirty, physical details of sex and death.

Throughout the play images of cormption, vegetative

passivity,

and animal

physicality are contrasted with images of “the purity of abstract thought.” This thought
reflected in language and therefore, there

is

is

a great deal of interest within the play in

language: the ceremonial language of Claudius; the circumlocutionary, evasive language

of Polonius; the emotion-laden language of the

actors; Ophelia’s

mad

verses; and Osric’s

pretentious inanities. Also ranged against these images of animal corruption,

concern with nations, trades and occupations, “But most of all,” according

“we

see those two strange professions, the actor and the gravedigger.

’^’Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 165.
‘^^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 170.

'^^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 170-71.
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we

find a

to Holland,

The one puts up

a

show, a

ritual,

physieal

a

thus Holland returns to his question:

Guildenstem?”

Hamlet

is

the division

life.

the other digs and probes in the dirtiest dirt of

reality.”’^"*

And

in

ceremony of words;

And

his

answer

is that

“Why

there had to be

fragmented and broken into

both Rosencrantz and

two of them “because everything

The plays leaves us with

pairs.”''^

between our godlike reason and our physical selves

As Holland

is

the sense that

the ultimate fact of

concludes;

There

is

division.

something

final

and rotten

The world of Hamlet

is

in this state

of

a world of disease,

garbage, filthy animals, obscenity, a world from which
the rational and sensitive

man

retreats into abstract

speculation. Digging, probing, splitting things to
find their core,

of Denmark.

we

It is

decomposition;

find something

is

rotten in the state

as though the very state of schism

we

were

long, metonymically, for the abstract,

the pure, the speculative, but

it

comes

to us

only as the

raw, physical grime of reality. In a religious sense, Hamlet
is

a play about original sin, or primal crime that

man with his sinfulness,
modem, we can say that
primal

fall,

that

shadow,

endowed

If we wish to be
complex is itself that
imposes itself on the godlike

his mortality.

the Oedipus
that

world of childhood. However we describe it, it is this flaw,
this hidden impostume that defines the world of Hamlet.

We see in this outline of Holland’s

interpretation of Hamlet several significant

differences from the earlier Freud/Jones interpretation. Holland concentrates on the text

of the play, treating the character of Hamlet as simply one aspect of that
finding in the play the Oedipal theme that

understanding of Hamlet, Holland finds in

'^“^Holland,

was Freud’s main contribution
this

theme not only

The Shakespearean Imagination, 176-77.

'^^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 178.

'^'’Holland,

text.

The Shakespearean Imagination, 179.
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While

to the

a disguised re-enactment

of the

infantile situation, but also the adult
tensions that are its latest incarnation: “the

tension between words and deeds, between
thought and actions, between

mind and body,

between the exterior and the inward man, between
mental abstractions and
reality.

Holland’s arrives

by paying

dirty, physical

expanded understanding of the “meaning” of the play

at this

careful attention to the defense

mechanism of “splitting” which can be found

not only in the characters, but also in the language,
structure, and theme of the play.

And,
play.

He

finally,

Holland alludes

to the variations in

psychic distance that mark

this

points out a curious parallel between the scene where Hamlet,
Rosencrantz, and

Guildenstem converse with the actors and the scene where the two grave diggers
prepare
Ophelia’s grave. In each scene, there

is

a break in the “aesthetic illusion” and suddenly

the world of Elizabethan England intrudes into the world of Denmark.

The players

discuss the current affairs of the theater world-as they actually existed in England-with
the

young

local

pub

courtiers; similarly, the grave diggers pause in their

for

According

to

beer-a pub that actually existed

in the real

work when one

world of the audience.

Holland,

By breaking up

the dramatic illusion, Shakespeare

Every play

says, in effect, ‘See?
.

grave

is

your grave.

,

1

is

your play, every

TO

'^^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 171.
‘^^Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 166-67.
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is

sent to a

CHAPTER

3

OBJECT RELATIONS: D.W. WINNICOTT

“There

is

no such thing as a baby.

With

this

observation

his dual vantage points as pediatrician and psychoanalyst
to set in

which would expand the scope of psychoanalysis
bond.

D.W. Winnicott used

motion a

line

of inquiry

to include the earliest matemal/infant

A member of the “middle school” or “independent tradition” within the British

Psychoanalytic Society, Winnicott capitalized on the work of Sigmund and

Anna

Freud,

the ego psychologists, and object relations theorists-especially Melanie Klein
and

W.R.D. Fairbaim-to transform psychoanalysis while remaining finnly anchored within
the psychoanalytic tradition. In simple, nontechnical, but often elusive language

Winnicott subtly differentiated himself from his predecessors.

As Greenberg and

Mitchell observe.

These formal
elusive

characteristics of Winnicott’s writing--his

mode of presentation and

his absorption yet

transformation of theoretical predecessors-parallel his
central thematic interest: the delicate and intricate
dialectic

between contact and

differentiation.^

Classical psychoanalysis had concerned itself with the relationship between the

conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality, and ego psychology explored the
interaction of ego and

to

id.

In Winnicott

one finds

that preoccupation

'D.W. Winnicott, “Anxiety Associated With Insecurity”
Psychoanalysis (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975), 99.

in

which characterizes

Through Paediatrics

R. Greenberg and Stephen A. Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic
Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983), 189-90.
^J.

third-phase or “object relations” psychoanalysis-the
relation of the self to

From Wmnicott’s

I

objects.

vision of the infant in the care of the “ordinary
devoted mother,”^

can derive a powerful aesthetic theory which

and

its

will attempt to

do just

that in

Chapter

true to

is

4.

human developmental

In this chapter,

I

we

processes,

will set out Winnicott’s

theory as simply and straightforwardly as possible, paying
special attention to areas of

divergence from his peers and predecessors.

Winnicott was exceptionally well placed within the psychoanalytic tradition
exploit the

thinking.

work of others who would provide him with

He was

in analysis for ten years

analyzed by Freud and

Of this

who

to

vital reference points for his

with James Strachey

who was

translated the Standard Edition of Freud’s

himself

work

into English.'*

analysis, Winnicott wrote in Strachey’s obituary:

I

would say that Strachey had one thing quite clear
mind as a result of his visit to Freud: that a process

in his

develops in the patient, and that what transpires cannot

be produced but
about

my own

it

can be

made

use

of.

This

is

analysis with Strachey, and in

what

I

feel

my work I have

tried to follow the principle

through and to emphasize the

idea in

It is

at

its

stark simplicity.

my

experience of analysis

made me suspicious of
work in analysis which seem

the hand of Strachey that has

descriptions of interpretative

to give credit to the interpretations for all that happens, as
if the

process in the patient had got lost sight

^Winnicott, “Primary Maternal Preoccupation” in

of.^

From

Paediatrics Through

Psycho-Analysis, 302.
'*Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations

in

Psychoanalytic Theory’, 190.

Winnicott began his ten-year analysis with James Strachey

^D.W.

V’b'mxhcoii, International

in 1923.

Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 50,129: 1969.
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own

While

statement demonstrates Winnicott’s ability to craft
a “distinctively

this

Winnicottian line of descent
process

(and

its

^

from Freud,

in its subtle

oblique critique of Melanie Klein)^

it

reworking of the Freudian
also demonstrates his ability to

use the theoretical standpoint of others as a place from which
to take off rather than as a
resting place.

The “processes” which Freud

set in

motion involved the use of free

association and the analysis of dreams and the transference to uncover
unconscious
conflict in neurotics

who had

achieved the Oedipal stage of psychic development.

Winnicott concentrated on preoedipal development and saw the countertransference not
only as a

bit

of unanalyzed resistance on the part of the analyst, but rather as a

tool

could be used to create a “facilitating environment”* in which the analyst adapted

needs of patients

^Adam

who had

not yet reached the integration which

Phillips, Winnicott

is

which

to the

a prerequisite of

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,

1988), 137-38.

^Klein emphasized the importance of interpretation within her analyses.

Winnicott,

who

dealt with patients

who had

considered the entire analytic set-up with

more important than any

its

regressed to earlier stages of development,

provision of a “holding environment” to be

individual interpretations that might be offered. In such severely

regressed cases, interpretations were premature and not useful to the patient. See D.W.

Winnicott, “Mirror-role of Mother and Family” in Playing and Reality, “Psychotherapy

is

making clever and apt interpretations; by and large it is a long-term giving the patient
back what the patient brings. It is a complex derivative of the face that reflects what is
there to be seen. I like to think of my work this way, and to think that if I do this well
enough the patient will find his or her own self, and will be able to exist and feel real.
Feeling real is more than existing; it is finding a way to exist as oneself, and to relate to
objects as oneself, and to have a self into which to retreat for relaxation.” (London:
not

Tavistock Publications, 1971), 117.

*D.W. Winnicott, “The Mentally 111 in Your Caseload” in The Matiirational
Processes and the Facilitating Environment (New York: International Universities
Inc., 1965),

223.
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Press,

Oedipal conflict or whose illness required a regression
to such an unorganized

While Freudian analysis can be characterized

state.**

as a “three-person” psychology, Winnicott

explored the development of the “two-person” relationship
between mother and child that

develops out of the “one-person” matrix of the combined
mother/infant psyche.
Winnicott would repeatedly define his
the formulations of others in the light of his

uncanny

ability to gather

would allow him

The

momentum
Gregorio

own

position

by reshaping or transfomiing

experience, demonstrating an almost

from diverse theoretical sources the conceptual equipment

own view

to forge his

that

without being captured by the systems from

which he borrowed. His position within the
illustrative

own

British Psycho-Analytieal Society

is

of this intellectual independence.
Society,

as a

Kohon

which had been founded by Ernest Jones

major center

for the dissemination

the day of its creation, the

life

quickly gained

of the new science of psychoanalysis.

describes the major achievements of the

From

in 1919,

first

ten years as follows:

of the Society

developed very quickly indeed. Papers on diverse
topics were presented at its Scientific Meetings,

some of them

predicting the subsequent interest

particular to British analysts: ‘The Psychology of

the

New-bom

Infant’

the ‘Minutes’, the

by Forsyth was, according

first

paper discussed (15

May

to

1919).

This was followed by ‘Note-taking and Reporting of

Psycho-Analytic cases’, presented by Barbara Low,

emphasizing the British preoccupation with the

immediacy of the clinical situation (12 June 1919).
The organization and publication of the International
Journal of Psycho-Analysis (1920); the foundation

^Winnicott, “Counter-Transference” in The Maturational Processes and the
Facilitating Environment,

'‘’Winnicott,

“On

1

58-65.

the Kleinian Contribution” in The Maturational Processes

the Facilitating Environment,

1

76.
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and

of the

Institute of Psycho-Analysis
(1924); the setting
up of the London Clinic of Psycho-Analysis
(1926);

the organization of the Eleventh International
PsychoAnalytical Congress in Oxford (1929), were all
projects
accomplished during the first ten years of the Society’s
life.

An

exciting

from the

It

was

a remarkable achievement."

mix of medical and

first,

number of the

lay analysts, the British Psycho-Analytic Society
was,

more independent than those
British analysts

societies

formed on the continent."

A

were working with children, and Ernest Jones saw the

analysis of children as an important area in which the British Society
could distinguish
itself"

Meanwhile, two competing theories of child analysis were developing on the
continent, one lead

by Anna Freud working with H. von Hug-Helmuth

second lead by Melanie Klein

who was working

with Karl

Abraham

developing a play technique for the analysis of children, and she
child’s associations to

it

could be interpreted in the same

adults could be interpreted."

Anna Freud maintained

for psychoanalytic interpretation."

way

in

Vienna and a

in Berlin.

felt that

Klein was

play and the

that free association in

that play

gave insufficient grounds

While Klein approached the analysis of children

as a

The British School of Psychoanalysis: The Independent Tradition, edited by
Gregorio Kohon (London: Free Association Books, 1986), 27-28.

"M. Masud R. Khan in his 1975 Introduction to D.W. Winnicott’s Matiirational
Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p. xiii. See also Kohon, The British School
of Psychoanalysis, 46-49.
"Phyllis Grosskurth, Melanie Klein:

Her World and Her Work (Cambridge,

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), 159.
"Judith

M. Hughes, Reshaping

the Psycho-Analytic

Domain

(Berkeley,

CA:

University of California Press, 1989), 66-67.

"Anna

Freud, The

Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense,

therapy might give us a very good insight into

id processes,
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38-39. “While play

play

is

accomplished without

procedure essentially the same as that of adults
(except for the technical adjustments
necessary because of their lack of facility with
language),

Anna Freud saw

her

own work

with children as more straightforwardly educational in
that the analyst provided an
appropriate ego-ideal for the young child.
child

Anna Freud

concentrated on gaining the

and confidence and worked within a positive relationship, while
Melanie

s trust

Klein allowed for both positive and negative transference
phenomena and gave
interpretations as she

Klein considered

would have done with

Anna

a mature analysand.'^

Freud’s technique, with

its

Those who followed

emphasis on the external, “real”

environmental situation, to be non-analytic.

With a number of members of the
training,

word soon

filtered

British Society going to Berlin for analysis and

back on the work

that Klein

was doing, and her observations

corroborated evidence the British analysts were encountering in their

young

children. In 1925, encouraged

own work

with

by Alix and James Strachey, Klein offered

to

do a

course of lectures for the British Society. The offer was eagerly accepted and Melanie

Klein and the lectures well received. Shortly thereafter, she

became an

member and

active

The

difficulties

moved

to

London and

leading theorist of the British Society.

between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein

intensified with

Anna

Freud’s publication oi Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis in 1927. The

book (which

explicitly challenged Klein’s

the conflict that
into the

is

aroused by free association and the fundamental

mechanisms of defense
'^’Kohon,

work) was soundly critiqued within the

is

British

rule; thus the insight

obscured.”

The British School of Psychoanalysis, 38. See also Greenberg and

Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory’, 144.
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Society,” and

when Sigmund Freud

expressed his displeasure Ernest Jones refused to

back down.'* This was somewhat of a British declaration of
independence, and there

began

to

develop within the British Society a

challenge Freudian orthodoxy.

line

of inquiry which was

Anna Freud championed

psychosexual stages culminating

in the

to eventually

her father’s formulation of the

Oedipus conflict and the introjection of parental

prohibitions as the basis for the formation of the superego; Klein and other British
analysts

saw evidence of superego formation

much younger
The

(as revealed

by a sense of guilt)

in children

than the four to five-year age range that Sigmund Freud had postulated.

British analysts, concentrating

on stages of development considered “preoedipal” by

the Freudians gradually developed their

own

theory and techniques-ostensibly within the

Freudian framework, but radically divergent in important aspects. The role of phantasy
in

infancy and childhood, the status of internal objects, the mechanisms of projection and

introjection,

and the importance of countertransference as an analytic

of the Kleinian-lead British

tool

became

faction.

Klein enjoyed a “harmonious honeymoon” within the British Society
1935'^

when

the presentation of her paper,

Manic-Depressive States” made clear just
Freudian theory.^®

It

staples

was not simply

“A

about

Contribution to the Psychogenesis of

how

far

she had traveled from traditional

a matter of the timing of the

which distinguished Klein from the Freuds.

until

In her postulation

of the “depressive

'^Hughes, Reshaping the Psyeho-Analytic Domain, 66-61

'*Kohon, The British School of Psychoanalysis, 39.
'^Kohon, The British School of Psychoanalysis, 38.

^"Kohon, The British School of Psychoanalysis, 40.
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Oedipus complex

position” resulting from the infant’s integration of “good”
and “bad” objects, she

advanced a new explanation

bound

to

arrival

intensified

of Sigmund and Anna Freud

British

by the society’s changing membership. An
to

London during World War

into the British Psychoanalytic Society lent

What had begun
became

was

European analysts who emigrated

welcomed
The

of superego functioning. Such apostasy was

provoke a reaction among the more conservative members of the

Society, and this reaction

influx of

for the genesis

in

London

in

weight

11

and were

to the conservative faction.

1938 further exacerbated the

as a difference of opinion regarding technique

between the two

split.^'

women

instead a battleground for the heart and soul of psychoanalysis.

Between January of 1943 and May of 1944,

there took place within the British

Society a series of meetings tenned the “Controversial Discussions,” the purpose of

which was “to

clarify Klein’s position vis-a-vis the

Rather than heal the

split

metapsychology of Sigmund Freud.

within the Society, however, these discussions merely

demonstrated more clearly the differences between the Kleinian position and
orthodox psychoanalysis. While there was

to

two

training courses: an

by the Kleinians, a “B” group with

“A” group with

a training

of

be no consensus on matters of theory and

technique, eventually a working compromise was reached.

three groups and

that

The Society was

a training

split into

program controlled

program controlled by the Anna Freudians,

and a third “group” consisting of nonaligned or independent analysts who refused

to ally

themselves with either of the two main groups. This third group had no training program

^'See Kohon, The British School of Psychoanalysis, 40-41 for a discussion of the

impact of the influx of European emigrants on the British Psycho-Analytic Society.

^^Kohon, The British School of Psychoanalysis, 41-45.
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of Its own; however, both

A and B

group trainees would take

under the supervision of an analyst aligned with

their

their first training case

own group and

their

second training

case under the supervision of one of the nonaligned analysts.

Winnicott was one of the independents
the Kleinians or the Freudians.

both groups,^*’ his

own

who

While he would draw on the

opportunity to observe.

As

more than

forty years,

approximately 60,000 cases,^^ and
psychoanalytic thinking.

he was presented with ample

a pediatrician (and, later, a pediatric psychiatrist)

Paddington Green Children’s Hospital from 1923

In

1

to 1963,

this extensive clinical

in the

at

Winnicott managed

experience infonns

940 he was appointed Psychiatric Consultant

Government Evacuation Scheme

all

of his

to the

County of Oxford and thus had the opportunity

observe and work with hundreds of children
into

theoretical contributions of

formulations would be finnly grounded in clinical observation;

and, in a career that spanned

and placed

refused to align himself with either

who were

youth “hostels” for their physical

displaced by the

safety.

German

air raids

Experience with these children

provided a psychological laboratory for the observation of the effects of child/parent
separation and the environmental adaptations required to minimize the psychic

damage

^^Kohon, The British School of Psychoanalysis, 45
^'‘See

Winnicott, Playing and Reality,

xii.

“Naturally, facts that can be elicited

need to be interpreted, and for full use to be made of information given or observations
made in a direct way on the behavior of babies, these need to be placed in relation to a
theory.

”

Robert Rodman, The Spontaneous Gesture: Selected Letters of D. W.
Winnicott. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), xiv.
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to

inherent in such separation.^^

in the

As

early as 1946, he

was

able to write (in “Child Analysis

Latency Period”):
In my practice I have treated thousands of children
of this age group by child psychiatry. I have (as a
trained analyst) given individual psychotherapy to

some hundreds. Also

I have had a certain number
of children of this age group for psychoanalysis, more
than twelve and less than twenty. The borders are so

vague

that

I

would be unable

At the same time he had begun

to treat

to

be exact.

psychotic adults in his private practice.^*

He was

thus ideally positioned to combine infant observation with the insights to be gained

through the psychoanalytic treatment of severely regressed older children and

was

this

adults.

It

environment of theoretical innovation and challenge combined with

extraordinary opportunities for clinical observation that provided the unique experiences

grounding Winnicott’s very personal vision of psychic development.
In a

paper presented before the Candidates of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic

Society on October 3,1962,^^ Winnicott recounts the intricate interweaving of his

He

observations and Melanie Klein’s early work.

own

first sets

forth the

own

problem posed by

his

observations:

I

was

starting

time, and

up as consultant paediatrician

you can imagine how exciting

it

at that

was

to

be

taking innumerable case histories and to be getting

^^Adam

Phillips, Winnicott, 62-65.

^^Winnicott, “Child Analysis in the Latency Period” in The Maturational

Processes and the Facilitating Environment,

1

15.

^^Winnicott, “Primitive Emotional Development” in The Maturational Processes

and

the Facilitating Environment, 145.

Winnicott,

“A

Personal

View of the Kleinian Contribution”

Processes and the Facilitating Environment, 171-78.
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in

Maturational

from uninstructed hospital-class parents all the
confirmation that anyone could need for the psychoanalytic theories that were beginning to have meaning
for me through my own analysis. At that time no other
analyst

was also a paediatrician, and so
I was an isolated phenomenon.

for

two or three

decades

mention these facts because by being a paediatrician
with a knack for getting mothers to tell me about their
I

children and about the early history of their children’s
disorders, I was soon in the position of being astounded

both by the insight psychoanalysis gave into the lives of
children and by a certain deficiency in psycho-analytic
theory which

I

At

will describe.

that time, in the 1920s,

everything had the Oedipus complex

at its core.

The

analysis of the psycho-neuroses led the analyst over and

over again to the anxieties belonging to the instinctual
life at

two

the 4-5-year period in the child’s relationship to the

parents.

Earlier difficulties that

came

were

to light

treated in analyses as regressions to pregenital fixation

dynamics came from conflict at the full-blown
genital Oedipus complex of the toddler or late toddler age,

points, but the

that is just before the passing

of the Oedipus complex and

the onset of the latency period.
histories

showed me

Now, innumerable
who became

case

that the children

disturbed, whether psycho-neurotic, psychotic, psycho-

somatic or antisocial, showed difficulties

development

in infancy,

in their

emotional

even as babies. Paranoid

hypersensitive children could even have started to be in

weeks or even days of life. Something
was wrong somewhere. When I came to treat children by
psycho-analysis I was able to confimi the origin of psychoneurosis in the Oedipus complex, and yet I knew that troubles
Babies could become emotionally ill.^'^
started earlier.
that pattern in the first

.

.

.

Recognizing the frustration Winnicott was meeting with

in his

attempt to

make

sense of his observations in light of traditional Freudian theory, James Strachey (with

whom

Winnicott was

in analysis at the time) directed

Winnicott writes of this “important moment”

Winnicott,

“A

Personal

him

to the

work of Melanie

Klein.

in his life:

View of the Kleinian Contribution”

Processes, 172.
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in

Maturational

So

I

and

went
I

to hear

and then

found an analyst

to see

who had

about the anxieties that belong

Melanie Klein,

a great deal to say

and 1
working with the benefit of her help.
This was difficult for me, because overnight 1
had changed from being a pioneer into being a

down

settled
.

.

to infancy,

to

.

student with a pioneer teacher.^'

Among the most powerful

of Klein’s influences upon Winnicott would be her

postulation of the notion of an “inner” subjective world which could be contrasted with
the “outer” objective world.^^ This

was

in part the result

of her vast elaboration of the

notion of “fantasy” that for Freud had represented the hallucinatory fulfillment of a wish
that is not satisfied

by

external reality.

Where Freud had seen

the “psychic energy”

represented by the drive for satisfaction as being directed either toward an external object

or to an internal fantasy, Klein advanced the related notion of “phantasy” as the
imaginative elaboration of all instinctual experience.

While Freud had seen

instinctual

drives as consisting of a source, an aim, and only secondarily, an object, for Klein

phylogenetic phantasies^** insured that

all

drives were object relational, even though the

object might be an internal one. Klein argued that

so-called “objective”

all

experience— even experience of the

world— would be colored and enriched by unconscious

phantasies,

while unconscious phantasies, in their turn, would be impacted by actual experience of

^'Winnicott,

"A

Personal

View of the Kleinian

“A

Personal

View of the

Contribution” in Maturatiomil

Processes, 173.
^^Winnicott,

Kleinian Contribution” in Maturatiomil

Processes, 174.

^^Hughes, Reshaping the Psycho-Analytic Domain, 44-50.

^^Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations
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in

Psychoanalytic Theory, 131-33.

the real world.^^

Thus were established

the conditions for a richly elaborated and fluid

inner reality.

Winnicott learned that Klein’s use of small toys as a means by which
children

in

analysis could “project” the contents of their “inner world” into the play
situation allowed

her an extraordinary insight into their inner psychic reality with
anxieties and primitive defenses.

initially

the

found

mother

s

in the external

breast

She theorized

its

“infantile conflicts and

that the “objects”

which the child

world were not whole persons, but “part objects” such

as

which the child imagined himself greedily devouring or destroying

frustrated or instinctual aggression.

Such objects would be

split into

in

“good” or “bad”

depending on the interplay of environmental factors and phantasied elaborations.

Through the processes of introjection and

projection,

“good” and “bad” objects could be

placed in the external world or appropriated as part of the self
feel his

own

instinctual aggression as an attack

Thus, the infant might

from “outside” persecutory objects

through introjection of the “good breast”, find comfort and

stability within.

or,

Klein tenned

the particular constellation of anxieties and defenses characteristic of this stage of

development as the “paranoid/schizoid position,”

own

because the infant

feels his

projected aggression as an attack upon himself by outside forces and schizoid

because the splitting inherent in the mechanism of projection implies an ego-split as well
as an unintegrated object.^*

^^Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations
^*^Winnicott,

“A

Personal

View of the

in

Psycho-Analytic Theory

Kleinian Contribution” in The Maturational

Processes and the Facilitating Environment, 174-75.
^^Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations

in

Psycho-Analytic

^^Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations

in

Psychoanalytic Theory, 128.
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Theory’, \1>\ -Zb.

Klein considered

to

be a major developmental achievement (occurring

months) when the infant moves from relating

SIX

a

it

at

about

to part-objects to the ability to relate to

whole person. The configuration of anxieties and defenses inherent

in this type

of

object relating she terms the “depressive position.” With the recognition of the
mother as
a

whole human being, the

object,

infant

is

able to relate to both “good” and “bad” in a single

and his experience of the external world becomes more congruent with

reality.

In

ordinary situations this means there will be a lessening of persecutory anxiety because,

according to Klein,

to

him by way of

now

much of the

his

own

hostility the child has previously experienced has

split-off projections.

come

Identification with the object (mother)

recognized as primarily good provides the basis for stabilization and integration of

the child’s

own

The anxiety

ego.

destruction of the

in this position will

good object (with

be produced by fear of loss or

resulting destruction of ego integration) and guilt

over real or phantasied predatory attacks on the object which the infant has previously
carried out through love or hate

instinctual impulses).

(i.e.,

through the expression of libidinal or aggressive

These anxieties

(restoration of an object

damaged

will give rise to the infant’s need for reparation,

or destroyed in phantasy). Winnicott considered the

formulation of the depressive position to be one of Melanie Klein’s most important
contributions to psychoanalysis,^^ though, in typical Winnicott fashion, he immediately

began

to reformulate

^“^Winnicott,

it

"A

as “the capacity for concern.”

Personal

View of the

Kleinian Contribution” in The Maturational

Processes and the Facilitating Environment, 176.
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In addition to her innovative theoretical

work/® Klein pioneered a numher of

techniques, most notably play therapy and the analysis of the
counter-transference. Klein

used small toys which could readily be manipulated by the child to symbolically
express
anxiety, phantasies, or actual experiences that he might be unable to process
through

language. Phyllis Grosskurth describes these toys as “nonmechanical, varying only in
color and size

and adds

that “the

human

figure should represent

no particular

profession.” Eventually each child analysand would have his or her

containing

“wooden men and women

in

two

sizes, cars,

own

drawer

wheelbarrows, swings,

trains,

airplanes, animals, trees, bricks, houses, fences, paper, scissors, a knife, pencils, chalks or

paints, balls

and marbles, modeling

clay,

and

As

string.”'"

including the analyst in the play, assigning her

now one

the child played, sometimes

role,

now

a “continual and shifting assignment of self-other configurations”

another, there evolved

which formed

the basis

of Klein’s contribution to the analytic technique which emphasized transference and
countertransference.'^^ Klein offered interpretations of the play or

transference/countertransference

phenomena and found confimiation of her

interpretations in the lessening of the child’s anxiety.*^^ Projective techniques and

extensive use of the transference and countertransference would

become hallmarks of

Winnicott’s technique as well.

‘^“Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory’, 121.

“^'Grosskurth,

Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work, 101.

"^Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations
“^^Hughes, Reshaping the Psycho-Analytic

140

in

Psychoanalytic Theory, 121.

Domain,

73.

“Thus,” says Winnicott, summing up the contributions
to his

by

my

his pioneer teacher, “a very rich analytic

own

made

thought

world opened up for me, and the material of

cases confirmed the theories and did so repeatedly. In
the end

I

came

to take

it

all

for

granted.”""

Winnicott’s

“many

tentative

and frightened papers” trying

problems with understanding infant psychology
technique finally “boiled up”, as he puts

it,

in

to point out the

terms of Freudian theory and

in a lengthy

paper in 1936 which he

titled.

Appetite and Emotional Disorder.”"^ His formulations in this paper represent a melding

of Kleinian influences and his

own

observations of eating disorders

children; disorders that he linked to the “general

are a

common

part of psychiatric

illness."*^

agreemenf

’

among

babies and

that disturbances

of appetite

Winnicotf s observation of infant feeding

problems confirmed what could be extrapolated from Klein’s analysis of children

young

as

two

years, nine

from the perversions and

months

illnesses

to organize his observations

more

Freud had extrapolated the psycho-sexual stages

of adult patients); and Klein’s theory helped Winnicott

on feeding disorders, establishing a

starting with “the recognition

resulting in “a

(just as

as

of oral instincf

’,

line

of development

progressing “through oral fantasy”, and

sophisticated linking up of this

theme of oral fantasy with the

‘inner

world.’”

""winnicott,

“A

Personal

View of the

Kleinian Contribution” in The Maturational

Processes and the Facilitating Environment, 174-75.
"^Winnicott,

"A

Personal

View of the

Kleinian Contribution” in Maturational

Processes and the Facilitating Environment, 172.

Through Paediatrics to
Psycho-Analysis, 34, note 2, “Although I was all the time influenced by Melanie Klein, in
this particular field I was simply following the lead given me by careful history-taking in
"^’Winnicott, "Appetite

and Emotional Disorder”

innumerable cases.”
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in

As Winnicott
desire and

its

puts

it,

satisfaction,

in its earliest incarnation the oral instinct is felt

I

want

to suck, eat, bite.

feel satisfied after sucking eating, biting.
“

to

This

I enjoy sucking, eating, biting. I

instinct,

developed

‘When hungry I think offood, when I eat I think of taking food
keep inside, and I think of what I want

The

third phase, the creation

this,

ideas of what

is

in.

in fantasy,

I think of what I like

be rid of and I think of getting rid of it.

.

.

.

namely ideas of what happens

inside oneself and, along

the state of the inside of the source of supply,

mother’s body. 7 also think of what happens at the source of supply.
think of robbing

becomes,

of an “inner world”, results from “a tremendous elaboration

of the two parts of the fantasy
with

to

simply as

and even of destroying

the source

When

very’ hungry' I

of supply and I then feel bad about

what I have inside me and I think of means of getting

and as completely as possible.

namely the

it

out of me, as quickly as possible

Claiming a continuity from the “anorexia nervosa of

adolescence, the inhibitions of feeding of childhood, the appetite disorders in childhood
that are related to certain critical times,

earliest infancy”"'*,

Winnicott argues in

and of the infant

is

not so simple as

mental structure

may

It

was

in

it

be allowed even

and the feeding inhibitions of infancy, even of
this

paper that “the psychology of the small child

would
to the

at first

seem

newborn

to be,

its

p.

34

complex

its

physical correlate in

physical correlates in the various excretory functions) that

“'^Winnicott, "Appetite

Psycho-Analysis,

that a quite

infant.”"'^

terms of this interplay between inner (with

eating) and outer (with

and

(italics

"'^Winnicott, "Appetite

and Emotional Disorder”

in

Through Paediatrics

to

in

Through Paediatrics

to

mine).

and Emotional Disorder”

Psycho-Analysis, 33.
"’‘'winnicott,

"Appetite and Emotional Disorder” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 34.
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Winnicott saw the psychic mechanisms of introjection and projection evolving
and

becoming

the basis for the creation of the internal objects and mental structures
that

would eventually allow
is

the

baby

to constitute a “self’ that

could be contrasted with what

“not-self.” Klein’s theory of an inner psychic world elaborated through phantasy

provided a
the

way

out of the impasse created by over reliance on the explanatory power of

Oedipus complex and made sense of phenomena Freud had not explored.
In his 1941 paper

“The Observation of Infants

in a Set Situation”,

Winnicott

describes a particular set up in his clinic that he used to explore the state of relationship

between the child’s inner and outer worlds. This simple
chairs,

set

and a tongue depressor (which Winnicott sometimes
...

I

She
I

sits

down

sit

way

handle the spatula,

I

invite the

mother

that, if the child
is

it

As

a routine,

what

I

of time

in

am

should wish to

about, and

which she and

I

fairly

be put

down

it

is

mother

easy for

is

to

me

be a period

will contribute as

as possible to the situation, so that

can

at the

to place the

possible. Ordinarily, the

gradually to describe to her that there

A child between

refers to as a “spatula.”)

place a right-angled shining tongue-depressor

will understand

two

opposite

with the baby on her knee.

edge of the table and
child in such a

table,

me with the
coming between me and her.

ask the mother to

angle of the table

up includes a

little

what happens

to the child’s account.^®

about five and thirteen months will normally go through a series of three

“stages” in his relation to the tongue-depressor, and Winnicott found any deviation from

the expected stages to be significant. In the

tongue-depressor and reach out for

for

any reaction from the doctor or

it,

first

stage the child will be attracted to the

only to hesitate and draw back, watching carefully

his mother.

He may

turn away, but will gradually

^°Winnicott, "The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation” in Through

Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis, 52-53.
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resume
still,

During

interest in the object.

and

enough

become

it

is

of hesitation” he will hold his body

only with the initiation of the second stage that he will “become brave

to let his feelings

soft

this “period

develop” and accept “the reality of desire.” His mouth will

and flabby and he will

the object and place

it

in his

salivate copiously.” Eventually he will reach for

mouth. “Instead of expectancy and

develops self-confidence, and there

is

free bodily

movement, the

manipulation of the spatula.” In the third stage, the baby
if

by mistake.”

If

it

is

“first

stillness there

now

latter related to

of all drops the spatula as

returned, the spatula will again be dropped, “but this time less by

mistake.” Soon the dropping itself will

become

the primary feature of the play, and the

child will eventually wish to join the spatula on the floor.^‘

This “set situation” was for Winnicott not only a research and diagnostic

found that allowing the child

pace had value

in itself,

to

complete the “process” spontaneously and

and so the

child’s ability to accept and act

on

set situation

inner world.

The

for

show no

once.

One

child

if

he dared

to get rid

of

gave a glimpse into the child’s

interest in the spatula at all, or

long time to be brave enough to display his

with the spatula even

The

Winnicott a major psychological achievement.

in response to the set situation

child might

of reality and

he

own

at his

a kind of therapy as well.

desire, to “take in” aspects

what he no longer wants represented

A number of variations

became

tool;

to grasp

interest.

it,

and

feel

He might be
compelled

he might take a

unable to play freely

to rid

himself of it

would display generous and uninhibited responses, attempting

at

to “feed”

the doctor, mother, and any other observers present. Another might crouch on the floor,

^'Winnicott, "The Observation of Infants in a Set Situation” in Through

Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis, 53-54.
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“throwing away the spatula, screwing himself up

in his

own

peculiar fashion and smiling

m a way that indicates a desperate attempt to deny misery and a sense of rejection.”^^
During the next decades, Winnicott would continue his exploration of the world
that Klein

had helped

to

open up

for him.

In the process,

he would transfonn Klein’s

formulations, just as she had transformed Freud’s. While Klein had superimposed her

own developmental
to

“positions” onto the Freudian psychosexual stages, Winnicott sought

understand the psychic development that had to occur prior to what either Klein or

Freud had theorized. This would take him
infant, a state

to the earliest relationship

between mother and

of total dependence characterized by such complete adaptation on the part

of the “environment-mother”

to her infant’s

needs that

it

is felt

by

the infant as total

independence.^^

Freud’s theory of human psychology
(translated

by Strachey

is

based on the idea of innate “drives”

as “instincts”) that provide pressure toward action. According to

Freud,

... an ‘instinct’

is

provisionally to be understood

as the psychical representative of an endosomatic,

continuously flowing source of stimulation

The concept of instinct

is

.

.

..

thus one of those lying on

the frontier between the mental and the physical.

.

..

[They] are to be regarded as a measure of the demand

made upon
instincts

the

mind

for

work. What distinguishes the

from one another and endows them with

specific qualities

sources and

is

their relation to their somatic

to their aims.

The source of an

instinct is

a process of exitation occurring in an organ and the

“Winnicott, "Appetite and Emotional Disorder” in Through Paediatrics

to

Psycho-Analysis, 47.

“Winnicott, "Paediatrics and Psychiatry”
Analysis, 163.
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in

Through Paediatrics

to

Psycho-

immediate aim of the

instinct lies in the

removal of this

organic stimulus.”^'*

Laplanche and Pontalis further describe Freud’s conception of instinct or drive
(Trieb in

German)

as follows:

Three Essays on the Theory’ of Sexuality was the work
which introduced the term "Trieh\ and along with it the
distinction (which Freud never ceased using thenceforward)

between source, object and aim. The Freudian conception
of instinct emerges in the course of the description of human
sexuality. Basing himself notably upon the study of the
perversions and of the modes of infantile sexuality, Freud
contests the so-called popular view that assigns to the

sexual instinct a specific aim and object and localizes
the excitation and operation of the genital apparatus.

shows how, on

the contrary, the object

and only chosen

in its definitive

form

vicissitudes of the subject’s history.

many and fragmented

is

in

it

in

He

variable, contingent,

consequence of the

He shows

too

how aims

‘Component Instinct’), and
closely dependent on somatic sources which are themselves
are

(see

manifold, and capable of acquiring and retaining a predominant
role for the subject (erotogenic zones): the

component

instincts

only become subordinate to the genital zone and integrated
into the

achievement of coitus

at

the end of a

complex evolution

which biological maturation alone does not guarantee.
Freud believed

by

that

it

is in

the integration of the drives with the cultural

civilized behavior that the

human

personality

is

constituted. This structural event

accomplished through the resolution of the Oedipus complex
drive behavior and object-relating behavior

is

demands imposed

in

which

is

for the first time

integrated.

^^Freud, “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality” in

SE

VII, 168.

(It is

also

important to note that Freud invokes the Constancy Principle-the tendency of the psyche
to zero or
to divest itself of excess “excitation” by either returning the sum of excitation
definition and role
to as low as level as possible. The many problems associated with the

of the Constancy Principle, a principle that Freud never abandoned) are laid out
341-347.)
in Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis,
^^Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, 215.
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in detail

Klein insisted that

all drives are inherently object relational.

At no point

is

a drive

simply the expression of organic tension; instead drives are expressions of love
and hate
directed at

first

toward the mother who will be

initially related to as a part-object or

phylogenetic object. Klein retained the use of Freud’s psychosexual stages
phallic, genital) but treated them, not as the source of the drives

in

(oral, anal,

(which she conceived of

psychological terms), but as the varying modes through which drives are expressed.^**

Winnicott understood Freud’s theory to be essentially a three-body psychology
that explores the relationship

two-body psychology

among

the child and

two parents, and Klein’s theory

that explores the relationship

between mother and

child.

as a

The

question that he posed for himself was, “What then precedes the first object

The

relationship?

is

logical

answer would seem

to

be a one-body relationship

implied “an external world to which the relationship

would,

in fact,

be the

state

of affairs

original libidinal cathexis of the ego

cathexes

out.”^^

much

as the

.

.

.

is

in his

[which] persists and

body of an amoeba

But, for Winnicott, this

.

.

is

is

related to the pseudopodia

a false step, for he finds

it

which

it

puts

clear that:

that the unit is not the individual, the unit is an

The

metaphor of “an

related to the object-

before object relationships the state of affairs

individual set-up.

which

of a negative kind.”)^* This

Freud had posited

that

.

is

(in

is this:

environment-

centre of gravity of the being does

not start off in the individual.

It is

in the total set-up.

By

^‘^Greenberg and Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanlytic Theory, 136-44.

^^Winnicott, "Anxiety Associated with Insecurity” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 99

(italics

mine).

^^Winnicott, "Anxiety Associated with Insecurity” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 99.
^’Freud,

“On

Narcissism:

An

Introduction” in

147

SE XIV,

75-76.

good-enough child

management
the

“There

is

the shell

can begin

to

be an individual.

directly, this brings us

no such thing as a baby.

of the situation

who makes

to Winnicott’s startling claim:

is

baby

the “nursing couple” that includes the baby

s

survival possible. In thus recognizing the reality

very beginning, Winnicott follows the lead of the ego psychologists

at the

who emphasized

the

back

”

Instead, for Winnicott, there

and the caretaker

and general

becomes gradually taken over and
kernel (which has looked all the time like a human
baby

to us)

Expressed more

care, technique, holding,

the actual external situation in

which the child finds himself rather than

the child’s instinctual drives and phantasies.^' This formulation changes the

of the problem of how the infant comes

to establish a relationship to the external world.

Freud’s problem had been to try to explain
relation with

its

autonomy from

objects. Winnicott

a world in

which

it

how

would have
is

whole nature

a solipsistic isolate can be brought into

to explain

essentially

how

the infant achieves

embedded.

‘’"winnicott, "Anxiety Associated with Insecurity” in

Through Paediatrics

to

Psycho-Analysis, 99.
"'See, for example,

“The prognosis

Anna

for the solution

motive for the defense against

when

Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, 63-64.
psychic conflicts is most favorable when the

Freud, The

of the

instinct has

been

that

of superego anxiety.

the defense in infantile neurosis has been motivated

by

.

.

.

But, even

objective anxiety, analytic

therapy has a good prospect of success. The simplest method-and that least in
accordance with the principles of analysis-is for the analyst, when once he has reversed
the defensive process in the child’s

own mind,

to try so to influence reality,

responsible for the child’s upbringing, that objective anxiety
that the

ego adopts a

great efforts to

less severe attitude

toward the

ward them off”
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instincts

is

i.e.,

those

reduced, with the result

and has not

to

make such

In

Primitive Emotional Development”, “ Winnicott lays
out his under-standing of

human emotional development

the basic

that

precedes Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position

and Freud’s Oedipus complex. Specifically, he examines the period
of time before the
infant

capable of object relationships and during which, unless things are
managed very

is

carefully,

even instinctual needs will be experienced as interruptions

He

being.”

much

of

sees this period of development as ending at about six months, but concedes

that the actual timing is not critical

or

in the “continuity

later.

(In the clinical set

be marked by the infant
finished with

and

that

some

children

may go

through

it

much

earlier

up with the spatula, the end of the period will normally

s ability to rid

himself of the spatula when he

is

ready to be

it.)^^

Using a strategy similar

to

Freud’s in “Three Essays on a Theory of Sexuality”,

Winnicott deduces from the psycho-pathology of psychosis failures
three very early developmental processes.

He names

in

one or more of

these processes integration,

personalization, and realization^^ and relates them, respectively, to the infant’s dawning

ability to see itself as a unit, inhabiting

that

it

its

own body, and

capable of relating to a reality

perceives as external to itself Personality disintegration and dissociative states are

common

in psychosis

and occur frequently as normal defense mechanisms. From

this.

^^The paper, presented before the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1945,
result

of more than two decades of work with

time analyses of psychotic adults.

would elaborate throughout the

It

rest

lays out

most of the important ideas

Developmenf

’

in

Through Paediatrics

to

Emotional Development”

in

Through Paediatrics

to

Psycho-Analysis, 147.
^“^Winnicott, "Primitive

the

that Winnicott

of his career.

^^Winnicott, "Primitive Emotional

is

infants and children and of extensive war-

Psycho-Analysis, 149.

149

Winnicott posits a primary unintegration which serves as the
basis (or regression point)
for

such disintegrated

states:

think that an infant cannot be said to be aware at
the start that while feeling this and that in his cot or
I

enjoying the skin stimulations of bathing, he is the
same as himself screaming for immediate satisfaction,

possessed by an urge to get

at

and destroy something

unless satisfied by milk.^^

There are long stretches of time in a normal infant’s
which a baby does not mind whether he is many
bits or one whole being, or whether he lives in his
mother’s face or in his own body, provided that from
.

.

.

life in

time to time he comes together and feels something.^^

Regressions to such early unintegrated states are also

commonly seen

By way of illustration, Winnicott

describes the patient

content merely to relate

activities

all

of the

any actual analytic work. While

this

who comes

to interpret this as the patient’s

for treatment

and

of his weekend, without feeling the need

need

to

be known

person, the analyst.”^’ Winnicott also points to other,

in all his bits

do

and pieces by one

more common forms of
somnambulism and

dissociations between the states of waking and sleeping, and also such “normal”

war and peace.

^^Winnicott, “Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 150.
‘^^Winnicott, “Primitive

to

“Sometimes,” he argues, “we

dissociation used as defense mechanisms, including fugue states and

dissociations as urban living and

is

behavior would be seen as resistance in an ordinary

analysis, Winnicott considers a different point of view.

need

in the transference.

Emotional Development”

in

Through Paediatrics

to

Psycho-Analysis, 150.
^^Winnicott, “Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 150.
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Similarly, Winnicott QxgwQS, personalizatiou-{\\Q
achievement of localizing one’s
self in

patient

one

s

who

own body— cannot be

taken for granted.

by

who

herself and her

was

.

.

.

and could only see

not aware of what her feet were doing”,

own

In childhood, another patient could not distinguish

twin and was surprised not to

Imaginary playmates, according

feel

movement when

to Winnicott,

that they are

between

she saw her sister

can also be seen as instances

of depersonalization. “Study of the future of these imaginary companions

shows

woman

believed she “lived in a box 20 yards up, only connected with her body

a slender thread.

picked up.^^

describes the psychotic

“discovered that most of the time she lived in her head

out of her eyes as out of windows, and so

and another

He

sometimes other selves of a highly primitive

(in analysis)

type.”^°

Winnicott sees integration and personalization as coming about through two “sets

of experience.”

First, there is the

“technique of infant care whereby an infant

warm, handled and bathed and rocked and named”

environment”

is

It is

important

of experiences makes possible the second. The

provision, by the mother, of what Winnicott will later explore

“facilitating

kept

and, second, “the acute instinctual

experiences which tend to gather the personality together from within.”^'
to note that, for Winnicott, the first set

is

more

fully

and name the

necessary to the infant’s ability to experience instinctual

^^Winnicott, "Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 149.
^^Winnicott,"Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 149.
^‘’Winnicott, "Primitive

Emotional Development”

in

Through Paediatrics

to

Psycho-Analysis, 151.
’’Winnicott, "Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-A nalysis, 150.
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urges as unifying rather than disintegrative forces.

experience that instinctual urges can be
disruptions from the outside, and

it

felt

as

coming from

the mother’s ego

is

the infant has developed the ego strength to perform

Once
to

only under cover of ego

It is

it

the self rather than as

which takes on
for

this function until

himself

integration and personalization can be experienced (even if only from
time

time and under optimal circumstances), the infant

or adaptation to reality.

makes possible

is

faced with the task of realization

Again, Winnicott believed that

the creative connection with reality that

it

is

is

the action of the mother that

the basis of all future objective

knowledge.

I

will try to describe in the simplest possible terms

this

phenomenon

mother’s breast

as

(I

I

am

see

it.

In terms

of baby and

not claiming that the breast

is

essential as a vehicle of mother-love) the

baby has
instinctual urges and predatory ideas. The mother
has a breast and the power to produce milk, and
the idea that she would like to be attacked by a
hungry baby. These two phenomena do not come
into relation with each other till the mother and child
live an experience together. The mother being
mature and physically able has to be the one with
tolerance and understanding, so that it is she who
produces a situation that
first tie

the infant

object that

is

may

with luck result

makes with an

in the

external object, an

external to the self from the infant’s point

of view.

I

think of the process as if two lines

directions, liable to

come near each

^^"With good-enough mothering
instinctual gratifications except

much

not so

come

to

If they

the beginning the

baby

is

not subjected to

in so far as there is ego-participation.

In this respect

it

is

a question of giving the baby satisfaction as of letting the baby find and

terms with the object (breast,

Child Development”

59 60

at

came from opposite
other.

in

bottle, milk, etc.).”

Winnicott, “Ego Integration in

The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment,

-

.
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overlap there

which the

is

a

moment of illusion-^ bit of experience

infant can take as either his hallucination or

a thing belonging to external reality.
In other language, the infant comes to the breast when
excited, and ready to hallucinate something fit to be

attacked.

and he

So

is

At

that

moment

his ideas are

the actual nipple appears

was that nipple that he hallucinated.
enriched by actual details of sight, feel,

able to feel

it

smell, and next time this material
In this

what

The mother,

way he

used

in the hallucination.

to conjure

up

actually available.

is

in effect, regulates reality in

infant’s needs.

is

up a capacity

starts to build

such a

way

that

it

will

match up with the

Out of this maternal provision comes what Winnicott

calls the experience

of illusion. This experience consists of some aspect of reality being presented just
infant

is

never be

ready to hallucinate

known with

it (i.e.,

conjure

it

up out of need) with the

result that

as the

it

can

certainty (from the infant’s point of view) whether he has found or

created the object. Every such experience yields sensory richness that the infant

is

able to

bring to future illusory experiences. Winnicott differentiates himself from both Freud

and Klein

in this area

of illusion.

It is

from

development offantasy which he carefully
spoken of hallucinatory wish fulfillment
this type

of experience

to fantasying.

illusion that Winnicott traces the

differentiates

in the face

of

frustration,

Fantasy, by contrast,

fulfillment of needs at just the right time, that

is,

at a

time

psychologically ready to accept a piece of reality as his

Winnicott follows Klein (as opposed

from fantasying. Freud had

to

is

made

when

own

and Winnicott

relates

possible by the

the infant

is

creation. In this

way,

Freud) in seeing fantasy as the subjective

component of all experience, but breaks with Klein

in that

he sees the origin of internal

’^Winnicott, "Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 152-53.

153

fantasies in the experience

It is

of maternal provision rather than

in phylogenetic derivatives.

through the experience of illusion that the mother introduces
the infant

which can have meaning

for him. In the ideal case, in

which the

infant

to a reality

and mother “live

an experience together” over and over again, the infant’s fantasy
world becomes “vastly
enriched with the world’s riches.
infant’s task is not to escape

from

This

is

why we

can say

Winnicott, the

that, for

solipsistic isolation, but to create

an individual self out

of the embeddedness of an self-environment matrix. Eventually, the infant will come
differentiate external reality

enough mother,

from his internal world, but

this distinction

does not need

to

at

the beginning, with a

to

good

be made.

For Winnicott, these three processes— integration, personalization, and realization-form the bedrock of the developing self Satisfactory development

at this stage is

what

allows an individual to feel real as he or she encounters the external world. While Freud

had worked with patients who suffered from repressed
ill

patients suffered

from a lack of ability

to experience desire

inability to feel real or to relate to objects in the

put

it

desire, Winnicott’s

more

severely

brought about by their

world as being

real.

As Winnicott would

in a later paper.

make
sense for us to discuss the early psychology of the human
infant, since, unless the environment has been good enough,
the human being has not become differentiated, and has not
come up as a subject for discussion in terms of normal psychology’.
Only

if the early

^“^Winnicott, “Primitive

environment

is

good enough, does

Emotional Development”

in

it

Through Paediatrics

to

Psycho-A nalysis, 153.
^^Winnicott, “Agression in Relation to Emotional Development” in Through

Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis, 214 (Italics Winnicott’s).
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In other words, Winnicott

for the psychotic

would

find that being, rather than desiring,

and borderline patients

whom

is

the critical issue

Freud had correctly diagnosed as beyond

the reach of his theory and technique. Winnicott

would spend

the rest of his career

tracing their illnesses (loss of reality contact and of reality
sense, disintegration, and

depersonalization) to deprivations in this area of primitive experience, and he
would

develop

new

analysis with

techniques for dealing with patients for

its

on the transference,

reliance

whom

an ordinary “classical”

free association,

and interpretation could

never reach the psychotic core. In the process, he would vastly expand the scope and
explanatory power of psychoanalysis.

Regressions to earlier states can be made in moments of health as well as in
illness.

new

Winnicott gives us a hint as

to

how

these regressions figure in the creation of a

understanding of the role of art in the constitution of the

argues that

“much

sanity

.

.

human

He

has a symptomatic quality, being charged with fear or

.

denial of madness, fear or denial of the innate capacity of every

^^See Winnicott,

personality.

“Ego

Integration in Child

human being

Development”

in

to

become

The Maturational

Processes and the Facilitating Environment. “In the body of an anencephalie infant
functional events, including instinctual localizations,

would be

may be

taking plaee, events that

called experiences of id-function if there were a brain.

It

could be said that

if

would have been an organization of these functions,
have been given the label ego. But with no electronic

there had been a normal brain there

and

to this organization could

apparatus there can be no experience, and therefore no ego.

But id-functioning

is

normally not

lost;

it is

collected together in

all its

aspects

word

and becomes ego-experience. There is thus no sense in making
phenomena that are not covered and catalogued and experienced and eventually
use of the

interpreted

‘id’ for

by ego-functioning.

of the development of a human child, therefore, ego
functioning needs to be taken as a concept that is inseparable from that of the existence of
the infant as a person. What instinctual life there may be apart from ego-functioning can
In the very early stages

be ignored, because the infant

is

not yet an entity having experiences” (56).
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unintegrated, depersonalized, and to feel that the world

is

unreal.”’^ In a footnote in this

seminal paper, Winnicott makes a further point: “Through
artistic expression

hope

to

keep

touch with our primitive selves whence the most intense
feelings and even

in

fearfully acute sensations derive,

next chapter,

I

we can

and we are poor indeed

if we

are only sane."^^ In the

will look at the kind of aesthetic theory that can be derived
from

Winnicott’s pioneering work.

^^Winnicott, “Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 150.
^^Winnicott, “Primitive Emotional Development” in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 150

(Italics

mine).
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CHAPTER 4

TOWARD A WINNICOTTIAN THEORY OF AESTHETICS
According
hallucinated

to Freud, reality is

memory of an

encountered

the ego, and

Submission

growing up

is

the infant

first

discovers that the

experience of satisfaction does not give real satisfaction.

thus through pain and frustration that the infant
hostile world.

when

makes

It is

his or her gradual entry into a

to the reality principle is essentially

an inhibitory function of

a long process of renouncing infantile pleasures. In adult

the individual painfully inhabits an outer world of enforced
frustration while hiding,

life

more

or less successfully, an inner world of phantasy and instinct. If the wishes
represented in
fantasy are to be satisfied, they must be satisfied surreptitiously, while the inhibiting
ego
is

otherwise distracted. Works of art, no less than dreams and symptoms, are vehicles for

the fulfilment of such disguised and

And
when

yet, in the Project for

this strict

unacknowledged wishes.

a Scientific Psychology, there

dichotomy does not seem

is

a

moment of grace

Freud relates a serendipitous event.

to apply.

Let us recall, then, that from the first the nervous system had
two functions: the reception of stimuli from outside and the
discharge of excitations of endogenous origin. It was from this
latter obligation, indeed, that, owing to the exigencies of life,
a compulsion came about towards further biological development.
We might then conjecture that it might actually be our systems
(j) and ijj each of which had assumed one of these primary
obligations.

The system

(j)

would be

the group of neurones

the external stimuli reach, the system

i|;

neurones which receive endogenous excitations. In
should not have invented the two [classes],

have found them already

(j)

and

ijj,

that case,

we

we

should

in existence.’

‘Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology’,

‘vorgefunden’).

which

would contain the

SE

I,

303, note (‘Erfunden’ and

In a similar vein,

Freud explains

that true scientific activity begins
with describing

and then classifying phenomena. However, he
notes, even such descriptions require
certain abstract ideas” that have been “derived
from

not from the

new

somewhere or other but

observations alone.” These ideas which are purposefully

certainly

left

vague,

gradually take on meaning through “repeated references
to the material of observation

from which they appear

to

have been derived, but upon which,

they have been

in fact,

imposed.”^

Now, what Freud
fit

into a theory

is

here describing

at a

of reality such as he professes

reality that is neither inner nor outer, but in

phenomenological

to espouse.

some

level does not actually

These descriptions are of a

third space that represents a blend of the

two. If we have need of such a third space to describe the development of
scientific
theories,

it

seems no

less certain that

we need

it

to describe cultural activities

and works

of art as well. In Playing and Reality, Winnicott discusses just such a need:
generally acknowledged that a statement of human
nature in terms of interpersonal relationships is not good
It is

enough even when the imaginative elaboration of function
and the whole of fantasy both conscious and unconscious,
including the repressed unconscious, are allowed
is

way of describing

another

for.

There

persons that comes out of the

researches of the past two decades.

Of every

brane and an outside and an inside,
is

can be said that there

an inner reality to that individual, an inner world that can

be rich or poor and can be
This helps, but

My claim
there

a

it

who
mem-

individual

has reached to the stage of being a unit with a limiting

is

is

is it

at

peace or

of war.

in a state

enough?

that if there is a

need for

this

double statement,

also need for a triple one: the third part of the life of

human

being, a part that

we

cannot ignore,

an intermediate

is

area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external
contribute.

It is

an area that

is

life

both

not challenged, because no claim

^Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” in
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SE XIV,

1

17.

is

made on

its

behalf except that

it shall exist as a resting
place for the individual engaged in the perpetual
human task
of keeping inner and outer reality separate but related.^

Winnicott not only argues for the theoretical need for such
a space, he locates
place of origin in the development of an infant in the care
of a good enough mother.

meeting the baby’s readiness

to hallucinate

its

By

an object out of need with the actual object

needed, the mother provides an experience of illusion, such that

it

can never be certain

(from the baby’s point of view) whether he has found or created the
object. Winnicott
traces the

development of this

from the infant’s

on

to the area

initial

third area

of experiencing (which he

calls potential space)

experience of illusion, through transitional objects, to play, and

of cultural experience

in general.

In this chapter,

I

will

examine some of

Winnicott’s key ideas in terms of their application to a theory of aesthetics.

To approach
theorist.

objects.

An

this at the

most general

level,

Winnicott

object-relations theory examines the interplay

Freud had already used the term “object”

instinct has a source,

“part objects” (e.g., the breast) or a part of the infant’s

oral instinct

is

an “object-relations”

between a subject and

in his definition

an aim, and an object. At a primitive

have seen, the aim of the

is

level,

own body

of the

instincts:

such objects

(e.g.,

its

may

the thumb).

every

be

As we

the incorporation of the object, and that of the

anal instinct to expel, withhold, or contain

its

object. In

Chapter

3,

we saw how

Winnicott traces the development of the idea of an “inner” and “outer” world through the
psychic elaboration of these somatic functions.
internalization of the “lost object” during

psyche by identification with

its

object.

Freud also pointed out that the

mourning

is

an instance of a modification of the

Implicit in Freud’s theory of the formation of the

^Winnicott, “Transitional Objects and Transitional
Reality,

2.
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Phenomena”

in

Playing and

superego out of the dissolution of that special

complex

set

of relationships known as the Oedipus

the idea that mental structures themselves

is

may be

created from internalized

object relationships:

The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated
by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be
the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting
of these
two identifications [with the two parents] in some way united

with each other. This modification of the ego retains its
special position; it confronts the other contents of the ego

as an ego ideal or super-ego.''
Therefore, in the relationship of the subject to

its

objects,

psychoanalytic terms the ways in which the individual

is

we have

a

way

to discuss in

changed and enriched,

in

part

created, through his or her interaction with the world.

An

important aspect of the relation of the subject to

idea of fantasy.

that represent

when

As we have

seen, Freud’s notion of phantasy

unconscious wishes and are contrasted

the reality-testing function of the ego

system becomes subject

to hallucinatory

is

objects can be found in the

its

is

to reality.

derived from “scenes”

They come

incapacitated or suspended, and the psychic

wish fulfilment. Melanie Klein greatly

expanded Freud’s notion of phantasy by theorizing

that

accompany

into play at times

so, for

all

into play

experience and do not merely

come

unconscious phantasies

of frustration. Even

Klein phantasies were not necessarily derivatives of actual experiences, but were

most often unconscious aspects of the person’s phylogenetic
brought the idea of fantasy closer to

reality,

experience of illusion. In illusion, fantasy

matching

basing the capacity for fantasy in the

is

not contrasted with reality. Instead a

reality is presented to the infant just as

‘’Freud,

“The Ego and

the Id” in

inheritance. Winnicott

he

is

SE XIX, 34
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ready to hallucinate

(Italics Freud’s).

it.

As

Winnicott explains, in the ideal case,

in

which the

infant

and mother “live an experience

together” over and over again, the infant’s fantasy world becomes
“vastly enriched with
the world’s riches.”^ Thus, for Winnicott, fantasy

and used by the individual

of the

way

a

memory

acuities,”^’

is

way

that reality

is

appropriated

who

has explored

many of Winnicott’s

the self is “articulated” through the objects of its

experience. Describing “intense evocative

much

the

subjectivity.

Christopher Bellas, a psychoanalyst
insights, writes eloquently

is

moments”

that

seem

“to elicit within us not so

as an inner psychic constellation laden with images, feelings, and bodily

Bollas claims that this use of objects to contain and then articulate the self

not an unusual occurrence but an everyday event.

.

.

.

[Wjithout giving

it

much

thought

at all

we

consecrate the

world with our own subjectivity, investing people, places,
things, and events with a kind of idiomatic significance. As

we

inhabit this world of ours,

we amble

about in a field of
pregnant objects that contribute to the dense psychic textures
that constitute self experience.

objects in

Very often we

ways unconsciously intended

imprints; indeed,

we do

this

many

select

to bring

and use

up such

times each day, sort of

thinking ourselves out, by evoking constellations of inner
experience.^

Bollas compares this creative experiencing of self constellations through the use

of objects that have been specially endowed with psychic meaning

to the process

of the

^Winnicott, “Primitive Emotional Developmenf’ in Through Paediatrics to

Psycho-Analysis, 153.
'’Christopher Bollas, Being

(New York:

Hill

^Bollas,

A

and Wang, 1992),

Being A Character,

Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Experience

3.

3.
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dream work, and he suggests
life.

According

that “the

human

subject

becomes

the

dream work of his own

to Bollas,

When I enter the world of dreams am deconstructed, as
I am transformed from the one who holds the
internal
world in my mind to the one who is experientially inside
I

the dramaturgy of the other. Gathered and processed by
the dream space and dream events, I live in a space where

seem to have been held before: inside the magical and
embrace of a forming intelligence that bears me.'’

I

erotic

This feeling of being held within the “magical and erotic embrace of a fomiing
intelligence that bears

in the

me,” Bollas

unconsciousness of the mother during the

In this state, ordered thought

moving from wakefulness
to

relates to the self experience

may

safely give

to sleep

state

way

who

is

held

of primary maternal preoccupation.

to intense experience.

Similarly,

and dream, our “complex reflecting” selves give way

our “simple, experiencing” selves. Once again

to the disintegration

of the infant

we

of the self that was the natural

return, this time through the dream,

state

of affairs

at

the beginning of our

lives.

Freud

tells

us that the course of dream experience-the people,

places, and events represented-renders the sleeper’s unconscious

wishes and memories
dream, unbeknownst

in
to

dramatic form, yet the self inside the

himself (as the simple

a theater of his represented

According
self and the

to Bollas, these

complex

two

parts.'*’

states

of consciousness, the simple experiencing

reflecting self, “enable the person to process life according to

^Bollas,

Being A Character,

3.

‘’Bollas,

Being A Character,

4.

'"Bollas,

self), is alive in

Being A Character,

4-5.
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different yet interdependent

modes of engagement: one immersive,

These modes operate during wakefulness no
possibilities for successions

articulated into reality.

less than in

of self experiences,

Some of these

in

the other reflective.”"

dreams. Our days offer

which our being potentials

may be

self experiences

are

planned, remembered and

organized. Others will be intensely experienced, but not thought, giving texture
and

substance to the mystery that

is

our

self.

Winnicott’s description of the child’s use of “transitional objects” will help to
simplify and

make

concrete the above considerations. In the beginning, the child need

not differentiate between what

manage

affairs that the

two

and what he has hallucinated, for his mother

is real

will coincide in an illusion.

adds to the richness of the infant’s fantasy,

more

or less coincide with what

his ability to act in the world.

names

is

it

illusory experience not only

also shapes his fantasies so that they will

actually available.

Now,

Each

will so

this place

The

child develops confidence in

between mother and

“potential space,” and eventually the child will

come

to

child,

Winnicott

use potential space to

“play” with “the precariousness of the interplay of personal psychic reality and the

experience of control of actual objects.'^ As Winnicott explains
not inner psychic reality, nor yet

is it

external reality.

It is

reality

and uses these

this potential space is

transitional

Into this play area the child gathers objects or

from external

it,

between the two.

phenomena
of some

in the service

sample derived from inner or personal

reality.

Without

hallucinating the child puts out a sample of dream potential

and

lives

with

from external

this

sample

in a

chosen setting of fragments

reality.'^

"Bollas, Being a Character, 4-5.
’^Winnicott, Playing

and Reality,

47.

’^Winnicott, Playing

and Reality,

51.
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We recognize in this

description the child’s teddy bear or favorite blanket,

that gains special significance for the child

or her inner psychic reality. Winnicott
the object

which

“It

It

us that the child assumes certain rights over

tells

must survive the

comes from without from our point of view, but not

baby. Neither does

it

come from

be repressed or forgotten, but

It

it

within;

it

object

because of its connection with aspects of his

are respected; nevertheless, because the object

the child’s feeling of omnipotence.

some

is

is real,

it

places limits on

child’s love, hate, and aggression.

so from the point of view of the

not a hallucination.” Over time,

it

will not

will gradually pass into “limbo.”

loses meaning, and this

phenomena have become

because the transitional

is

diffused, have

become spread

out over the whole intermediate territory between ‘inner

psychic

two persons
cultural

and

reality’

in

‘the external

common’,

world as perceived by

that is to say,

over the whole

field.''’

This experience of transitional objects in potential space leaves the adult with the
capacity to use objects to contain or articulate the self in intense encounters with

These objects of self experience are more than just a mnemic symbols

As an

object in the real world, each has

listen to a certain piece

for a walk.

it

of music, go

Each of these

to a

own

it

is

structure

and

for internal states.

possibilities.

We choose to

movie, play pick-up football, read a novel, or go

activities will lend its

evokes. Bollas suggests that

least six

its

reality.

own

characteristics to the self experience

useful to look at the evocative quality of objects in at

ways: sensationally, structurally, conceptually, symbolically, mnemically, and

projectively.'^

‘‘’winnicott.

'^Bollas,

Playing and Reality,

5.

Being a Character, 34.
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Daniel N. Stem,

in

The Interpersonal World of the

demonstrate the ability of infants

to relate

infants respond to vitality affects: a

human

interaction.

on studies

that

experiences cross modally in tenns of shape,

and temporal properties such as duration,

intensity,

Infant, reports

and rhythm. Furthemiore,

beat,

form of cross-modal experiencing

Vitality affects can be characterized as

“dynamic

that

is

particular to

shifts or patterned

changes,” elusive qualities captured by “dynamic, kinetic terms, such as
‘surging,’
‘fading away,’ ‘fleeting,’ ‘explosive,’ ‘crescendo,’ ‘decrescendo,’ ‘bursting,’
‘drawn out,’
etc.”

If we think

of the infant and the mother

functioning almost as a single unit,

we would

of primary preoccupation as

in a state

expect that their interactions would be

based on such cross-modal cues. If so, the infant has already developed aesthetic
capacities that will facilitate interaction with artworks of many fomis, including music,

dance, and abstract

It

becomes

art,

as well as representational art and literature.

clear that

what

is

developing here

a

is

way

to

look

at aesthetic

experiences in temis of their potential for psychic elaboration and stmcturing. In our
interaction with a

nor do

we

work of art, we do not merely evade

the onerous constraints of reality,

necessarily play off conscious and unconscious aspects of our personality in

order to gain the release of psychic tension (though that

experience).

We

may be

a

component of the

use art to elaborate the processes and contents of our psyches and

complicate our relationship with

to

reality.

N. Stem, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from
Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985),
47-61 Stem suggests that these “amodal representations could consist of a temporal
''’Daniel

.

pattern of changes in density of neural firing.”
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The work of art

is

constructed (in the

artist’s

“play”) in such a

way

that

it

offers

very dense articulation potentials, “sensationally, structurally,
conceptually, symbolically,

mnemically, and project! vely.”
that invites states

It is

“framed” (as

of unintegration.

That

is,

we

discussed in Chapter

the structure of the

Two)

in a

way

work of art provides

a

“holding” situation similar to the holding environment provided by the mother
for her
infant or

by the psychoanalyst

highly individual as

for his or her patient.

members of the audience

self.

constructive activity, but

it

will be

much “suspending”

recognizing that there are areas of experience in which reality

opposed

work of art

The simple experiencing

of unintegration, will “merge” with the artwork, not so

offers alternative realities as

to a

relax into the “dreaming” state that

involves the suspension of the complex, reflective
state

Response

is

to alternatives to reality.

invites destructive responses as well for

it

reality as

art

may

be a highly

undermines the

given.

This merging of the unintegrated self and the artwork

is

facilitated

by the same

“aesthetic” considerations that regulate the interactions between the mother and infant:

shape, intensity, duration, beat, and rhythm, as well as the “dynamic shifts or patterned

changes” of the

vitality aspects discussed

In first-phase psychoanalysis,

art to

that a theory

of aesthetics

that assimilates

fantasy cannot be ontologically significant. In the second phase of psychoanalysis

(ego psychology),

more

by Stem.

we saw

art is still

comprehended

in

terms of the pleasure principle, though a

sophisticated definition of pleasure considerably strengthens the theory.

‘^As opposed to “disintegration.” See Chapter Three.
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a

The work of art

created.

Thus,

self, in

It is

only

in third-phase psychoanalysis,

in

however, that the truly creative potential of art

an interplay of self and world
In the next section,

demonstrate

this

I

in

which both

is

are created and transformed.

will explore Shakespeare’s

Winnicottian perspective.

167

Hamlet

in

an attempt

to

theorized

CHAPTER

5

POTENTIAL SPACE AND SHAKESPEARE’S HAMLET
“You would pluck
and, indeed,

a mystery.

we

It is

out the heart of my mystery,” Hamlet bitterly accuses Guildenstem'

as readers and audience stand under the

said of Ophelia in her

mad

same indictment. For Hamlet

is

rambling.

Her speech is nothing.
Yet the unshaped use of it doth move
The hearers to collection; they yawn at it,
And botch the words up fit to their own thoughts.
Which as her winks and nods and gestures yield them,
Indeed would make one think there might be thought.
Though nothing sure, yet much unhappily.^

We might say the same of the play itself,

for if its

words conceal an unrevealed mystery,

they compel a fascinated search for meaning in their conveyance of an overwhelming
grief

The work has

inspired almost as

many

interpretations as

it

has interpreters, with

T.S. Eliot’s criticism standing as a perpetual challenge; “Hamlet (the

by an emotion which

Hamlet
answers.

is

is

inexpressible, because

is in

is

dominated

excess of the facts as they appear.”^

plagued by a series of questions which have no answers or too many

Why does Hamlet delay

so long in carrying out the Ghost’s

provokes his violent attacks on the
his savagery

it

man)

woman

he supposedly loves?

commands? What

How

are

we

to explain

toward her father? Gertrude’s desertion of her husband for a man described

’william Shakespeare, Hamlet

in

The Riverside Shakespeare,

Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974),
will be from this edition.

III. ii. 36-7.

ed.

G. Blakemore

All quotes from the play

^Hamlet, V.v.7-13.
^T.S. Eliot as quoted

1939),

Appendix D, 305.

by

J.

Dover Wilson, What Happens

in

Hamlet (New York,

way remains

as his inferior in every

Queen— Leave

a mystery.

The Ghost’s injunction regarding

her to heaven”^— in the face of his bloodthirsty

her partner in sin

is

as confusing to the critic as

it

is

characters

it

How

answers.

whose motivation remains

Most of the
madness or on

great action laid

upon a soul

visitation.”^ Knight’s

own

is

identify so closely with

on the question of Hamlet’s

demanded by

“Shakespeare meant ...

unfit for the

which

intellect

we

of a plot which raises

so obscure?^

his inability to carry through the action

that

in the face

possible that

criticism of this play has focused

Knight quotes Goethe’s analysis

Hamlet’s fine

is it

of vengeance toward

spirit

bewildering to his son. The

undeniable power of the play demands an explanation

more questions than

the

the Ghost. Charles

to represent the effects

perfonnance of it,”^ and he

cites

of a

Coleridge on

“deranged” or “unfixed” as a result “of the supernatural

belief— ’’That [Shakespeare] meant the character to be

mysterious, though not inexplicable, there can be no doubf ’*-leads him to conclude that

it

is

precisely the capacity of Hamlet’s thought, his ability “to grapple with the most

familiar and yet the deepest thoughts of human nature”^

which not only prevents

acting with the unthinking forthrightness of Fortinbras, but

at

the

his

same time produces

the

richness and complexity that allows each reader to see himself in Hamlet.

Hamlet,

I.v.86.

^See Freud,

’’Some

by

“New

rationalistic, or

a thing without

SE XXII, 95.
against being moved

Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis” in

perhaps analytic, turn of mind in

knowing why

‘’Charles Knight, Studies

I

am

me rebels

thus affected and what

it is

that affects

of Shakespeare (London, 1849), 324.

^Charles Knight, Studies of Shakespeare, 324.

^Charles Knight, Studies of Shakespeare, 324.

^Charles Knight, Studies of Shakespeare, 327.
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me.”

Dover Wilson argues

that there is

no doubt “

.

.

.

that

Shakespeare meant us

imagine Hamlet suffering from some kind of mental disorder throughout the
he

insists

on reading the play

as

drama

true to

its

own

historical context

to

play,”'° yet

and points

to the

usurpation of the throne and Gertrude’s incest as providing the basis for the tragedy of “a
great and noble spirit subjected to a moral shock so

and

for life

Hamlet

all

belief in

to falter

Hamlet’s moral
crippled,

it.”‘’

For Wilson,

is

it

stature, so

tough

is

his nerve, that the

to carry out the Ghost’s

the repressed wish of the son to

Hamlet

fails to act

kill

because he

is

in

“So

his

moral duty,

to

which

command

to the

is

his father exhorts

and so he cannot. His lashings of self-reproach
and remorse are ultimately because of this very
the refusal of his guilty wishes to

sin.

By

in

Given

caught between two equally unacceptable

(he being identified with Claudius in the situation),

undo the

is

Hamlet and

the father and possess the mother.

of his mother (by killing Claudius), but his unconscious does not want to put an end to them

i.e.

is

paralyzed.”’^

Oedipal situation

him, to put an end to the incestuous activities

failure,

great

Hamlet’s unconscious wishes. He

alternatives:

It is

itself

seen, Ernest Jones’ classic psychoanalytic interpretation,

Hamlet’s inability

this reading,

shatters all zest

back does not break. But he

and the arm which should perform the Ghost’s command

it is

it

not an essential weakness that leads

Oedipus, emphasizes the psychic conflict inherent

which

that

under his burden, but the sheer weight of the burden

As we have

links

overwhelming

refusing to abandon his

own

incestuous wishes he perpetuates the sin and so

'°J.

Dover Wilson, What Happens

in

Hamlet. 217.

"j.

Dover Wilson, What Happens

in

Hamlet, 26-50.

'^J.

Dover Wilson, What Happens

in

Hamlet, 50.
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must endure the

And

stings of torturing conscience.

yet killing his mother’s

husband would be the

equivalent to committing the original sin himself,
which would if anything be even more guilty. So of
the two impossible alternatives he adopts the

passive solution of letting the incest continue
vicariously, but at the same time provoking destruction
at the

King’s hand.'^

Norman N. Holland
failing inherent in all

accepts Jones’ logic as “unimpeachable,” but points out
the

of these interpretations:

The psychoanalytic reading
mistake as

all literalistic

.

.

.

makes

They

Hamlet out of the play and

as a living

at

.

.

..

And

it

is

treat

him

to

In other

those parts of the play which deal with the

look

words,

at the

it is

we

not an individual mind, but rather a text which requires

discover the play

tragedy, for him,

is

is

perspective to include the text as a whole,

about “fragmentation, splitting, decomposition.”

an exploration of the

reason and physical, animal

We have

play as a whole.

Once we have broadened our

Holland argues,

lift

not fair to look only

quite appealing nature of Hamlet.

The

same

character, beginning with Goethe’s.

person

explanation.

the

readings of Hamlet’s

reality;

split

between words and

action; god-like

and the play of ritual and ceremony as opposed

to the

inescapable fact of our mortal selves.'^

A

more

recent psychoanalytic interpretation

by David Leverenz explores themes

suggested by the interpersonal school of psychoanalysis and

’^Ernest Jones,

its

emphasis on the

Hamlet and Oedipus (New York: W.W. Norton

& Company,

1976), 90-91.

‘'^Norman N. Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination

(New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1964), 159.
’^Norman N. Holland, The Shakespearean Imagination, 178.
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development of identity

in relation to others.

Like Holland, Leverenz attempts

“the whole text”; however, he argues that the play

is

to read

about the inability of Hamlet

to

achieve a unified identity in the face of the “mixed and contradictory
expectations” of the
father figures within the play-expectations

dutiful reason

and

bestial lust.'^

paradoxically grounded not so

According

much

which
to

array of ‘mixed signals’ that separate role from
love.”'’

The play thus becomes

own

divided image of

Leverenz, Hamlet’s “self preoccupation

himself as

in

reflect their

in the extraordinary

self,

is

and unremitting

reason from feeling, duty from

a critique of the “patriarchal order,

which has cracked

all

the mirrors for self-confimiation.”'*

How then are we
refuses interpretation?

to

understand

The very

this

complicated text that both demands and

diversity of the readings accorded

it

within the

critical

tradition forces a recognition of the constructive nature of the interpretive process.

enter the world of the play, not merely to find

meaning but

to create

it

We

through the

imaginative re-creation of Shakespeare’s vision. These considerations remind us not only

of Hamlet’s contempt for Guildenstem,

who “would

mystery,”'^ but also of his love for Horatio

who

pluck out the heart of my

“has been as one in suff ring

all that

Woman in Hamlet: An Interpersonal View” in
New Psychoanalytic Essays, eds. Murray M. Schwartz

"’David Leverenz, “The

Representing Shakespeare:

Coppelia Kahn (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 110.

Woman in Hamlet: An Interpersonal View” in
New Psychoanalytic Essays, 111.

’’David Leverenz, “The

Representing Shakespeare:

Woman in Hamlet: An Interpersonal View”
New Psychoanalytic Essays, 125-26.

’*David Leverenz, “The

Representing Shakespeare:
'^Hamlet,

III. ii. 36-7.
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in

and

suffers nothing.”^®

revelation of

We plumb

mystery

its

is

the depths of the play at the risk of drowning, and
the

always a self-diselosure. In

takes plaee within the realm of what Winnieott has

short, the art

named

of interpretation

“potential space.”

Harold Searles, writing of the schizophrenic individual’s experience of
his world,
tells

of his

of the

own

initial

subject.”^'

He

“overwhelming panic

at the

unorganized vastness and complexity

attributes this “anxiety, confusion

and despair”

to an

empathic

understanding of “the panic that chronically grips the schizophrenic individual

who

is

so

greatly at a loss for reliable organizing principles to render meaningful and manageable
the chaotic perceptions that assail him.”^^

I

feel the

Hamlet. Within

same anxiety and confusion
this play, the

it

demands constant

attention” described

I

attempt a psychoanalytic reading of

dead constitute a living presence, persons are seen as plants

or birds or animals, and external reality

that

as

testing.

As

is

so inextricably

a critic,

by Hans Loewald

I

mixed with disordered thought

read with the “empathy” and “free floating

in his discussion

of the psychoanalytic process^^

'°Hamlet.III.ii.66.

^‘Harold F. Searles, “The Schizophrenic Individual’s Experience of His World”

Countertransference and Related Subjects,
1979),

(New

in

York: International Universities Press,

6.

^^Harold F. Searles, “The Schizophrenic Individual’s Experience of His World” in

Countertransferance and Related Subjects,
^^Hans

W. Loewald,

6.

“Psychoanalytic Theory and the Psychoanalytic Process” in

Papers on Psychoanalysis, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 284-85. Loewald
writes on page 284, “For the theoretical grasp of that aspect of analytic work which
involves empathy, the notion of the loosening or suspension of the subject-object split is
essential, as it is for the understanding of true identification. The subject-object split can
be suspended because

it

did not always exist in psychic development, because psychic

development takes its beginning in a psychic matrix which comprises, stated from the
viewpoint of an outside observer— a nonpsychoanalytic observer-mother and infant.
Stated from a reconstructive, psychoanalytic viewpoint, this matrix
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is

a psychic field

and through

this

reading

I

discover a “fantasy creation

imaginative elaborations of present

conspiracy with the

text,

it

actuality.”'''

nevertheless

is

woven from memories and

If this fantasy is the result

based on what

I

of my

own

see the play attempting to

reveal, “only fleetingly, defensively, haltingly, in
inhibited [and] distorted fashion.”'^

The schizophrenic of Searles’ experience
reliable

way of knowing whether what he

or part of an outer, real world; whether
time; whether

it

is

alive or dead,

it

human

is

is

inhabits a world in

perceiving

something

is

part

which he has “no

of an inner, fantasy world

that exists in present, past or future

or non-human.”'^ Factors in the early

environment which Searles delineates as schizophrenogenic include most prominently the
inability

of parent and child

related individuals.

child remains

which

to differentiate

from a symbiotic matrix into separate-but-

Through processes of projection,

enmeshed

in parental attitudes,

introjection,

and

identification, the

modes of perception, and emotional

affects

are vague, ambiguous, contradictory or unpredictable. This leads to ego

fragmentation, or failure of ego integration, within the child. Since his parental models

may be

massively denying or otherwise unable

from which the

infantile

to

cope meaningfully with major parts of

psyche gradually becomes differentiated as a relatively

autonomous focus of psychic

activity,

by processes of internalization and extemalization

taking place within the total original field.”

'‘Hans

W. Loewald,

“Psychoanalytic Theory and the Psychoanalytic Process” in

Papers on Psychoanalysis, 354.
'^Hans

W. Loewald,

“Psychoanalytic Theory and the Psychoanalytic Process”

in

Papers on Psychoanalysis, 354.
''’Harold F. Searles,

“The Schizophrenic Individual’s Experience of His World”

Countertransferance and Related Subjects, 6-7.
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in

their

environment, the child develops “built-in impediments

realistically

and

to perceiving his

own world

in detail.”^^

Moreover, the child’s family role will be deeply conflicted. Family
members may

make him
him

the

as crazy

spokesman

when he

for dissociated parts

functions as an individual

Alternatively, the child

reality.

of their

rigid, punitive or contradictory

may

who

own

is

personalities, but then react to

aware of these

split-off aspects

identify in an automatic and primitive

way

of

with

super-ego functions of the parent in an unconscious

attempt to defend against parental hostility or his

own

ambivalent feelings toward the

parents.

In these [schizophrenogenic] families there

is

so

of trustful leisurely sharing of one another’s
thinking as to leave little time and emotional
security for the weighing of perceptions before
meanings must be imposed upon them. Instead,
little

a perception must be reacted

and

child, as confirming

to,

by both parent

one or another emotional

prejudice, one or another rigid superego standard,

derived from parental indoctrination. The child
lead to feel that not to

know—Xo

exist in a state

is

of

meaning— means
to be crazy, to be something beyond the human
pale. He comes to feel, essentially, that the only
uncertainty and of searching for a

alternative to oneness with the parent
isolation, craziness. All too often,
in a position

where he must choose between

parent and his

I

is total

he finds himself

own perceptual

his

equipment.^*

believe that Searles’ delineation of schizophrenogenic conditions within a

disturbed family environment describes the “rotten” state of Denmark portrayed in

^’Harold F. Searles, “The Schizophrenic Individual’s Experience of His World”

in

Countertransference and Related Subjects, 1979, 7-10.
^^Harold F. Searles, “The Schizophrenic Individual’s Experience of His World”

Countertransference and Related Subjects,

1

1
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in

Shakespeare

s

play.

We need

only

call to

mind Hamlet’s plea

for truth in the face

duplicity of Rosencrantz and Guildenstem to understand that this

nothing

is

as

is

a world

of the

where

seems:

it

.

.

but

.

let

me

conjure you, by the rights

of our fellowship, by the consonancy of
our youth, by the obligation of our everpreserv’d love, and by what more dear a
better proposer can charge

even and direct with

We,

as readers,

.

withal, be

.

must arm ourselves with a “hemieneutics of suspicion”^®

same kind of confusion

into the

me

you

that

for

we

Hamlet experiences; and our own struggle

understand this baffling and disjointed play parallels Hamlet’s search for truth

where he may

ironically

tell

Guildenstem

upon a recorder

that to play

is

drawn

are

to

in a

world

“as easy as

lying.’”'

Joseph Barnett’s insight
point.

He

the child

in

“Hamlet and the Family Ideology” makes a similar

describes the “family ideology” as a “system of cognition that determines what

may and must

not know,” and he suggests that

creates acceptable perspectives and

[i]t

modes of

interpreting reality, and erects a supporting

which sustains these

interpretations

of specific mental operations and

.

.

..

mythology

Restrictions

affects, idiosyncratic

definitions of experience, aid in excluding the likelihood

of freedom of thought within the family,

at least in

those

^''Hamlet, II.ii.283-86.

^*^Paul

Ricoeur, Freud

and Philosophy: An Essay on

Yale University Press), 32-36.
^^Harnlet,

111. ii. 357.
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Interpretation

(New Haven:

areas that threaten the homeostasis of the family
or
the parents’ marriage.

Like the child
secrets

who

and complexities,

into possession

is

we

bom

into a pre-existing family situation with

enter this play “in the middle” and

of infonnation

that

we

don’t

know how

Tis bitter cold,/ And

says Francisco.

this

alamiing remark, but

“watch”
first

if

we

we

I

am

sick at heart.

are immediately put

of its

we immediately come

to deal with.

and amid some confusion exchange places on the watch. “For

all

Two

this relief

There

is

sentinels

much

thanks,”

no explanation

“on guard” ourselves— we,

meet

too,

for

must

are to put this world into correct perspective. In fact, the 175 lines of the

scene contain no less than 25 references to watching, or seeing, or appearing:
Hor.

What, has

Bar.

I

this thing

have seen nothing.

Mar. Horatio says

And

‘tis

but our fantasy.

will not let belief take hold

Touching

this

Therefore

With us
That

if

of him

dreaded sight twice seen of us;

have entreated him along.
watch the minutes of this night.

I

to

again this apparition come.

He may approve
Hor.

appear’d again to-night?

Tush, tush,

‘twill

our eyes and speak to

it.

not appear.^'*

And, when the Ghost does appear:
Mar.

Peace, break thee off!

Look where

it

comes

again.

^^Joseph Barnett, "''Hamlet and the Family Ideology” in Journal of the American

Academy of Psychoanalysis,
Hamlet,

3 (1975), 409.

Li. 8 -9.

^^Hamlet, I.i.21-29.
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Bar.

In the

Bar.

.

Hor.

Before

.

same

What

.

figure like the

King

that’s dead.^^

think you on’t?

my God, I might not this believe
Without the sensible and true avouch
Of mine own

eyes.^^

Furthermore, the arrival of the Ghost sparks prolonged discussion, both

Scene 2 regarding

its

appearance. In Scene

Mar.

Is

Hor.

As thou

it

in

Scene

1

and

I

see

I:

not like the King?

art to

thyself

Such was the very armour he had on

When

he the ambitious Norway combated.

So frowned he once
And,

in

Scene

father .... In

to

2,

my

.

.

following Hamlet’s heartsick confession,

“My

father-methinks

my

mind’s eye, Horatio”,^* Horatio counters with the report of what seems

be more than fantasy,

“My

lord,

I

think

saw him yesternight.”” Urged

I

description, he provides details;

Two

nights together had these gentlemen,

Marcellus and Bernardo, on their watch
In the

dead waste and middle of the night.

Been thus encount’red:

Armed

at

a figure like your father.

point exactly, cap-a-pe.

Appears before them

.

.

^^Hamlet, Li. 39-40.
^^Hamlet, I.i.55-58.

^''Hamlet. I.i.59-62.

I. ii.

184-86.

Hamlet,

I.ii.l89.

Hamlet,

l.ii.

196-201
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to further

And

I with them the third night
kept the watch,
Where, as they had delivered, both in time.
Form of the thing, each word made true and good.

The

apparition comes.

I

knew your

These hands are not more

father.

like.'^’

Ham. Arm’d, say you?
Hor.

Ann’d,

Ham. From
Hor.

my lord.

top to toe?

My lord,

from head

Ham. Then saw you
Hor.

O

yes,

my

to foot.

not his face.

lord,

he wore his beaver up.

Ham. What, looked he frowningly?
Hor.

A countenance more
In

sorrow than

Ham.

Pale, or red.

Hor.

Nay, very

Ham. And
Ham.
Hor.

.

.

I

pale.

fix’d his eyes

His beard was

was, as

It

A
Ham.

.

in anger.

I

upon

grisl’d,

have seen

no?

it

in his life,

is

paralleled

sable silver’d.

will

watch

to-night.

This extraordinary insistence on the visual

reliability

you?'^^

by an undermining of the

of speech. Horatio’s ears are “assailed” by the story of the Ghost related by

^'Hamlet, I.ii.209-12.

^^Hamlet, l.ii.226-233.
^^Hamlet, l.ii.239-242.
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Marcellus and

Bernardo.'*'’

When

Marcellus asks the reason for this “same

strict

observant watch,” Horatio can only report rumors (“at least the
whisper goes

These early references

to the unreliability

of what

is

play which depicts a world in which communication

which even seeing
But

is

believing only for those

this is to get

ahead of our story, for

regarding the reliability of what
that

we must

who

we

are told

so”).'*^

spoken emerge as a major theme
is

in a

hopelessly corrupted, and in

are able to “see unseen.”^^

we must examine what

means

and most

to the reader.

I

this

would

caveat

like to suggest

read the text in terms of defense mechanisms such as those that disguise the

meaning of dreams or

distort the

communication of the schizophrenic: displacement,

projection, introjection, and isolation.'*^

Norman N. Holland
defined

all

in

of these defenses

“Defense, Displacement and the Ego’s Algebra” has

in

terms of the single operation of displacement, and his

exposition has the advantage of allowing us to understand both texts and characters in

temis of the same mechanisms. Classically, Freud defined displacement as “the diversion

of a

train

of thought, the displacement of the psychical emphasis on

the opening one.”"*^ Holland’s characterization of all of the defense

of just four kinds of displacement includes displacements

Hamlet,

I.i.31.

Hamlet,

I.i.71.

^^Hamlet,

to a topic other than

mechanisms

in direction,

in

terms

displacements in

III.i.32.

‘’^Harold F. Searles, Collected

‘’^Sigmund Freud, quoted by

Papers on Schizophrenia, 382-98.

Norman N.

Holland, “Defense, Displacement, and

the Ego’s Algebra” in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (1973)
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248.

time, displacements

m number, and displacements based on similarity

of direction encompass

movement from
displacements

in

all

of the various internalizations and projections

in

which there

is

a position perceived as “inner” to one perceived as “outer”
or vice versa-,

time characterize regressions or prematurely adaptive behaviors
such as

the “flight into health” or maturity; displacements in

number include defenses

as denial, splitting, and condensation; while displacements based
shift

Displacements

from the original

to

something similar, different

or opposite.^'’ This fourth kind of displacement

is

the

(a

on

as various

similarity involve a

“more disguised

representation”),

most complicated and includes

verbal and clang associations, symbolisms, literary allusions,

etc.,

as well as

displacements based on similar attitudes, physical similarities, or displacements through

body

relation.^'

Just such a system of displacement operates within the text of Hamlet, and

take a second look at the opening scenes of Act

The play opens abruptly
understood

in

“Bernardo has

in the

in light

can

of the above considerations.

middle of a watch. The immediate remarks cannot be

terms of any existing context. Francisco says somewhat strangely,

my place.

Horatio answers the question regarding his

with the enigmatic reply that a “piece of him”
unreliability

I

we

of what

'’“^Holland,

is

is

there.

There

is

own

presence

an insistence on the

heard or spoken that parallels an overwhelming emphasis on the

“Defense, Displacement, and the Ego’s Algebra”

in

UP, 248-49.

^^Holland, “Defense, Displacement, and the Ego’s Algebra” in

UP, 248-49.

^'Holland, “Defense, Displacement, and the Ego’s Algebra” in

UP, 249.

^^Hamlet,

l.i.l7.

Hamlet,

l.i.l9.
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importance of what

The Ghost does not speak, but

seen.

is

the watchers speculate that his

presence has something to do with the recent renewal of the
old combat between Norway

and Denmark,

in the

person of dead Norway’s son, Fortinbras. The Ghost appears a

second time, and again the watchers speculate on the reason for

uphoarded

it,

in thy life /Extorted treasure in the

stay and speak.

However, the Ghost

crowing of a cock, which
and erring

spirit to his

we

are told,

wakes

scene

is

says Horatio, “Speak of

.

the

by the

“god of day” and sends “the extravagant

is

bom. Horatio

drily observes,

is

“So have

I

in part believe it.”

as follows. There

influence of the dead king

Ghost suggests

by Norway.

.

confme.”^^ Marcello relates that the crowing of the cock

Given the language of displacement,
this

of earth

fades, startled like a “guilty thing’’

associated with the season in which the savior

heard and do

womb

unease. “If thou has

its

fairly

is

is felt

I

would suggest

that

one way

we

could read

an atmosphere of heart-sickness and alarm in which the
to

be alive

in

Denmark. The

first

appearance of the

obviously the revival of the external danger of invasion of Denmark

In this appearance, the Ghost

is

described as martial, fully armored,

frowning.

The second appearance of the Ghost

womb, cock and
birth

of a

child.

more problematic,

birth unmistakable suggest an

The Ghost

of course, the cock

Hamlet,

is

starts like

137-39.

^^Hamlet, I.i.147-155.

Hamlet,

I.i.

sexual adventure resulting in the

“a guilty thing” upon the crowing of the cock. Yet,

itself is “the guilty thing.”

I.i.

illicit

yet the imagery of

165.
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And, although the Ghost

is

the

extravagant and erring spirit” that fades upon the
crowing of the cock, Hamlet the King
(as

we

will learn at lines I.ii.l40 and lll.iv.56)

was himself Hyperion, “god of day.”

All of the above seems rather tentative and mysterious;
however, the situation will

become even more complex

in the following scenes.

delivers the opening speech of Scene 2, and

“sometime
speech

sister,” the

widowed Queen

m which Claudius

ruthless

we

Claudius, brother to the dead king,

learn that Claudius has married his

Gertrude, and assumed the throne. This

power

is

is

a

only thinly veiled by a smooth surface

courtesy. Admitting that the situation calls for grief “and our

contracted in one

brow of woe,”^^ he nevertheless

reality to pair the

most impossible opposites. “

.

.

sets forth

.

whole kingdom/To be

with the

air

of one legislating

[W]ith a defeated joy, /With an

auspicious, and a dropping eye,/With mirth in funeral and with dirge in marriage”^*-he

how he

blandly narrates

throne.

along,

has “taken to wife” the “imperial jointress”

Thanking the court whose “better wisdoms
he turns

to the subject

“young Fortinbras” has made

.

.

.

who

is

have freely gone with /This

of Fortinbras’ threatened invasion.

We

in a

to the lands lost

“weakened

the mistake of underestimating the extent to

by

his father.

state,” Fortinbras

“So much

which

for him”, says

Hamlet,

I.ii.4-5.

l.ii.10-13.

^''Hamlet, l.ii.13-15.

^^Hamlet,

l.ii.25.
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this

when

has “pestered” the court with his claims

Claudius dismissively.^*’

deal instead with Fortinbras’ “impotent and bedred” uncle

^^Hamlet,

affair

see at once that

usurper has consolidated his power. Having thought to press his advantage

Denmark was

his link to the

who

is

currently

He

King of

will

Norway, and who

Voltemand

to

will

be told

to bring his

convey these messages

to

nephew

to heel.

Sending Cornelius and

Norway, he sharply reminds them of the

limits

and origin of their power:
Giving

to

you no

To business with

Of these

delated articles allow.

But Claudius’s veiled lesson
with external

he turns

affairs,

power
more than the scope

further personal

the King,

to

in

power

is

not yet complete, and, having finished

household matters:

What wouldst thou
That shall not be

beg, Laertes,

my offer,

not thy asking?^^

Again, the seeming courtesy masks a subtle display of power. Laertes, on the basis of the
position and services of his father, will be allowed to return to his studies in France.

Hamlet’s

bitter asides testify that

he has not missed the message beneath the

facade, but he, too, can play this double game. Chided

remembrance of his

father

which “seems so

Seems,

madam?

nay,

by

particular’’ to

it is, I

know

his

mother

for the

melancholy

him, he savagely responds.

not “seems.

Hamlet’s grief and contempt probe the hypocrisy of the court— his uncle’s
assertions of power beneath their cover of congeniality, and his mother’s expedient

forgetfulness of her recently dead husband. Claudius,

however

is

not to be deterred; his

lesson will be learned. Hamlet’s grief is mere “peevish opposition’’;

it

shows “impious

stubbornness,” “unmanly grief,” a “heart unfortified,” a “mind impatient,” an

^'Hamlet,

I.ii.

36-38.

^^Hamlet,

I.ii.

45-46.

^^Hamlet,

I.ii. 76.
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understanding, simple and unschooled.”^^
to school in Wittenberg,

Furthennore, as for Hamlet’s wish to return

Claudius decrees;

It is

most retrograde

to

our desire.

And we beseech you bend you
Here

in the

to

remain

cheer and comfort of our eye

Gertrude, demonstrating where her loyalty

lies,

.

.

concurs:

Let not thy mother loser her prayers, Hamlet,
I pray thee, stay with us.^^

The claws within

the velvet

paw have shown

themselves, and Hamlet can do no other

than comply with a fine, undercutting irony;

I

shall in all

my best obey you, madam.

Thus, the subtleties and intrigues of the court where language bears only the most
distorted connection to the reality

appearance and

By
to

him

is

its

describes are added to the mystery of the Ghost’s

unyielding silence.

the second half of Scene 2,

Hamlet

is

almost suicidal with despair, the world

no more than a rank, unweeded garden, and he cannot

of the “incestuous

The

it

sheets’’ to

which

contrast between the king that

throne and in his mother’s bed

fills

his

mother has

was and

the usurper

Hamlet with

^^Hamlet, I.ii.92-97.

Hamlet,

I.ii.l

14-1 16.

Hamlet,

I.ii.l

18-1 19.

Hamlet,

I.ii.l

20.

fled
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rid

himself of the thought

upon the death of her husband.

who

disgust:

has displaced him on the

So excellent a king,
Hyperion to a satyr
Furthermore, his mind

who

Arranging

that night,

then

sit still

my

watch

soul.”'^‘^

.

was

to this

.

possessed by the image of his father, and he leaps
eagerly

is

Horatio’s story of the Ghost

to join the

that

to

has walked the guard platform for the past three
nights.

he urges himself to patience

in the

meantime,

The scene ends with an ominous restatement of the

‘“Til

priority of

the visual:

Foul deeds will

Though

all

the earth

o’erwhelm them,

Scene 3 represents an apparent change of subject.
himself to patience only to encounter Laertes giving his

rise.

men’s

to

We

sister

eyes.^°

leave Hamlet counseling

Ophelia some

last

minute

advice before he embarks for France. In the light of a text marked by displacement,

very

is

shift

away from

the central narrative should alert us to the possibility that this scene

crucial to an understanding of the play, and, in fact,

forward to the scenes that follow

way

that

it

this

it

and backward

I

believe that

to the scenes that

provides a main connection in the buried text that

we

can read

precede

it

in

it

such a

lies disjointed at the

manifest level.

We

learn in

Scene

Hamlet has been courting
attentions.

The

“trifling

3, in the

her,

conversation between Laertes and Ophelia, that

and Laertes warns

of his favor”

is

that she

must

fear the

merely a “fashion and a toy

danger of his

in blood,

the youth of primy nature,/Forward, not pennanent, sweet, not lasting.”^'

Hamlet, I.ii.139-140.
^‘^Hamlet, I.ii.255.

255-256.

^^Hamlet,

I.ii.

^'Hamlet,

I.iii.5-9.
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/A

violet in

As
will

the future king,

Hamlet may not “carve

for himself’; instead his choice

be circumscribed by the demands of state.
Ophelia

is

of wife

warned:

Then weigh what
If

loss your honor may sustain
with too credent ear you list his songs,

Or your chaste treasure open
To his unmastered importunity.^^
Laertes insists that ‘virtue itself scapes not calumnious
strokes’’^^ and, in a series of

astonishing metaphors,

beauty

tells his sister

to the moon”^** is to

of the danger she

is in.

Merely

to

“unmask her

be too prodigal. Her innocence and youth are no protection,

but rather invitations to corruption;

The canker galls the infants of the spring
Too oft before their buttons be disclos’d.
in the mom and liquid dew of youth
Contagious blastments are most imminent.

And

Agreeing

to

keep

this lesson “as

watchman

to

my

heart,” Ophelia urges her brother.

Do not, as some ungracious pastors do.
Show me the steep and thorny way to heaven.
Whiles,

puff d and reckless libertine.
Himself the primrose path of dalliance treads
[like] a

.

.

Ophelia’s father enters the scene, and, after urging Laertes to hurry aboard the
ship that

is

even

now

waiting for him, Polonius offers his son a “few precepts” which are

notable, not only for their length, but also for the fact that

advances are two which

we have been

I.iii.38.

'^Hamlet,

I.iii.37.

^^Hamlet,

l.iii. 39-42.

the platitudes he

given every reason to question. “Give every

^^Hanilet, I.iii.29-32.

^^Hamlet,

among

^^Hanilet, l.iii.47.50.
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man

thy ear,” says Polonius, and “costly thy habit
as thy purse can buy

proclaims the

man

Polonius’ advice, however,

leave-taking, the old

man

is

.

.

.

/For the apparel oft

not only for his son; upon Laertes’

turns to his daughter, seconding the warnings
her brother has

just delivered

I

must

tell

you

You do not understand yourself so clearly
As it behooves my daughter and your honor/*
Ophelia

girl,

s

belief in

Hamlet

s

protestations of love brand her, in Polonius’ eyes, a “green

/Unsifted in such perilous circumstance.” Should Hamlet’s “tenders” be
taken for

true pay,

she

is

liable to

tender [Polonius] a fool.”^^

catch woodcocks,” “blazes

fire.*°

.

.

.

Hamlet’s vows are “springes

to

giving more light than heat” which must not be taken for

Polonius drives his point home:

In few, Ophelia,

Do

not believe his vows, for they are brokers.

Not of that dye which their investments show.
But mere [implorators] of unholy suits.
Breathing like sanctified and pious bonds.

The
I

better to beguile.*'

read a fascinating series of correspondences between this scene and the scenes in

which the Ghost appears. Ophelia

is

warned by Laertes of the danger should she her

“chaste treasure open”; Horatio asks of the Ghost if it walks because

treasure in the

womb

it

has “extorted

of earth.” Laertes warns Ophelia she must not “unmask her beauty

^^Hamlet, I.iii.67-72.

'’^Hamlet, I.iii.95-97.

^''Hamlet, I.iii.99-109.

^''Hamlet,

I.iii.l

15-120.

Hamlet,

I.iii.l

26-131.
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to the

moon”; Hamlet asks the Ghost why

Ophelia urges her brother not

show her

to

it

“revisits thus the

glimpses of the

“the steep and thorny

way

to

moon

heaven,” while he

himself the “primrose path of dalliance treads”; the Ghost
complains that he was “[c]ut
off even in the blossoms of my sin,” while, as for
Gertrude, he

heaven, /And to those thorns that

Ghost

exits

Scene

high eastward

1

just as “the

Ophelia

hill”;*''

in

bosom lodge /To

her

tells

prick and sting her.”*^

to

The

mom in msset mantle clad /Walks o’er the dew of yon

is

warned, “And

in the

mom and

liquid

/Contagious blastments are most imminent.” The Ghost takes his
as “[t]he

Hamlet, “Leave her

glow worm shows the matin

to

be near, /And gins

dew of youth,

first

leave from Hamlet

to pale his ineffectual fire.”*^

Polonius cautions Ophelia, “These blazes, daughter, /Giving more light than heat, extinct
in both

/Even

promise as

in their

it is

a-making, /You must not take for

protests:

0

Hamlet, what a falling off was there

From me, whose
That

made

1

Ophelia

is

told

by her

it

father:

went hand
to her in

“Do

was of that dignity
hand even with the vow

love
in

marriage

^^Hamlet, I.v.86-88.
^^Hamlet, Li. 166-67.
I.v. 89-90.

Hamlet,

I.iii.l

1

7-120.

^^Hamlet, I.v.46-50.
^^Hamlet,

I.iii.l

.

not believe his vows.”**

Hamlet, I.v.53.

Hamlet,

.

27.
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fire.”*^

The Ghost

But

While

it

we may go

further.

Let us look

at

Hamlet’s speech which begins Scene

ostensibly refers to the Danes’ custom of drunken
revelry,

appearance of the Ghost

it

4.

also introduces the

to his son:

So oft it chances in particular men
That for some vicious mole of nature in them,
As in their birth wherein they are not guilty
(Since nature cannot choose his origin).
By their o’ergrowth of some complexion

Oft breaking

down

the pales and forts of reason.

Or by some habit, that too much o’er leavens
The form of plausive manners-that these men.
Carrying

I

say, the

Being nature’s
His virtues

As

else,

infinite as

stamp of one defect.

livery, or fortune’s star.

be they as pure as grace,
undergo.

man may

Shall in the general censure take corruption

From
Doth

To
I

find the

most

that particular fault; the
all

his

own

scandal.*^

interesting thing about this speech

beginning, “Virtue itself scapes not calumnious
as

we have

seen,

is that

asserts that

vicious

to

one

is

may

in

such a

infinite in virtue, as

way

gist

of Laertes’ warning,

oft before their buttons

be

disclosed’’),

Hamlet’s meditation

“pure as grace”, and yet undone by “some
to the

whole. Can

we

connect these lines

as to explain her particular vulnerability to the “calumnious

strokes” which Laertes so fears?

which threatens her

The

fragile than she has realized.

mole of nature” which brings corruption

Ophelia

relation to Laertes’ lines

Ophelia’s innocence and youth are no protection from corruption

much more
be

is its

strokes.’’^®

(“The canker galls the infants of the spring, /Too

and that her honor

dram of [ev’l]

the noble substance of a doubt

To do

so

would be

purity.

^‘^Hamlet, I.iv. 24-38.

'^''Hamlet, I.iii.38.
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to find the “vicious

mole of nature”

David Willbem has pointed out the connection
between
Hamlet’s reference

at I.v.162 to the

innate corruption to Ophelia

Ghost as an “old mole.”*"

To join

the idea of some

we

can begin

to

fit

connect

to

together the

puzzle pieces of the fantasy that makes sense
of this broken world. The “crowing

cock has resulted
is

“mole of nature” and

by way of the “vicious mole of nature” would
be

her to the dead king. If such a tenuous
connection holds,
first

this

her father. She

in the birth

of a child^^

who

cannot be acknowledged by the king

accepted by Polonius as his

is

own

(in return, perhaps, for political

advancement). Hamlet’s subsequent courtship of her, of
course, becomes a cause

alarm-so much alarm
forbids her to see

that Laertes

Hamlet

at all.

is

moved

to his extravagant

fool.

X\\q feared

And Ophelia

of the king’s

repetition

is

is

my Lord,

which the Ghost appears lead

of a seduction. Polonius has already been “tendered

Rose of May,” the cankered

Scenes 4 and 5

to the

infant of spring, the very

comes!”*^'’ is

I

will speak with thee.”*’^

Following

its

in

such a

resolute silence, the

^‘David Willbem, Meeting of the Renaissance Studies Group, University of
Massachusetts, (Amherst, MA, 1986).
also Polonious to Ophelia at l.iii.l04.

'^^Hamlet, IV.v.58.

''^^Hamlet, I.iv.38.

‘^^Handet, I.v.43-44.
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in

the visual. Horatio’s exclamation, “Look,

followed shortly by Hamlet’s insistent, “Thou com’st

questionable shape /That

”See

a

blossom

same conclusion. The Ghost’s entrance

marked by a renewal of emphasis on

it

the

sin.

We may read
Scene 4

the

in

for

metaphors, and Polonius

The extraordinary correspondences between

language of their warning and the language of the scenes
us to read

who

“.

.

.

think yourself a baby

.”
.

.

Ghost’s

words

first

are

words

meant

to

Hamlet

to signify

is

Scene

more than

a

5 are

“Mark me"« (and

command

for

Hamlet

about to be said. They are an echo of
Bamardo’s question
the

King? Mark

Horatio,”)” Hamlet

it,

tells

in

I

to

wotild argue that these

pay attention

Scene

1

:

“Looks

to

what

‘a not like

Horatio. “Touching this vision here.

honest Ghost.’”® The witnesses are sworn
to “Never

is

make known what you have

/It is

an

seen

tonight.

Combined with
nature,

the Ghost’s confession of his “foul
crimes

his thrice-repeated

command “Mark me” becomes

done

I

couple hell?

like

The above reading has
Ophelia

in

Act

II,

'^^Hamlet,

Scene

the advantage of making sense of Hamlet’s encounter
with

the scene

I,

which

directly follows

Hamlet’s encounter with the

Li. 48.

I. v.

37-38.

Hamlet, I.v.145.
Hamlet, I.v.145.

'^'Compare to Hamlet,

III. iii.

57-64 where Claudius muses:

In the corrupted currents

Offense’s gilded hand

And

oft ‘tis

Buys out
There

is

of this world

my

[shove]

by justice.

seen the wicked prize itself

the law, but

‘tis

not so above:

no shuffling, there the action lies
and we ourselves compelTd

In his true nature,

Even

To

“And

Ophelia}^'

'^^Hamlet, I.v.2.

Hamlet,

at line 93,

I think that the point of this insistence upon what
the Ghost looks

Ghost looks

like is that the

my days of

an insistence that Hamlet

see a resemblance, a resemblance that leads to
Hamlet’s despairing cry
shall

in

to the teeth

and forehead of our

give in evidence.

192

faults.

Ghost.

Ophelia reports to her father that as she

sat

sewing

in her closet,

Hamlet

appeared before her,

.

No

.

.

with his doublet

all

unbraced.

upon his head, his stockings fouled,
Ungart’red, and down gyved to his ankle.
hat

And

with a look so piteous in purport
if he had been loosed out of hell

As
To speak of horrors
But Hamlet does not speak.

He had come

.

.

to 5ee,

and Ophelia’s next words confirm

this:

He took me by the wrist, and held me hard,
Then goes he to the length of all his arm

And with his other hand thus o’er his brow
He falls to such perusal of my face
As

‘a

would draw

Long

it.

stay’d he so.

And thrice his head thus waving up and down.
He raised a sigh so piteous and profound
As it did seem to shatter all his bulk
And end his being.
Hamlet’s searching of Ophelia’s

face,

and

its

thrice-repeated confirmation,'®^ removes

whatever doubt he has regarding her relationship

to the

dead king: however,

if

Ophelia

is

indeed the daughter of the king, then the appearance of the Ghost constitutes a very

complicated message. Hamlet’s misgivings regarding his mother’s hasty marriage are

deepened

to horror

by

the Ghost’s account of the

'®^Although the time lapse
to

is

murder

may

orchard and the queen’s

generally thought to have been too great for Hamlet

have gone directly from his encounter with the Ghost

this

in the

to his

encounter with Ophelia,

simply be another instance of the well known problem of the

elasticity

of time

within this play.

'^^Hajnlet,

Il.i.

75-82.

Il.i.

84-93.

’^^Significantly, the triple repetition

“Mark me”

nods of confirmation.
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is

echoed here by Hamlet’s three

adultery that preceded

incest

it.'‘^'^

However, Hamlet

m his pursuit of Ophelia.

also learns that he himself

Thus, not only has the “Hyperion”

courting

is

whom

Hamlet had

pictured as his idealized father been revealed as part satyr,
his corruption has spread to

and contaminated his son. From
incestuous sheets

which had

this

filled

scene on, Hamlet will not be able to contemplate the

him with such loathing and

disgust before the

Ghost’s appearance without feeling that same loathing and disgust toward
himself and

toward Ophelia.
Thus, the Ghost’s

command

to

vengeance

is

also a sentence of guilt, and the

confusion of the Ghost’s account of the events preceding his death
confusion into which Hamlet must be plunged upon hearing
appears to

tell

it.

illustrates perfectly the

The Ghost

ostensibly

the story of his murder, but he instead begins with a recitation of the “foul

crimes” for which he has been

“Doomed

for a certain temi to

walk the

night.”‘°*

His

condemnation of Claudius

.

.

.

that incestuous, that adulterate beast.

With witchcraft of his

O wicked wit

and

wits, with traitorous gifts—

have the power
So to seduce!— won to his shameful lust
The will of my most seeming virtuous queen‘°^

^^^Hamlet, I.v.42. See “

.

.

gifts that

that incestuous, that adulterate beast

.

.

..”

'°^Such feelings of loathing and disgust will, of course, be intensified

if

Hamlet

and Ophelia have already consummated their relationship. Salvador de Madariaga, On
Hamlet, Second Edition (London; Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1964) argues that this is so, and
points to the rumors that have so alamied Laertes and Polonius.

As

far as

I

can see, there

is nothing in the play that would allow us to detemiine this for certain, but it remains an
ominous possibility. I should note that I do not agree with de Madariaga’s analysis of

Hamlet’s character.
'''^Hamlet, I.v.lO.

^^‘^Hamlet, I.v.41-43.
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way

gives

to a reflection that appears

But

virtue, as

it

more confession than
never will be moved,

Though lewdness
So

accusation:

court

in a

it

shape of heaven.

though to a radiant angel link’d.
Will [sate] itself in a celestial bed
And prey on garbage.”'^
In this

all,

[lust]],

passage he surely cannot be referring to himself as the “radiant angel.” He

loosed only temporarily from purgatory to deliver his dread message, as

reminded

The

in the

next

line,

“But

soft,

methinks

radiant angel can only be Gertrude

I

whose

scent the

“celestial

morning

air,

we

/Brief

let

is,

after

are

me be.”

bed” King Hamlet himself left

to

“prey on garbage.”
Similarly, the “O, horrible, O, horrible,

most horrible!”’" which

refers to the

king’s death in an unschriven state points not only to his murder, but also to his

Even

sins.

the injunction.

Taint not thy mind, nor

let

thy soul contrive

Against thy mother aught, leave her to heaven

And to those
To prick and
is

ambiguous. The “thorns”

in

thorns that in her

bosom lodge

sting her"^

Gertrude’s

bosom could be

the pricking of her

own

conscience or they could be the pain and sorrow attendant on the “blossoms” of the dead
king’s

own

sin.

guilt

Given the second

which moves him

alternative,

it

to protect the

might well be the Ghost’s recognition of his

queen whose betrayal of him followed

betrayal of her.

'“’//aw/e/, I.v.53-57.

Hamlet, I.v.80.
'^^Hamlet, I.v.85-88.
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his

For the

critic

who

enters into this fantasy,

vengeance, love and guilt which plays

it

is

an overwhelming confusion of

through the characters, imagery, and

itself out

structure of this tragedy. Hamlet, like the
child in a schizophrenogenic

home,

lives in a

m which language is divorced from reality; and those around him treat the truth

world

made manifest by Ophelia’s very presence with massive
results

of this denial

is

that

many of the

One of the most

denial.

actions within the play

striking

seem groundless because

they are undertaken from motives which cannot be
acknowledged.

A second result is the

excess noted by T.S. Eliot. Not only Hamlet, but the other
characters as well, bring an

otherwise unexplained excess of emotion to the action of the play.
Hamlet’s description

of the relationship between his parents, for example, seems almost grotesque

in its

exaggeration. Hamlet remembers his father as

.

.

.so

loving to

my mother

That he might not beteem the winds of heaven
Visit her face too roughly
.

.

.

Why, she would hang on him
As if increase of appetite had grown

By what

it

fed on

.."^
.

.

We see here not the reality of a secure marriage, but rather an idealization which
arises

from denial and parodies the

first

flush of love.

It is

not difficult to imagine

why

Gertrude moves so easily from mourning to the wedding bed, but when Hamlet confronts
her with the monstrous nature of her action in exchanging one brother for another, the

family ideology prevents him from considering her real motive:

Look you now what
Here

is

your husband,

like a

follows:

mildewed

ear.

Blasting his wholesome brother. Have you eyes?
Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed.
And batten on this moor? Ha, have you eyes?

''^Hamlet,

I.

i

i. 1

39-144.
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You

cannot

call

it

love, for at

your age

The heyday in the blood is tame, it’s humble.
And waits upon the judgment, and what judgment
Would step from this to this? Sense sure you have.
Else could you not have motion, but sure
that sense
Is apoplex’d, for madness would
not err.
Nor sense to ecstasy was ne’er so thrall’d
But it reserv’d some quantity of choice
To serve in such a difference.”’’
Surely, the wife

marriage, but

easily her

it

who

finds herself betrayed

may

cling to the appearance of a

happy

not love or even lust but revenge that prompts
her to demonstrate

is

husband may be replaced. And,

between the brothers who are outwardly so

in this case, the

different

is

how

proclamation of equivalence

an indication of the pain and anger

she cannot openly admit.

Polonius

is

in the

uneasy position of one

who

has

made himself indispensable by

rendering a service that everyone involved would prefer to forget.
In his description of

Hamlet

s

love for Ophelia, he insists he has done

impossible match.

To

Claudius’ question, “But

all in

how

his

power

to prevent this

has she /Received his love?’’'”

Polonius can only repeat insistently, “What do you think of me?’’”^ “What might you,
or

my dear Majesty your Queen here,

think

.?”'”
.

.

Hamlet, III.iv.63-76.
Hamlet,

II.ii.l29.

'^^Hatnlet, II.ii.30.

Hamlet,

Il.ii.

134-1 35.

''^Hamlet,

Il.ii.

139.
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“What might you

think?’’”*

The

queen’s refusal to understand his misgivings
finally prompts Polonius’

charge to his daughter: “Lord Hamlet

While Gertrude refuses

being a “fishmonger”

man

(i.e.,

a prince out of thy star; /This must not
be.”"'*

acknowledge

to

insisting that Polonius not forget

is

it.

He

their guilty secret,

encounters the old

Hamlet by now

man and

after accusing

a pander), suggests that were Polonius honest
he

picked out often thousand.” But, for Hamlet,

his attack

to report flatly his

is

him of

would be

this is not a subject for raillery,

a

and

soon grows more savage:
For

sun breed maggots in a dead dog,
being a good kissing carrion-Have you a daughter?’^®
if the

Let her not walk

F

th’ sun.

Conception

blessing, but as your daughter

look

We

are

a

conceive, friend,

to’t.’^'

reminded of the dead king-Hyperion, God of Day-and the “dead dog” can only

be Ophelia’s mother. From
recall the

two

may

is

this disgusting union,

“cankered rose” that

lines therefore constitute a

Ophelia “loosed”
his revelation

may be

is

Ophelia. But the “sun”

warning

at risk,

Hamlet envisions “maggots” and we

that plays

is

also the “son” and the second

ambiguously with Polonius’s

not only from Hamlet’s sexual advances but also from

of her true parentage.

The scorn and abuse Hamlet heaps upon Polonius throughout
an interpretive challenge, yet
a conspiracy

fears.

it

makes

perfect sense if we consider Polonius to be part of

whose corrupting influence has reached out

issue of Polonius and his daughter

Hamlet,

Il.ii.

is

a recurring theme.

141-42.

'^''Hamlet, Il.ii.l 81-82.

Hamlet,

Il.ii.l

the play has posed

84-85.
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to

engulf Hamlet himself The

“You do

not understand yourself

so clearly /As

it

behooves

my daughter and

forbids her relationship with Hamlet.

And

suspicion that Hamlet’s love for Ophelia

announce the

arrival

as they

of the

meet

the

main cause of his madness, he begins

mine

is

.

in the lobby.

“Have you a daughter?”

.

And when

Polonius comes to

Hamlet resumes the game of cat-and-mouse:

actors,

Ham.

he warns Ophelia as he

confronting the king and queen with his

is

coyly, “I have a daughter-have while she

Hamlet taunts Polonius

your honor,

0 Jephthah, judge of Israel, what a treasure
hadst thou!

Pol.

What

Ham.

Why-

a treasure

had he,

my

lord?

“One fair daughter, and no more.
The which he loved passing well.”
Pol.

[Aside]

Ham.

Am

Pol.

If you call

I

on

Still

not

r

th’ right,

Nay,

old Jephthah?

me Jephthah, my

daughter that

Ham.

my daughter.

I

lord,

I

have a

love passing well.

that follows not.

In these lines, the daughter as “treasure” echoes the king’s “treasure extorted from the

womb

of earth” and the story of Jephthah

is

that

of a daughter sacrificed

the state. Again, in the loaded bantering before the

himself acted once while

at the university: “I

dumb show,

to the

welfare of

Polonius admits that he

did enact Julius Caesar.

I

was

kill’d

I’

th’

Capitol; Brutus kill’d me.” Hamlet’s punning reply expresses the grossest contempt: “It

'^^Hamlet, I,iii.96-97.

Hamlet,

II.ii.106.
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was a

brute part of him to

so capital a calf there."'^-* Polonius

kill

immature, contrasted to the potency of Bull Jove,'”
the god
ravager of Europa. And, significantly,

was seated on

this

brow: /Hyperion’s

girl

make

the ‘‘calf’, sexually

in his manifestation

of

be told of King Hamlet, “See what a grace

curls, the front

This interpretation also helps to
Ophelia, the

we will

is

of Jove himself.

.

sense of Hamlet’s changed relationship to

he has courted “in honorable fashion” offering
“almost

all

the holy

of heaven.”'^' From the moment of the encounter with
his father’s Ghost, Hamlet

by contradictions which defy

integration. His father’s accusations against

Claudius, his confession of his

own

sins, his

is

vows

tom

Gertmde and

charge to his son—

Let not the royal bed of Denmark be
A couch for luxury and damned incest

—followed by

his injunction

mother aught

Taint not thy mind, nor

let

thy soul contrive/ Against thy

leave Hamlet in a state of bewilderment and apprehension that he, too,

has been warned against incest, a fear that will be echoed in the gossip about the
child
actors.

When

Rosencrantz

Hamlet,

tells

Hamlet about the group of child

actors that have taken

III.ii.98- 106.

A Literafj & Psychological Essay
and a Comprehensive Glossary, revised edition (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc.,
1969), 73. Patridge quotes the following lines from Much Ado About Nothing: “Bull
'^^See Eric Partridge,

Jove,

sir,

Shakespeare ’s Bawdy:

had an amiable low, /And some strange

calf in that

same noble

feat

/Much

like to you, for

^^^Hamlet, III.iv.56.

Hamlet,

I.iii.l

14.

'^^Hamlet, I.v.82-83.

^^‘^Hamlet,

I.

v.

85-86.
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bull leapt your father’s

you have just

cow, /And got a

his bleat” (V.iv.48-51).

London by stonn, “

an aery of children,

eyases, that cry out on the top of

little

question, and are most tyrannically
clapp’d for’t.”

Hamlet

asks:

children? Who maintains ‘em? How
are they escoted*?
Will they pursue the quality no longer
than they can sing?
Will they not say afterwards, if they
should
to

common

players (as

[no] better), their writers

own

against their

succession?'^'

Hamlet’s perusal of Ophelia’s face
incest

which

festers in

grow themselves
like], if their means are
do them wrong to make them exclaim
[most

it is

m ILi.84-93

has confirmed his

own

implication

Denmark, and each subsequent encounter with her only

the mixture of grief and disgust

which has corrupted the purity of his former

ability to act is paralyzed, not only

by

the Oedipal prohibitions

m the

intensifies

love.

His

which Jones has so

convincingly demonstrated, but also by the

fact that his

Oedipal tangle by finding a love of his

own

is

thwarted by the disastrous results of his

father’s philandering. His love for Ophelia

is

forbidden by the same prohibition against

incest as

is

his love for his mother.

attempt to free himself from the

To punish Claudius

for the

same crime with which he

accuses himself would put him in the position of the child actors whose
writers do them

wrong

“to

make them exclaim

against their

own

succession.”

Hamlet’s encounters with Ophelia, which,

been so

difficult to interpret,

emotional confusion of one

like his

can also be understood

who

learns he has

contempt for Polonius, have

in the light

been courting a

of the moral and

sibling.

where Polonius “looses”

his daughter to Hamlet’s attentions while he

from behind the

Hamlet’s

arras,

first

words

are,

Hamlet, II.ii.339-41
‘^‘//a/;2/e/II.ii. 345-51

ll.ii.

163-64.
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“But

soft

In the

meeting

and the king spy

you now,/The

fair

Ophelia.

Nymph,

“Remember me,” and
to

my

in thy orisons/Be all

remember

are the

by

sins

the sins of his father and

When

as confession.

it

which now,

ironically, can

be

she attempts to return the tokens of
love he has

was not he who gave them

to her, “I

never gave you

Like the fragmented world of Denmark,
Hamlet’s self is fragmented as well:

the lover he

but

the king’s plea to

give voice to a contradictory desire.
Surely, the “sins” he asks her

given her, he refuses them, saying
aught.

They echo

moments of love they once shared-moments
of ecstasy which have

been transformed into

remembered only

sins remembered.”'^'

when

was has been replaced by

she replies, “Indeed

“You should

right to intimacy,

old stock but

we

my

This metaphor

is

lord,

you made

I

me

you once,” he admits,

believe so,” he

is

set

of images which runs throughout the

play connecting the Ghost of the dead king, Ophelia, and
Hamlet in a
their true relationship. In the lines above,

we

[inoculate] our old stock but

the Ghost of the

way

Hamlet

shall relish

tells

All

a

that hints at

of it.” This

calls to

mind

the description

by

the poison poured into his ear affected his body, curdling the blood,

most

instant tetter bark’d about

with vile and loathsome crust
smooth body."^

lazar-like,

my

'^^Hamlet,

Ill.i. 87-89.

^^^Hamlet,

III. i. 95.

Hamlet,

way

Ophelia “for virtue cannot

“like eager droppings into milk,”

And
And

quick to deny their

lov’d you not.”"'

of an interesting

part

“I did love

is.

not have believ’d me, for virtue cannot so
[inoculate] our

of it.

shall relish

the brother he

Ill.i.1

14-1

8.

'^^Hamlet, I.v.65-73.
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This image of the king’s body, tree-like,
“bark’d about” with corruption

Hamlet’s

comment

bitter

to his sister that virtue

viciousness from which they both spring.

cannot be grafted on to the old stock
of

And Hamlet,

“the rose of the fair state”

blasted with ecstasy” echoes the description
of Ophelia as

cankered infant of spring. Claudius speaks

to

“You speak

like a green girl.”'^*

“The Rose of May,”

Hamlet of the dead king, “Though

Hamlet our dear brother’s death/The memory be
green
Ophelia,

ties neatly to

.

now

the

yet of

while Polonious warns

.

Similarly, Laertes’ description of Hamlet
as

a violet in the youth of primy nature”'^^ will be
echoed in his speech over Ophelia’s
grave:

Lay her

And from

her

May violets
In a similar

Hamlet

s

is

I’

th’ earth.

and unpolluted flesh

spring!

way, Ophelia’s language of distress

hand takes a strange form

undercurrent.

she

fair

When

in

after the death

of Polonius

which the question of her parentage

Gertrude refuses to meet with Ophelia

who

.

.

.

speaks

much of her
I’

th’

Spurns enviously

at

father, says she hears

world, and hems, and beats her heart.
straws, speaks things in doubt

That carry but half sense.

Hamlet,

I.ii.1-2.

Hamlet,

I.iii.lOl.

^^‘^Hamlet, I.iii.7

'^^Hamlet, V.i.238-40.

Hamlet, lIl.v.3-13.
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a subtle

has been locked away,

informed that Ophelia,

There’s tricks

is

at

Horatio warns the queen, “‘Twere good
she were spoken with, for she

/Dangerous conjectures

in ill-breeding minds.”'^^

Gertrude’s presence, playing a

Hamlet’s mystery
to the quick

How

one

IS

in a

way

make a

that

we

difference,

should

(i.e.,

Ophelia

is

strew,

finally admitted into

begin to suspect that she has sounded the
heart of

Rosencrantz could

“How

of the matter,
to

lute,

When

may

I

not.''’^

your true-love

to differentiate)

up the cast of the play given the many roles

that

Her question

know from

among

to the

queen goes

another one?”'^^

the characters

each character has assumed

who make
in the

construction of this false world. Not only Hamlet in
his “antic madness,’’ but each of the
others plays a double

corruption

game

inextricably

is

much

himself

which

their true selves hide

behind a public facade and

mixed with the visage of piety. The Ghost asks

vengeance but comes from
too

in

hell.

Polonius confesses,

“We

are oft to

prov’d-that with devotion’s visage and pious action
to

blame

we do

for holy

in this-’Tis

sugar o’er the devil

which Claudius quietly concurs:
O,

How

‘tis

too true.

smart a lash that speech does give

my

conscience!

^‘^^Hamlet, IV.v.14-15.

'^^Hamlet, III. ii. 349-72. When Guildenstem attempts to pry into the cause of
Hamlet’s distemper, Hamlet asks him to play upon a recorder. Guildenstem admits he
cannot play the instmment, and Hamlet asks angrily:

Why

look you

now how unworthy

you make of me! You would
play upon me, you would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out
the heart of my mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to [the
top of] my compass; and there is much music, excellent voice in this little
organ, yet cannot you make it speak. “Sblood, do you think I am easier to be
play’d on than a pipe? Call me what instrument you will, though you can fret
me, [yet} you cannot play upon me.
a thing

^‘^‘^Hamlet, I.ii.v.23-24.

'^^Hamlet,

III.

i.45-48.
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The
Is

harlot s cheek, beautied with plast’ring
art,
more ugly to the thing that helps it

not

Than

my deed

is

to

my

Rosencrantz and Guildenstem come
willing accomplices to murder.

confesses,

“Thou

in the guise

When

[my eyes

turns

most painted

into

of friends, but play the part of spies and

forced by Hamlet to confront her perfidy,
Gertrude

my very]

grained spots/As will [not] leave their

word.'**^

soul,/And there

tinct.”'^'

I

Hamlet himself,

see such black and

in his earlier

encounter

with Ophelia, has warned:
I am myself indifferent honest,
but yet could accuse
me of such things that it were better my mother
had not borne me: I am very proud, revengeful, ambitious,
with more offenses at my beck than I have thoughts to put
I

them
in.

imagination to give them shape, or time to act them
fellows as I do crawling between earth

in,

What should such

and heaven?
In this

world of lies and duplicity, there

subjectivities,

own

We are arrant knaves, believe none of us.'"**

no way

separate identity.

to build a

is

common

no

world of shared

The only commonality

meeting place for individual

reality

available

and values which preserves one’s
is

to

merge oneself into another’s

fantasy or the prevailing “family fiction,” and by doing so to lose both one’s self and

one’s

own

contribution to the construction of a shared reality.

where others have refused
community,

to

to

do so

is

simply

To make a

difference

to put oneself outside the pale

of human

be “crazy.”

'""^Hamlet, III.i.49-52.

Hamlet,

Ill.iv.

89-91.

would argue

which weigh so heavily on
manner of his father and
incest in the manner of his mother. His entanglement in this perfidious world rings in the
line, “Believe none of us.” And the arrant knave wandering between heaven and earth
serves to connect Hamlet to the split image of his father as both Hyperion and a demon
^^^Hamlet,

Ill.i.

120-29.

I

that the sins

Hamlet’s imagination are his fear of repeating a seduction

from

hell.
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in the

Ophelia then sings of Polonius' death
and
totally inappropriate to his status
at eourt.

muses “the owl was

we may

be.”'*

is

we know what we

With these words, we are reminded of
Polonius’
it

behooves

own

establish one’s

s

is

no way

identity. Ophelia’s next lines describing
the

chamber and

lost

in a

are, but

know

not what

earlier warning,

in

way

telling note as she

my daughter and

the identity of everyone else in
question, there

young man

done “hugger-mugger”

But her lament sounds a

a baker’s daughter. Lord,

do not understand yourself so clearly as
only

burial,

“You

your honor.” Not

such a false world

to

maid who entered the

her maidenhood forever echo the lines in
the opening

scenes about the crowing cock, the rising sun,
and the illegitimate birth which followed:

“Young men

By Cock,
“Quoth

will

do

‘t

if

they

come

she, ‘Before

You promised me

you tumbled me.

to wed.’”‘^°

(He answers.)
“So would I ‘a’ done, by yonder

And
Ophelia

madness which

among

to’t.

they are to blame.

thou hadst not

come

to

sun.

my bed.”’^’

s

growing understanding of who she

is

her final undoing. In her next appearance she interrupts a confrontation

Gertrude, Claudius, and her brother Laertes

is

leads her inexorably into the

who

has just rushed baek to Denmark

bent on vengeance upon hearing of his father’s death. After another lament over
a funeral

which could be

that

of King Hamlet or of Polonius, she urges:

IV. v. 42-44.

Hamlet, IV.v.60-61.
'^'Hamlet, IV.v.65-66.
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You must
call

sing, “A-down, a-down,” and
you
him a-down-a. O how the wheel becomes

It is

it!

the false steward, that stole his master’s
daughter.

Laertes response, “This nothing’s

more than

matter”’^^

precisely true, for the false

is

steward has stolen his master’s daughter. Ophelia’s
reference to the wheel resonates with
that

of Guildenstem

who

explains the reason that protection must be
accorded to

kingship:

The cess of majesty
Dies not alone, but like a gulf doth draw
What’s near with it. Or it is a massy wheel
Fix’d on the summit of the highest mount
[huge] spokes ten thousand lesser things
Are mortis’d and adjoin’d, which when it falls.

To whose

Each small annexment, petty consequence.
Attends the boist’rous

The

fall

of the great wheel of kingship has indeed brought about general

king’s unacknowledged daughter

been destroyed

in

is

ruin,

one of the “ten thousand lesser things”

in the

“language of flowers” to

pansies, that’s for thoughts.

response,

plea,

“A document

We

“Nymph,
in

are

'^^Hamlet,

in thy orizons,

III.iii.174.

Ill.iii.

Ill.iii.

be

all

my sins

madness, thoughts and remembrance

15-22.

Hamlet, IV.v. 175-77.
'^^Hamlet,

have

now

And

sees

there’s

reminded of the Ghost’s command, “Remember

Hamlet, IV.v.171-73.
Hamlet,

that

state the truth as she

“There’s rosemary, that’s for remembrance;/pray you, love, remember.

me” and Hamlet’s

and the

Denmark.

Ophelia continues

it:

[ruin].

178-79.
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rememb’red.” Laertes’
fitted”'^^ aptly describes

the situation. In

spaee, no place

Denmark,

where

to

remember and

subjectivities

to think is to

may meet and

rue for you, and/ here’s

wear your rue with a
wither’d

all

The

and ingratitude; and

flattery

some

for

me; we may

call

difference. /There’s a daisy.

when my

common

is

both, but Gertrude’s

to Gertrude, she offers, “There’s

a’

Sundays.

would give you some

may wear

You may

violets, but they

hers “with a difference.”

the result of King Hamlet’s unfaithfulness has given

reasons for sorrow and repentance-Ophelia has

now

lost

two

Gertrude has enforced the family secrets to her

own

Riverside Shakespeare points out, difference

also a term

variation in a coat of arms

made

is

fathers

from heraldry meaning “a

members of a

own unacknowledged

young Hamlet

is

violets, but they

withered

family.

relationship with the family of

all

also a casualty in this disaster.

when my

The

final bitter

father died,” reminds

He who was once

Hamlet, IV.v. 180-81.
Hamlet, IV.v. 181-86.

The Riverside Shakespeare,

p.

1174, noiesio Hamlet, IV.v. 180-84.
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different

and her lover while

the dead king and offers a daisy-symbol of dissembling-to the queen.

would give you some

them

The

downfall. But, as the editor of the

to distinguish different

Ophelia thus makes a point of her

us that the

reality.

father died.”'^*

worn by

tangled ruin which

line, “I

memory

and columbines”'^’

herb of grace/

it

I

no potential

symbol of sorrow and repentance, Ophelia divides between herself and

rue,

Gertrude, to be

to face a

to Claudius, she adds, “There’s fennel for
you,

symbolizing respectively

is

enrich one another, for every

and thought are met with forgetfulness and the refusal
Turning

be mad. There

a “violet in

the youth of primy nature” has withered
with their father's death, and

way

to

is

even

now on

his

England and execution.
In

imagery

Act V, Scene

1

Ophelia meets her

own

that has lead us to associate her with the

death, and

dead

it

is

in

keeping with the

king'.

There

is a willow grows askaunt the brook,
That shows his hoary leaves in the glassy stream.
Therewith fantastic garlands did she make

Of crow-flowers, nettles, daisies, and long purples
That liberal shepherds give a grosser name
But our cull-cold maids do dead men’s fingers call them.
There on the pendant boughs her crownet weeds
Clamb’ring to hang, an envious sliver broke.

When down
Fell in the

her

weedy

trophies and herself

weeping brook.

In a figurative attempt to patch together a coherent life history,
Ophelia has

“crownet” which she attempts

to

hang upon a willow. But,

like the

is

refused even this symbolic link to the father

instead, while she

is

trying to

who

a

dead king, “bark’d

about” in corruption, the “vicious stock” from which she sprang, the willow

She

made

lets

her

fall.

should have supported her;

hang her crown upon the tree-to

act out

what cannot be

said— an “envious sliver” breaks, dropping her into the river where she slowly drowns,
pulled from “her melodious lay to

muddy

death.”'^'

Gertrude, relating the incident,

describes the flowers in Ophelia’s crown in a series of coarsening images which give

expression to her unacknowledged understanding of the significance of Ophelia’s

Wild orchids become “long purples” or “dead men’s fingers” which

act.

“liberal shepherds

give a grosser name.” In this semantic slide, Gertrude begins with the purple of royalty

and ends

in a

crude sexual joke, obliquely expressing the anger she cannot consciously

'^^Hamlet, V.i. 166-175.

Hamlet,

V.i. 182-83.
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admit. G. Blakemore Evans

tells

us that the meaning of King Claudius’
enigmatic

epitaph, “This grave shall have a living
monument”'^^ remains in doubt.

monument

that the living

maimed

offers

and introduce a moment of healing

full circle

into a play

which her

would bring

the

which otherwise

no such anodyne.

The preceding
created

by

this play.

in the creation

enact Hamlet

exist, that

s

if

dead king— and

it

is

of reasoning

Shakespeare

is

but one entrance into the potential space

invites, in fact, requires us to

It is

become

the play’s ability to pull us in, to

full participants

demand

that

we

re-

search for the solid ground of an honorable path where none seems to
this

we
I

realize that

tellingly,

line

of its meaning.

makes

Furthermore,

must

would argue

will be a tree to take the place of a proper
headstone

rites”‘®^-and her questionable origins-will not allow.
This

symbolism

I

tragedy the great work of literature

it

is

acknowledged

are to entertain the fantasy of Ophelia’s relationship to

to be.

Hamlet and the

believe the play gives such a fantasy overwhelming support— then

Hamlet

is

we

about more than the prohibition against incest. More

about the absence of a communal confirmation of one’s

own

perceptions,

without which there can be no ground for meaningful action.

Though Hamlet continuously urges himself to vengeance,
mouthing an
after

introjected

command

that

it

is

as though he

is

he has not truly assimilated as his own. Time

time we, as readers and theater audience, are lead to question the morality and

judgement of those who
strength in arms leads

are able to act with unthinking violence. Fortinbras,

him

to risk

whose

twenty thousand lives for a plot of land not large

^^^Hamlet, V.i.297.

Hamlet, V.i.219.
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enough

to

bury those

who

will die taking

it,

is

hardly an example to emulate, despite

Hamlet’s attempt to convince himself otherwise.
rushes

home

to take

Similarly, Laertes, Polonius’ son

revenge upon his father’s murderer and

indiscriminately even before he

knows who

is

is

ready to

who

kill

responsible and ready to engage in any

treachery to accomplish his goal, surely cannot
provide the pattern for what Hamlet

should have done.
Perhaps the most damning expression of the butchery

descend

lies in

the recital of Aeneas’ tale to Dido,

players’ arrival. This

is

a tale told

to

which revenge can

which Hamlet requests upon

by another young man who has met

the

his father in the

underworld, and, significantly, our sympathies (as well as those of Aeneas and
Hamlet)
are with the

embodied

aged Priam

who

in these lines that

falls

under Pyrrhus’s devastating blows. In the sheer horror

Hamlet

recites

from memory, we see the “rub” which makes

revenge so alien to his inclination:

“The rugged Pyrrhus, he whose sable arms.
Black as his purpose, did the night resemble
When he lay couched in th’ ominous horse.

Hath now this dread and black complexion smear’d
With Heraldy more dismal; head to foot

Now

in total gules, horridly trick’d

With blood of fathers, mothers, daughters, sons
Bak’d and impasted with the parching streets.
That lend a tyrannous and a damned

To

their lord’s murder.

And

Roasted

in

light

wrath and

thus o’er-sized with coagulate gore.

With eyes like carbuncles, the
Old grandsire Priam seeks.

hellish Pyrrhus

'^^Hamlet, III.iv.1-66.

II.ii.452-64.
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fire.

The continuation of the speech, taken up by

the player only deepens the horror at the

death of the old King:

“Anon he finds him
Striking too short at Greeks. His antique sword,
Rebellious to his arm,

Repugnant
Pyrrhus

at

to

where

lies

it

falls.

command. Unequal match’d,

Priam drives,

But, with the whiff and

Th’ unnerved father

in

rage strikes wide.

wind of his

falls.

fell sword
[Then senseless Illium,]

Seeming

to feel his blow, with flaming top
Stoops to his base, and with a hideous crash

Takes prisoner Pyrrhus’

ear; for lo his

sword.

Which was

declining on the milky head

Of reverent

Priam, seem’d

th’ air to stick,

I’

[And,] like a neutral to his will and matter.
Did nothing.

But as

A

we

often see, against

some

stomi,

silence in the heavens, the rack standstill.

As hush

as death, anon the dreadful thunder
Doth rend the region; so after Pyrrhus’ pause,
A roused vengeance sets him new a-work.

And never did the Cyclops’ hammers fall
On Mars’ armor forg’d for proof eteme
With

Now

remorse than Pyrrhus’ bleeding sword
falls on Priam.
less

Out, out, thou strumpet Fortune! All you gods.

synod take away her power!
Break all the spokes and [fellies] from her wheel
And bowl the round nave down the hill of heaven
As low as to the fiends!’’
In general

While these

lines

make

clear Hamlet’s confusion— his identification with the

“hellish” Pyrrhus, black with blood, and his simultaneous

grandsire Priam, there

is

more

at

sympathy

for the “reverent”

stake here than personal emotion. These lines present a

powerful reflection on the nature of revenge— its boundlessness which reaches out
include “fathers, mothers, daughters, sons” and eventually whole kingdoms-and

on the avenger. The “hellish” Pyrrhus, drenched
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in blood,

is,

in the end, little

to

its

effect

more than

a

toy of fortune and a murderer.
limit

One of the

of free action and the extent

fortune

is

to

great questions introduced in this play

which we

are simply

is

the

pawns of fortune. The wheel of

a constant counter to the wheel of kingship. In
the “play within the play”

we

hear this puzzle stated explicitly:

For

a question

‘tis

us yet to prove

left

Whether love lead fortune or
Or, put another

devices

still

way

a few lines later,

and

fates

do so contrary run/That our

none of our own.”'^’ Even

actor cannot anticipate the consequences of his or her actions, and

free

so free choice can only act blindly.

its

wills

are overthrown,/Our thoughts are ours, their ends

the supposedly

destroys

“Our

else fortune love.'^*^

The consideration introduced here

is

that

revenge

agent while setting in motion disastrous and unforeseen consequences that

it

cannot control.

I

would argue

the question of why

that instead

Hamlet

of being a revenge play which demands an answer

to

do the bidding of his father’s Ghost, Hamlet

is

hesitates to

Shakespeare’s meditation on the

futility

of revenge, and the play

fully explored the topic within the confines

only

in

way

to fix

what’s wrong

which each person’s

in

“truth”

adding to the pile of corpses

in

Denmark

becomes

is

not over until he has

of an intense and convoluted matrix. The

is

to recomiect

part of a

language with a shared

reality

commonly recognized whole. Merely

an attempt to take control of the narrative cannot be the

solution to this play’s mystery. Such simple killing

"’"’//awH III.ii.202-03.

Hamlet, IIl.ii.210-12.
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is

no more than Hamlet himself calls

It,

“mere

of justice

hire

and salary,” and not the resolution

in a corrupt

There

is

a second set of images that guide the

the original catastrophe.

by Marcellus’ bird

of the establishment

world.

alive with references to birds.

call

There

Hamlet

is

is,

meaning of the

play.

Hamlet

is

of course, the crowing of the cock which signals

recalled from his meeting with the Ghost of his father

which he mockingly

Polonius

returns.

Hamlet’s holy vows of love are “mere springes
to the

to the great question

to catch

tells

Ophelia that

woodcocks,”'^® and

later reports

king and queen:

But what might you think.
this hot love on the wing-perceived it (I must tell you that)

When
As

I

I

my daughter told me- What might you

Before

Or
If

my

had seen

dear Majesty your queen here, think.

had play’d the desk or table-book.

I

Or given my heart a [winking,] mute and dumb
Or look’d upon this love with idle sight.
What might you think?’’'
Hamlet wryly

tells

Rosencrantz and Guildenstem that he will save them from their

dilemma of either

lying or betraying their mission from the king and queen, “I will

you why, so

my anticipation prevent your discovery,

shall

'^*See Erik H. Erikson, “Youth: Fidelity

and your secrecy

and Diversity,” Daedalus,

to the

XCI

tell

King

(1962), 5-

by Norman N. Holland: “He [Hamlet] becomes, for example, the
furious avenger his better ethical sense would not tolerate. He endorses a bellicose

27, as paraphrased

Fortinbras utterly alien to his
for fidelity, dies.

The

rites

own complex,

of war that are

to

rich self,

and the true adolescent, searching

speak for him are false and inadequate.

‘Thus do inner reality and historical actuality conspire
identity for

to

deny

tragic

man

the positive

which he seems exquisitely Q\\osQX\"\Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare,

'^''Hamlet,

I. v.

115-16.

Hamlet,

I.iii.ll5.

Hamlet,

Il.ii.

134-39.
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175).

and Queen moult no
players,

feather.”'^^

an aery of children,

When

north-north-west.

Later,

“We’ll e’en

ambiguous

when

wind

eyases,”'^^

is

and he warns Guildenstem,

southerly

talking to the players,

to’t like

tale,

the

little

I

know

a

Hamlet asks

[French] falc’ners-fly

at

any thing

hawk from

for

we

“1

am but mad

a hand-saw.”'

Aeneas’ speech

to

Dido:

see;”"' and, after the gory,

he berates himself with words which do not adequately

reflect the

confusion of emotion that assails him:

But

I

am

pigeon-liver’d and lack gall

To make oppression
I

should

With

‘a’ fatted all

bitter,

or ere this

the region kites

this slave’s offal.

Claudius says of Hamlet, “There’s something

on brood,/And

I

in his soul/O’er

which

his

melancholy

do doubt the hatch and the disclose/Will be some danger

.

.

sits

Hamlet

confirms Claudius’ fears with yet another bird image when Claudius asks before the play
within the play,

“How

fares our cousin Hamlet?”'^*

The

prince’s reply contains a subtle

threat:

^^^Hamlet, II.ii.293-95.

II.ii.339.

II. ii.

and hand-saw refer

378-79.

As

the Riverside editor tells us in note 379, both

to birds if you accept

handsaw

preyed upon by hawks.
^'^^Hamlet, II.ii.429-30.

'’’^Hamlet, II.ii.477-80.

Hamlet,

Ill.i.

164-67.

^^^Hamlet, III.ii.93.
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as a play

hawk

on hernshaw, a kind of heron

Excellent,

Though

faith,

I’

eat the air,

I

the king

may

Hamlet warns him

treat

that

of the chameleon’s dish:

promise-cramm’d-you cannot feed capons

him

so.'^^

as a harmless sexual neuter, fattened to be
devoured,

he does so

at

some

Later he will urge the players to begin

peril.

the play within the play with yet another reference
to birds:

Begin,
murtherer, leave thy damnable faces and begin.
the croaking raven doth bellow for revenge.'**^

Only minutes

Hamlet

after the play,

is

calling Claudius a “‘very, very’-pajock”'*'

Claudius, too, compares himself to a trapped bird
struggling to be free/ Art

more

In each case, the bird

imagery implies

which signals what

culminates in the scene

“What

shall

I

do she

Not

is

is

this,

prays:

“O

limed soul, that

threat,

entrapment, manipulation, or the

It is

as

though there

is

a “private

never straight- forwardly spoken. This imagery

when Hamlet

confronts his mother in her

bedroom

His sarcastic answer pulls together

asks?’’’*^

and demonstrates she

when he

and

engag’d!”'*^

refusal to be threatened, trapped, or manipulated.

language’’

Come,

more than an innocent victim
by no means,

that

in this

all

after the play.

of the bird imagery

diseased scenario:

bid you do:

I

Let the bloat king tempt you again to bed.

Pinch wanton on your cheek,

Hamlet,

call

you

his

mouse.

III.ii.94-95.

III.ii.252-54.

Hamlet,
attributed

many

See Evans

III. ii. 284.

in note 284,

“The

natural history of the time

vicious qualities to the peacock.’’

'^^Hamlet

III. ii. 68-69.

substance used for catching

See note 68, “limed: caught

birds.)’’

Hamlet, III.iv.l80.
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(as in birdlime, a sticky

And let him,
Make you to
That

1

for a pair

of reechy kisses,

ravel all this matter out.
essentially am not in madness.

mad in craft. Twere good you let him know.
who that s but a queen, fair, sober, wise.
Would from a paddock, from a bat, a gib.

But
For

Such dear concemings hide? Who would do so?
No, in despite of sense and secrecy.

Unpeg

the basket on the house’s top.

Let the birds

To

fly,

and

like the

famous ape.

conclusion in the basket creep.
break your own neck down.’***

try

And

This dense passage pulls together a number of themes
which help to reinforce
Gertrude’s role in the behind-the-scenes manipulation of
the play’s action, and her
stranglehold on the family secrets which have so disastrously
unraveled. She has

destroyed not only the

birds

she attempts to control, but, as the plot plays out, she will

indeed, like the “famous ape,’’ “break her

own neck down.”

Furthermore, the comparison of Gertrude to an ape corresponds to Hamlet’s
reference to Claudius as an ape

Guildenstem

in his

jaw

“imperial jointress”

to

who

be

who

“first

keeps his servile courtiers Rosencrantz and

mouthed

.

.

.

last

swallowed.”'*^ Gertrude

holds the rotten world of Denmark together.'*^ She

the

is

is

tied to the

former King Hamlet, the present King Claudius, and the meddlesome advisor Polonius,
a series

of animal images which compare them variously

apes; and she controls the birds

^^^Hamlet,

Ill.iv.

who

to

moles,

rats, bats, toads,

are helpless, trapped, and manipulated.

As

in

and

the

181-96.

^^^Hamlet, IV.ii. 14-19.

'^‘’When bidding his mother farewell as he
is

is

about to embark for England, Hamlet

chided by Claudius for not including his “loving father.” Hamlet’s response upsets the

accepted hierarchy and shows that he knows where ultimate power
father

and mother

is

man and

wife,

man and

wife

lll.iii.49-53.
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is

one flesh,— so,

lies:

my

“My

mother;

mother.” Hamlet,

enforcer of the family ideology, she

is

also at the heart

of the breakdown of the

connection between language and reality-a
breakdown vividly portrayed by the young
“chough”'*’ Osric,

who

invites

Hamlet

to the duel with Laertes, in such
tortured,

convoluted language that the linguistic
posturing can barely be deciphered.
If we

Gertrude that

were

to think

we come

which Freud describes
There

of the play

to the “navel”

in

terms of Freud’s dream theory,

of the play, analogous

it

would be

to the place in the

in

dream

as follows:

often a passage in even the most thoroughly
interpreted dream which has to be left obscure’
is

this

is

because

we become aware

during the work of

interpretation that at that point there is a tangle
of
dream-thoughts which cannot be unraveled ....
This is the dream’s navel, the spot dream-thoughts

which we are

led

by

interpretation cannot,

to

from the

nature of things, have any definite endings; they are
to branch out in every direction into the intricate

bound

network of our world of thought.
this

meshwork

grows up,
Freud’s language

is

is

like a

uncannily

mushroom

rises

apt.

In all

point where

dream-wish

of this play’s images of rotting vegetation

up from the decay. While

role in the travesty of a world

some

out of its mycelium.’**

(which Holland has so carefully documented),

where a fungus

It is at

particularly close that the

it

is fitting

we

that

we

find a central place

can never be sure of Gertrude’s precise

which Denmark has become, we

are constantly aware of

her brooding presence as the pivotal point around which the rest of the action revolves.
is

her adultery and over-hasty marriage which has set Claudius upon the throne that

should have been, her son’s.

husband,

first

by refusing

We can only speculate that she has taken revenge upon her

to allow

him

to

acknowledge

his daughter,

^^^Hamlet, V.ii.87.

’**Freud,

The Interpretation of Dreams, SE IV, 525
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and then by

It

enforcing the family ideology which
claimed Ophelia was Polonius’ child.
That she has

betrayed her husband before his death
and perhaps manipulated Claudius, that
“limed
soul struggling to be free” to do the
actual

She herself acknowledges her

my sick

To

murder

soul, as sin’s true nature

spills itself in fearing to

And when Hamlet

not beyond reasonable speculation.

guilt in her refusal to see the

Each toy seems prologue to some
So full of artless jealousy is guilt.
It

is

be

mad

Ophelia:

is.

great amiss.

spilt.

forces her to see the “black and [grained]”
spots within her soul in

their encounter in her

bedroom

after the play, accusing her of.

Such an act
That blurs the grace and blush of modesty,
Calls virtue hypocrite, takes off the rose
From the fair forehead of an innocent love

And

makes marriage vows
As false as dicers’ oaths. Oh, such an act
As from the body of contraction plucks
The very soul, and sweet religion makes
sets a blister there,

A rhapsody of words
he

ties

her perfidy to the blasted roses that he and Ophelia have become. The

of this accusation echo Act
“almost

all

the holy

Do

I,

Scene

3 in

which Hamlet’s courting of Ophelia with

vows of heaven” has prompted Polonius

not believe his vows, for they are brokers.

Not of that dye which their investments show.
But mere [implorators ] of unholy suits.
Breathing like sanctified and pious bonds.

The

better to beguile.

Hamlet, IV.v. 17-20.
''^^Hamlet, III.iv.40-48.

Hamlet,

I.iii.

126-3

final lines

1
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to

warn

her:

It

is

not only his father’s sins that have
tainted Hamlet, but his mother’s
as well. Gertrude

made

has

a

moekery of law and

Ophelia that Hamlet was about

When
claims that

it

religion in precisely the

that Polonius

warned

to do.

the Ghost appears to

is

same way

Hamlet

in his

mother’s room, she does not see

madness which prompts her son’s

psychic denial which Hamlet will not

vision. This

is

it,

and

an instance of her

pass!

let

Mother, for the love of grace,

Lay not

that flattering unction to thy sin;

That not your trespass but

my madness

speaks.

will but skin

and film the ulcerous place.
While rank corruption, mining all within.
It

Infects unseen.

This “rank corruption, mining
pioneer

the

all

within” reminds us of the Ghost, the “worthy

[miner] undermining the ground beneath Hamlet’s

It is

in

Gertrude that

“massy wheel” of kingship and the wheel of strumpet fortune merge

in

mad

destruction. In short,

unravels

somewhere

all

roads lead to Gertrude, but only as strands in a knot that

else.

She

is

perhaps the only character in the play

exact perfect revenge, and in the end
less

we

who

is

able to

see the disastrous results of her actions are no

bloody than Pyrrhus’s slaughter of Priam.

Although the play
of the defenses

it

is

subjectivities

of values, and, ultimately, a

it

is

that

laden with Oedipal overtones and must be analyzed in terms

employs, Hamlet derives

what happens when

why

feet.

its

ultimate

do not meet

common

Hamlet has captivated

power from

to create a

common

its

examination of

history, a

common

set

world. With such a bleak theme, one might wonder

theater goers for close to four hundred years.

'''^Hamlet, Ill.iv. 144-49.

'''^Hamlet, I.v.162.
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I

believe

all

it

is

the contradiction between what the play
depicts and what

entranced. For

Hamlet provides

seductive rhythm and musicality of
justice

for us exactly

its

language,

and revenge which must concern us

its

all, its

and what the limits of freely chosen human action

where we become

part of the great dialogue

what

it

denies to

its

does that holds us

characters.

The

meditation on the great themes of

examination of what

it is

to

be human

are, invite us into a potential

which Shakespeare has

221

it

set in

space

motion.
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